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Abstract 
 
This thesis examined the role that knowledges of ‘consumers’ played in the 
formulation of energy market regulation in Great Britain between 2000 and 2016. 
The thesis found, based on documentary analysis, elite interviews and process 
tracing and mapping, that during this period there was not equitable access to the 
procedures of retail energy market regulation. Such equitable access was 
undermined by three features. 
  
First, energy regulation was embedded in a complex policy system of interacting 
institutions and organisations. Second, there were resource inequalities between 
policy actors. Third, there was an inequality of respect for different knowledges - 
that is the ways of understanding people who use energy – within procedures of 
energy regulation. These three features resulted in preferential access to 
regulatory procedures for energy supply firms who had the resources to make the 
case to regulators with evidence of market engagement which was accepted as 
credible and relevant to regulatory decision making.  
 
Inequitable access to regulatory procedures meant a failure of energy regulation to 
meet the standards set in terms of regulatory legitimacy and energy justice – equal 
access for diverse voices. Preferential access of firms to regulatory processes 
undermines regulatory legitimacy and procedural justice. This analysis identifies 
the role of epistemic capture – capture by ideas – of market logics within economic 
regulation between 2000 and 2016. The repeated failures to incorporate diverse 
knowledges meant that successive market reforms failed to incorporate the 
nuanced understanding of people who use energy presented by diverse voices in 
regulatory procedures and visible in the regulators own research. The inability of 
the regulator to implement market reforms which incorporated ways of knowing 
people beyond deficit concepts of consumers led to a series of unfair outcomes in 
the energy market between 2000 and 2016 – unaffordable energy for some of the 
most vulnerable groups in society.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction    
 
“Pensioners found dead after gas was cut off over a £140 bill” was the stark 
headline carried by the Independent newspaper in December 2003 (Akbar 2003). 
The news across the UK expanded on the story: a couple in their eighties were 
found dead in their home three days before Christmas, after British Gas had 
disconnected their gas supply leaving them without any heating. Despite headlines 
in the press and questions in the House of Commons, no action was taken against 
British Gas (House of Commons Select Committee on Trade and Industry 2005). 
Despite the serious consequences, the gas bill had not been paid. No law or 
regulation had been breached in ceasing to supply gas to the home of Mr and Mrs 
Bates. Further, the case itself was not of sufficient concern to result in any changes 
in the law or in regulation to stop such a case occurring again (Ofgem 2005e). The 
scenario is, in fact, far from unique. The Independent newspaper noted that 
unaffordable energy bills had led to 15,000 deaths in 2014 (Independent 2015). 
Despite public concern as voiced in the press and continued pressure from elected 
representatives, the actions of energy suppliers in restricting access to necessary 
energy in the home remained unchanged by successive governments (National 
Energy Action and E3G 2018). Instead, in 2000, powers to restrict the actions of 
energy supply companies were given to an economic regulator, the Office of Gas 
and Electricity Markets (Ofgem). However, from its inception until the time of 
writing, death as a result of a lack of energy supply has not been the focus of the 
energy market regulator. As I go on to explain in this thesis, despite the deadly 
consequences of the actions of energy suppliers and the consistent concern of the 
public and their elected representatives, Ofgem’s predominant focus has been the 
efficient functioning of the market and promoting the message  that people in their 
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homes should engage with the market to secure low prices. As one participant in my 
research put it: 
“…through all the ups and downs, and to the current day, it is always ‘You can be 
an energy shopper’” (Participant Ad3, 2017). 
Access to energy to ensure a warm home is not a luxury but a necessity (United 
Nations 1996). As the above story shows, like other necessities required for life, 
restricted access to energy through limited income can lead not only to poor health 
but to premature death (National Energy Action 2019). The particular tragedy of Mr 
and Mrs Bates suggests that something had gone very wrong with the way that 
people are supplied with, purchase and consume energy in their homes in the UK, 
leading to many difficult questions. How and by whom are decisions actually made 
around energy supply, pricing, distribution and use? What role do different people 
and organisations play in this decision-making? What sorts of knowledge and 
evidence - and ways of gathering these – are employed in decision-making around 
energy supply, and how are these different sorts of knowledge viewed and 
deployed, and with what effect? Addressing these questions would generate a 
better understanding of what leads to people dying in their homes for lack of 
energy. Such understanding also requires understanding the procedures of policy 
decision-making around energy supply, pricing, distribution and use. This in turn 
involves identifying the different people and organisations and the roles they play 
in this decision-making.  
The key feature of decision-making regarding energy markets policy in Great Britain 
is that it has been largely delegated from elected representatives to a market 
regulator (Helm 2004; Robinson 2002). To understand the chasm that has opened up 
in terms of expectations is therefore to understand the series of decisions taken 
that led to the energy market arrangements in which the Bates case occurred. How 
 
 
12 
 
were these decisions made and by whom? What legitimacy did those decisions have? 
Investigating these questions can help to understand how unaffordable energy in 
the home has resulted in an average of 9,700 deaths every year, with few 
consequences for the energy firms who control the price that restricts access to 
that energy (Guertler and Smith, 2018).   
I argue that the unjust decision- making by the energy regulator in GB was the 
result of a narrow understanding of the people who use energy in their homes: the 
tendency to view them almost exclusively as purchasing consumers in need of 
information. My findings explain that this manner of understanding – or way of 
knowing – which was used by decision makers, limited the way in which decision 
makers made predictions about the outcomes of the energy market and the type of 
experts with whom they interacted to make regulatory policy. The limitations of 
decision- making that are identified by the research in this thesis raise difficult 
questions in terms of the expectations of regulatory institutions and their 
legitimacy. Theoretically, an important element of regulatory legitimacy is equal 
access to decision makers (Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge 2012; Ogus 2004; Koop and 
Lodge 2017). My research findings identify significant limitations in terms of access 
to decision makers and the procedures of policy-making. Specifically, those 
regularly engaging with the regulator saw people who use energy simply as 
consumers within the energy market. I argue that the limitation identified in this 
research has an impact on the fairness of outcomes in the energy market and, 
ultimately, the affordability of energy in Great Britain.  
The aim of the research discussed in this thesis was to answer the issues raised by 
revealing what role knowledges of ‘consumers’ played in the formulation of GB 
energy policy and market regulation between 2000 and 2016. The case of Mr and 
Mrs Bates and the regulatory policy response described at the start of this chapter 
illustrates the chasm that was created between the expectations of the public and 
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their elected representatives and the regulations regarding the limitations on 
energy firms. On the one hand, the public expect protection from harms to health 
and life from unaffordable energy (Becker et al. 2019; Demski et al. 2017). On the 
other hand, there is the expectation from institutions of energy governance that 
energy supply firms will be self-regulating within a market (Helm 2007; Kern, 
Kuzemko, and Mitchell 2014; Kuzemko et al. 2016). This disconnect between 
expectations was created as a result of a series of decisions regarding energy 
system ownership and control – a change from state official accountability to 
society to private firms accountable to their shareholders (Helm, Kay, and 
Thompson 1989; Littlechild 2006). A useful way to begin to address the aim of the 
research is to examine the different elements of the UK energy policy landscape 
(Deller et al. 2018; Helm 2004). There are several key elements to this: devolved 
decision-making, markets, affordability, fairness and regulation. These different 
elements are explained in this chapter in the following sections.  
1.1 Regulatory Energy Policy in Great Britain 
 
To answer the questions I have described above requires a detailed understanding 
of the energy policy framework between 2000 and 2016.  Devolved decision making 
in energy policy and its implementation in the UK occurred across three levels of 
governance (Kern et al. 2014; Kuzemko et al. 2016; Lockwood et al. 2017). The first 
level included policies developed by UK Government departments and scrutinised 
by the Houses of Parliament (Price 1997; Lockwood et al. 2017). The second level 
included the energy policies that relate specifically to each of the individual 
countries that make up the United Kingdom: Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales and 
England (Mould and Baker 2017; Muinzer and Ellis 2017). Each country had specific 
areas of energy policy devolved to the parliaments and assemblies. The third and 
final level related to the regulatory governance, that is, the regulation of energy 
distribution and supply (Littlechild 1983; Thomas 2019). This third level reflects the 
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geographical distinction in that period between the two energy markets, one in 
Northern Ireland and one in Great Britain. Affordability in Northern Ireland was a 
consideration in the control of prices for people who use energy in their homes 
(URNI 2019). However, in Great Britain (GB) between 2000 and 2016 price 
regulations were minimal, with the final cap lifted in 2002 (Waddams Price 2018).  
Looking at energy markets, they have been both enthusiastically supported and 
roundly critiqued (Deller et al. 2018). The primary focus of energy policy in GB 
between 2000 and 2016 was on markets that delivered benefits to consumers 
(Garrod et al. 2008; Helm 2007). With one of the world’s longest-standing 
commitments to privately owned energy assets, market design and investment were 
the central focus of GB policy makers and in research of those market designs (Crew 
and Parker, 2006; Helm, 2004; Price, 2008). Within this framework, people who 
used energy in their homes were conceptualised as 'consumers', whose choice of 
products and suppliers provided pressure on market players (Littlechild 2002, 2008). 
This was not specific to GB energy (Crew and Parker 2006; Frantzeskaki, Loorbach, 
and Meadowcroft 2012). In market economies, access to necessities is managed 
through a market: only those who can pay can access necessary goods such as food. 
What is specific to the GB energy market between 2000 and 2016 is that it was 
designed with features specifically selected and implemented by policy makers 
based on a specific set of logics (Littlechild 2019), which in turn were based on an 
assumption of a range of positive outcomes of an energy market: consistent 
investment in infrastructure, efficient prices and attractive consumer products 
(Defeuilley, 2009; Littlechild, 2008).  
The decision to implement a competitive energy market was accompanied in GB by 
a logic of positive outcomes (Littlechild 1983, 2006; Thomas 2016). Industry was 
promised reduced risk of political interference to secure investment and people 
who used energy would secure a price for that energy that was lower than would be 
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available without competition (Jamasb and Littlechild 2004; Littlechild 2006). 
Conversely, people who used energy in their homes would be empowered to engage 
in the market and their activity would deliver positive market outcomes for all 
(Cseres, 2008; Defeuilley, 2009; Littlechild, 2009). Firms that offered lower prices 
and high quality service would thrive and those who did not would have so few 
customers that they would be forced to exit the market (Helm 2004; Littlechild 
2002; Robinson 2002). Even those who did not engage in the market themselves 
would benefit from low prices, as the market would only include efficient, high 
quality firms (Littlechild 2006; Ogus 2004; Robinson 2007).  
Such faith in energy markets and their outcomes was not, however, universal. Third 
sector organisations and the press articulated the impact of existing market 
structures, namely that a growing number of people could not afford to heat their 
homes. This narrative focused on the lack of affordable of energy in homes and 
identified the pricing decisions of energy supply firms pricing as the cause (National 
Energy Action 2019; National Energy Action and E3G 2018). The narrative of 
unaffordable prices introduced an alternative characterisation of market structures 
– not that market structure was driving behaviours of firms deemed desirable but 
that the outcomes of regulation were unfair (Deller et al. 2018). At the core of the 
argument that prices were unfair was that energy supply firms were able to secure 
profits while some of the most vulnerable people in society died as a result of being 
unable to afford sufficient energy in their homes (National Energy Action and E3G 
2018). 
By 2016, much public and political opinion outrightly rejected the logic of positive 
outcomes within energy markets, following the failure of markets to lead to 
positive outcomes for a sufficient number of consumers in GB (Demski et al. 2017). 
Instead, evidence in a series of market reviews explained that firms could easily 
reward only new customers with lower energy prices (Competition and Markets 
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Authority 2016c; Ofgem 2008b, 2010f).The operation of pricing decision-making 
within energy supply companies and their impact of affordability was identified as 
far more complex than the expectation of positive consumer outcomes for all due 
to a competitive market driving down average prices (Deller et al. 2018). The 
practical outcome of energy supply market arrangements instead saw different 
groups of people accessing different prices (Price and Zhu 2016). These prices 
reflected the ability of an individual to engage with the energy market and did not 
reflect affordability pressures. Whether or not energy was affordable for people in 
their homes was not necessarily a straightforward outcome of the energy markets 
structure where prices were, on average, lower across all households if compared 
to an alternative model to the competitive retail energy market (Ofgem 2014a). 
While the market mechanisms designed sought to reward those consumers who 
engaged in the market, the consequence was punishment for those who did not. 
During the first seventeen years of economic regulation in the energy market, this 
inequality between those who engaged and those who did not was exacerbated by 
demographics: those who were least likely to secure low prices through market 
engagement were those on low incomes, with caring responsibilities or of a 
pensionable age (Competition and Markets Authority 2019). That some of the most 
vulnerable households in society had the least affordable energy may not have had 
an impact on the efficient operation of an energy market. However, the inequitable 
distribution of the benefits and costs did influence the acceptability of an energy 
market to the GB public and their elected representatives (Deller et al. 2018).  
The outcomes of the energy market resulted in consistent calls for those in power 
to ‘do something’ to ensure energy that was affordable and outcomes that were fair 
(National Energy Action and E3G 2018). The responses to ‘do something’ began with 
Government spending: those who were identified as at highest risk of dying in the 
cold received specific income support for winter energy bills and a programme of 
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installation of warm home measures such as new boilers began in 2000 (Sovacool 
2013). Affordable energy would be secured, under these programmes, by ensuring 
lower energy needs and higher disposable incomes. However, the impact of the 
structures of the energy market was not part of the policies considered to respond 
to the problem of energy affordability, with small Corporate Social Responsibility 
programmes seen as sufficient at this time (Ofgem 2005e). Empowered consumers 
could, after all, punish firms that did not do their bit for society by switching to an 
energy company who did. Energy prices were acknowledged as part of the cause of 
unaffordable energy but beyond the scope of significant intervention (Sovacool, 
2013; Walker and Day, 2012). 
A significant policy change came after 2008 and Government spending on keeping 
homes warm reduced significantly after the financial crisis (Department of Energy 
and Climate Change 2015b). Without the willingness to commit further taxpayer 
funds to warm homes, energy companies fell under pressure to support those 
unable to pay for a warm home directly through discounted energy bills. This began 
with a “Voluntary Agreement” for support to those who the energy company 
believed should be supported (Ofgem 2008f, 2010d, 2011e). In 2011, support from 
energy suppliers was replaced by customers receiving pension credit aligning with a 
decrease in a similar payment to pensioners from the Department of Work and 
Pensions’ Winter Fuel Allowance (Department of Energy and Climate Change 
2015b).  
There was therefore an increase in affordable energy programmes, designed by the 
UK Government, delivered by energy supply firms and monitored by the energy 
regulator (Deller et al. 2018). The findings of this thesis suggest that even as energy 
supply firms took on the responsibility for affordable energy schemes, no parallel 
policy questions were posed regarding the energy supply markets in setting energy 
prices for people in their homes. Faith that the market would deliver the lowest 
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price was maintained within the institutions with the power to support maintaining 
the status quo or to bring about change.  
While direct interventions to improve affordability and fairness had varied support 
and mixed results, one central element in the development and delivery of policies 
for affordable energy in Great Britain continued throughout: regulation of market 
participants by the economic regulator, the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets 
(Ofgem). Ofgem was founded in 2000 through the Utilities Act which:  
“…establishes a single Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (“the Authority”), in 
place of the twin posts of Director-General of Gas Supply and Director-General of 
Electricity Supply [and] contains provisions to enable the gas and electricity sectors 
to make an appropriate contribution to the Government’s social and environmental 
objectives. It contains provisions to make regulation more transparent and 
predictable. The Act also updates the regulatory regime for the gas and electricity 
sectors to take account of and to facilitate further competition.”  
Utilities Act 2000 Explanatory Notes C2.7 (The National Archive 2000) 
In GB, this meant that Ofgem developed and implemented regulatory policies 
regarding the energy market. Ofgem set the rules that governed how energy market 
participants interacted and the limits on their behaviour (Department of Business, 
Innovation and Skills 2011; Ofgem 2016j). While in some other countries this 
includes setting a maximum price for a unit of energy, Ofgem did not regulate any 
energy prices between 2002 and 2016 (Deller et al. 2018; Waddams Price 2018). The 
statutory powers of Ofgem reflect the expectations of an economic regulator where 
previously nationalised industries are privatised (Helm 2004; Littlechild 1983; 
Robinson 2002). The role of an economic regulator is to manage a market through 
setting out the standards that firms providing a specific service must meet by 
setting rules. An economic regulator then measures the performance of firms 
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against those standards and intervenes if standards are breached. The statutory 
powers provided to an economic regulator means that there is an alternative model 
of policy making compared to the standard UK parliamentary procedures of creating 
laws that govern the behaviour of firms directly (Baldwin et al. 2012; Koop and 
Lodge 2017; Robinson 2002, 2006). The statutory powers of the economic regulator 
itself follow the standard policy development procedures – the Government bring 
legislation to the Houses of Parliament which is scrutinised and, in the majority of 
cases, passed (Leston-Bandeira and Thompson 2017; Olson 2015; Russell, Gover, and 
Wollter 2016). The statutory powers of the economic regulator include policy 
making within its domain (Baldwin et al. 2012; Ogus 2004). Under their statutory 
powers, the economic regulator would then make regulatory policies under their 
mandate (Crew and Parker 2006; Robinson 2007).  
The statutory powers of Ofgem did not stay the same over the period studied. 
Between 2000 and 2016, the regulator’s statutory powers were changed five times 
in successive Energy Acts (Deller et al. 2018). However, I found through my analysis 
that the regulator's output appears to have been quite tightly bounded and 
relatively unchanged. In regulatory reviews of the energy market between 2008 and 
2016, it did not engage with the questions of whether market outcomes were fair. 
Instead, Ofgem and the Competition and Markets Authority focused on the question 
of whether market structures were organised in a manner that resulted in efficient 
outcomes (Ofgem, 2008; Ofgem 2010a; Competition and Markets Authority, 2016). 
Classical regulatory theory states that a regulator needs to pass five tests to be able 
to exercise its powers: support from legislative authority; a scheme of 
accountability; relevant expertise; efficiency within the organisation; and 
procedures which are fair, accessible and open (Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge 2010b; 
Baldwin et al. 2012; Ogus 2004; Robinson 2007). In practice, UK economic 
regulators followed guidance from the UK Government that they were to be 
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focused, predictable, coherent, adaptable, accountable and transparent 
(Department of Business, Innovation and Skills 2011). Accountability operates 
through scrutiny via parliamentary select committees which ensure that regulators 
are acting in line with their statutory powers (Deller et al. 2018).  
The disconnect in expectations from the perspective of market regulation of 
efficiency prices and public concern regarding affordable, fair prices poses a 
challenge to regulatory legitimacy (Baldwin et al. 2012; Koop and Lodge 2017). This 
includes accountability to democratic institutions, transparent procedures that 
include multiple perspectives, and expertise in delivering the regulator's statutory 
mandate (Baldwin et al. 2010b; Robinson 2007). This concept of regulatory 
legitimacy does not, however, support a description of how the functioning of a 
regulator might be identified as legitimate or otherwise (Koop and Lodge 2017). It is 
therefore not clear what the implications of concerns regarding fairness might have 
for how we conceptualise regulatory legitimacy.  
The institutional framework from classical regulatory theory incorporates a scrutiny 
procedure that was enacted in GB through accountability to elected representatives 
in the House of Commons and devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales 
(Mould and Baker 2017). Theoretically, this provided a point at which economic 
regulators could be held accountable where there was a disconnect between the 
activities of a regulator and any expectations of fair outcomes from the public and 
their elected representatives (Baldwin et al. 2010b; Robinson 2007). However, the 
enduring public concern regarding the unfair and often fatal outcomes of the 
energy market without regulatory changes that acknowledge these concerns 
indicates that this accountability mechanism was not operating as theorised.   
While affordability and fairness have been important ideas in the policy landscape, 
between 2000 and 2016, there appears to be a disconnect between these and the 
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focus of a key policy actor - the energy regulator - on the efficient operation of 
markets. A focus on market outcomes with efficient prices is distinctly different 
from the consideration of the affordability of energy and the fairness of outcomes 
that could result in significant hardship (National Energy Action and E3G 2018). This 
disconnect between the public and political view of energy market outcomes and 
that of the regulator became part of the narrative from third sector organisations, 
some politicians and the press from 2012 onwards, with questions posed on what 
role Ofgem as a regulator should play in policy making (Lodge and Stern 2014; 
Thomas 2019). Indeed, the debate regarding the role of the energy regulator in 
limiting the harms of unaffordable energy became a focus, with the opposition 
Labour Party manifesto for the 2015 election including a proposal for Ofgem to be 
abolished (Miliband, E. 2008; Labour Party Green Paper, 2013). However, the 
extent to which such critique influenced the outputs of the regulator is not 
immediately clear (Thomas 2016). The response of Ofgem to the concerns regarding 
its efficiency focused on its own view of the role of economic regulation regarding 
energy prices: to deliver competition that would incentivise energy supply firms to 
offer efficient prices to consumers (Littlechild 2019; Waddams Price 2018) 
(Littlechild, 2008; Waddams Price, 2018). This is unsurprising between 2000 and 
2010 considering that the focus on the energy regulator was set out in legislation 
(Deller et al. 2018). In this period, the majority of the powers granted to Ofgem 
were in line with the original logic of the introduction of markets into utilities 
under the Thatcher and Major Governments between 1979 and 1997 (Helm 2004; 
Lodge and Stern 2014). However, the statutory powers of Ofgem were changed in 
the Energy Act of 2011 to consider the impact of factors beyond competition in 
Ofgem’s decision making. However, my analysis found that there was little 
opportunity to allow for disagreements in how the active decision-making within a 
regulator might vary over time. This may help explain the distinction between 
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expectations of the role of an energy regulator as conceived by Ofgem and the 
vocal critics of Ofgem’s approach, but it remains an open question. 
In sum, these key elements of GB energy policy - devolved decision-making, 
markets, affordability, fairness, and regulation –developed and interacted in such a 
way as to produce controversial (and in some cases fatal) outcomes, particularly 
around delivery of major policy priorities. This thesis presents the results of a 
detailed investigation into GB energy policy, in particular the operation of energy 
market regulation by Ofgem. What did the regulatory procedures and actors do or 
not do? How did they respond to critiques? Who was involved and how? Whose 
knowledge was represented and how influential was it? What have the outcomes 
been on different groups of people? To address the above puzzles, the thesis looks 
in detail at energy market regulation since the establishment of Ofgem in 2000. 
 
1.2 Analysing Energy Market Regulation in GB 2000 - 2016 
 
I undertook research that sought answers to the questions described in the section 
above by drawing on several different academic literatures, in order to incorporate 
different conceptual frameworks and analytical tools. The first of these, Regulatory 
Studies, provides insight regarding the theoretical and actual outcomes of styles of 
regulation and regulatory policies, drawing on the disciplines of economics, law and 
institution-focused political science (Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge 2010a; Koop and 
Lodge 2017; Robinson 2007). An important question in the Regulatory Studies 
literature focuses on the ability of regulatory institutions to change once the 
regulator’s obligations in law are set out in statute (Baldwin et al. 2012; Robinson 
2002).  
The predominant focus in Regulatory Studies is how the regulator may change its 
decision-making in response to elected representatives or regulated firms (Koop and 
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Lodge 2017; Lodge and Stern 2014). However, there is an absence of studies that 
consider whether energy regulation is, or should be, responsive to its societal 
context. This means that Regulatory Studies has yet to consider how concerns 
regarding fairness of energy market outcomes could develop or change over time. 
This could have implications for a key consideration which has been the focus of 
research in Regulatory Studies: the legitimacy of regulatory institutions (Baldwin et 
al. 2012). In the GB context, enduring concern about the fairness of energy market 
outcomes in terms of the affordability of household energy bills, resulted in a 
political questioning of the regulator Ofgem (House of Commons Select Committee 
on  Business and Enterprise 2008; House of Commons Select Committee on Energy 
and Climate Change 2013; House of Commons Select Committee on Trade and 
Industry 2005). However, prior to the research undertaken in this thesis, no analysis 
had attempted to connect the theoretical concerns regarding the legitimacy of 
regulatory institutions to an empirical case that incorporates a concern regarding 
affordability of energy and fairness of energy prices.  
Energy affordability and associated impacts on the extent to which it can be said to 
be fair or unfair has, however, been the focus of the second area of literature upon 
which I draw, namely Energy Justice. Scholars in this field conceptualise a lack of 
energy affordability as unfair and unjust (Deller et al. 2018; Snell, Bevan, and 
Thomson 2015; Walker and Day 2012). Lack of justice is connected to unaffordable 
energy on three factors: inequality of access to affordable energy due to 
distributional inequalities; inequality of access to policy procedures concerned with 
affordable energy; and inequality of recognition of needs for affordable energy 
(Bickerstaff, Walker, and Bulkeley 2013; K. Jenkins, Sovacool, and McCauley 2018; 
Sovacool 2013). Understanding how inequalities of distribution, recognition of needs 
and policy procedures function in impacting affordable energy, have predominantly 
focused on national government policy of the UK (Gillard, Snell, and Bevan 2017; 
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Simcock, Walker, and Day 2016a; Snell, Bevan, and Thomson 2014). These have not 
engaged with the impact of the energy market and its regulation in terms of the 
affordability of energy. This has meant that the fairness of the regulations that 
have resulted in lack of affordability of energy, have yet to be examined. This 
thesis seeks to close the gap in understanding of how regulatory policy-making 
impacted the fairness of energy affordability in GB when the price of energy was 
not regulated. It does this through presenting  an empirical case study of energy 
regulation to understand how the operations and functioning of GB’s energy 
regulator, Ofgem, were shaped by institutional expectations, which in turn 
influenced the price of energy paid by people in their homes.  
Research from within a third area of literature, Energy Studies, identifies the 
impact of energy markets logics on decision-making on energy policies regarding the 
distribution of and demand for electricity in the UK (Cotton and Devine-Wright 
2012; Shove and Walker 2014). This research finds that that the way in which policy 
makers understand people who use energy in their homes is limited to a concept of 
people as ‘consumers’. This is a specific way of understanding or ‘knowing’ people 
who use energy in their homes. The identification of ‘consumers’ within electricity 
demand and distribution, results in the access of restriction of policy procedures 
(Devine-Wright 2012; Geels 2014; Scrase and Ockwell 2009). Whether an equivalent 
restriction of access to policy procedures occurred within regulatory policy making 
had not, at time of writing, been analysed. If similar limitations exist in the way in 
which energy policies support the affordability of energy to people in their homes, 
it could be that the way people are ‘known’ in regulatory policy has important 
implications for the scope and outcomes of those policies. To identify whether 
there was a similar restriction in the way in which people were understood within 
policy procedures in GB energy regulation as in the case studies from UK electricity 
policies and whether this has an impact on the fairness of regulatory policy 
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formulation, is the focus of this thesis. In order to conduct the research, I analysed 
how specific regulatory policies were made and their implications for fairness. 
To address this, I used three contemporary analytic frameworks which had, to date, 
not been used in combination. Each contributes a different angle to examining the 
questions. To analyse the implications of the fairness of regulatory policies and 
their outcomes, the inequalities of distribution, procedures and recognition were 
identified using the Energy Justice Framework (Sovacool et al. 2016). This provided 
a foundation for understanding how regulatory policies distributed the benefits and 
costs associated with the GB energy market and whether those policies were 
developed in an equitable manner. However, identifying the extent to which 
regulatory policies are developed in an equitable manner is limited without 
understanding how and why regulatory policies are developed. Therefore, in 
addition to the Energy Justice Framework I applied two analytical frameworks from 
the field of policy studies. The second policy analysis framework used was the 
“Tools of Policy Formulation” (TPF) framework (Jordan and Turnpenny 2015). 
Applying the TPF framework identifies how particular regulatory policies were 
developed and delivered between 2000 and 2016. This provides insight into how the 
tools used within the regulator were embedded, through translating Ofgem’s 
implicit embedded assumptions into regulatory policies. The second framework was 
the “What is the Problem Represented to Be” (WPR) approach (Bacchi 2009a). 
Applying the WPR framework helped to identify why particular regulatory policies 
were developed and delivered between 2000 and 2016. This provided insight into 
what problem or problems the regulator, Ofgem, set out to solve and what 
particular embedded implicit assumptions were in operation, as regulatory policies 
to address particular problems were developed.  
Each of the frameworks, Energy Justice Framework, “Tools of Policy Formulation” 
and “What is the Problem Represented to Be”, were used to analyse a corpus of 
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policy documents and  interview transcripts, examining the initial seventeen years 
of the energy market regulator in GB – Ofgem. Together, the frameworks provide an 
analysis of the extent to which the implicit assumptions embedded within the 
regulator bounded the regulatory policies developed and delivered between 2000 
and 2016 and the extent to which those policies impacted inequitable access to 
affordable energy in GB homes. Insight provided by this analysis identifies what the 
implicit expectations of the behaviour of people who use energy in their homes 
were within GB energy regulatory decision-making. It enables the elaboration of 
how those expectations were set, embedded and to what extent it could have been 
possible to challenge them. 
In summary, the period 2000 to 2016 saw a continuous concern raised by the public 
and their elected representatives that energy was not affordable and energy 
markets were not fair. The policy procedures that might have responded to these 
concerns were within economic regulation. These processes– policy formulation 
procedures – were notoriously opaque and undertaken by experts.   
I describe these processes in order to explain why the experts formulating 
regulatory policies failed to respond to public and political concerns regarding 
affordability. The activities of regulators have been described in Regulatory Studies 
but not in terms of their responsiveness to concerns regarding fairness and rarely in 
terms of incorporating public concerns. Energy Justice research, on the other hand, 
engages directly in revealing unfair outcomes of policy making and concerns from 
the public regarding affordability of energy. It does this by identifying 
distributional, recognition and procedural inequalities and their interaction. Energy 
Justice research has not, however, engaged directly in the detailed analysis of 
regulatory policy procedures. To engage directly with the political ‘netherworld’ of 
policy formulation, I therefore extended my analysis to explain how and why policy 
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procedures resulted in prices that were characterised in society as unfair and 
unaffordable.  
Research from Energy Studies suggests that defining people who use energy in their 
homes as ‘consumers’ could play a role in limiting policy outcomes. Analysis of the 
energy system beyond regulation indicates that the way that acknowledged experts 
within energy policy making procedures describe, define and explain policy 
problems has important effects on policy outcomes. This is because diverse ways of 
understanding people – or ‘knowledges’ – are not equally influential in policy 
procedures (Haas, 2004; Nowotny, 2003). Instead, only some knowledges in a policy 
area are accepted as credible, salient and legitimate (Boswell 2008; Cash et al. 
2003; Shove 1997). 
In order to reveal whether such limitations in the way of knowing operated within 
regulation of the energy market between 2000 and 2016, I set out to identify 
features of their policy procedures and their effects. These effects include the 
effects of particular knowledges within policy procedures themselves, the role 
knowledges played in changing the way that people were known, and ultimately the 
effect of those policies on energy market operations and outcomes.  
The key question in this thesis can be summarised as: 
What role did knowledges of ‘consumers’ play in the formulation of GB energy 
market regulation between 2000 and 2016? 
1.3 Plan of the thesis 
 
How and why inclusion and exclusion function within the regulator has important 
implications for the extent to which regulatory policy development can be 
described as fair or just. My review of existing research identified a probable link 
between how people in their homes are conceptualised within an institution like 
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the regulator Ofgem and policy outcomes. I begin Chapter 2 by reviewing the 
academic literature that provides a foundation to understand why and how 
regulatory policy is developed. There are three areas of research that provide 
insight into this area: Regulatory Studies, Energy Justice scholarship and Energy 
Studies. Regulatory Studies research explains the features of regulatory institutions 
and how they might be evaluated. While there is no engagement with the concept 
of fairness, regulatory legitimacy in society is noted as an important – though rarely 
empirically researched – factor in considering how regulators function (Baldwin et 
al. 2012; Koop and Lodge 2017; Levi-Faur 2011). Energy Justice scholarship does 
engage directly with themes related to fairness. Noting that ‘fairness’ can be used 
interchangeable with ‘just’, Energy Justice scholarship provides a framework to 
evaluate the extent to which policies and their development can be described as 
inequitable, unjust or unfair (Heffron and McCauley 2017; K. Jenkins et al. 2018). 
This framework from Energy Justice scholarship identifies three interacting factors 
that must be present: distributional, recognition and procedural justice. Where 
these three factors are present, policies and their outcomes can be described as 
fair (Sovacool 2013; Walker and Day 2012). The final body of academic literature 
that provides a foundation for understanding the extent to which regulation could 
be described as fair, comes from Energy Studies. In Energy Studies, case studies 
identify influential limitations to the way in which institutions develop and 
implement policies – the embedded implicit assumptions of the institution itself 
(Devine-Wright 2012; Scrase and Ockwell 2010; Shove and Walker 2014). In 
particular, energy institutions examined in the field of Energy Studies explain the 
influence of institutional embedded implicit assumptions in shaping how the people 
impacted by those policies are ‘known’ or understood by policy makers. The review 
revealed that at the time of this study, there was no prior academic research 
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identifying the embedded implicit assumptions at Ofgem and how they might 
impact the fairness of energy regulation.  
In Chapter 3, I explain how I analysed regulatory policy developments to identify 
the role of knowledges that were operating within Ofgem. I explain the creation of 
a corpus of GB energy regulation made up of publicly available documents and 
interview transcripts to analyse procedures and regulatory outputs between 2000 
and 2016. As at the time of writing, no existing research had evaluated the fairness 
of regulation and the role that embedded implicit assumptions play in the fairness 
of regulation, I explain the use of the three contemporary analytics frameworks 
introduced above and how they were applied, to reveal the way that regulation 
functioned between 2000 and 2016 at Ofgem.  
In Chapter 4, I provide an overview of regulatory policy between 2000 and 2016. 
This comprises the series of events that unfolded from the regulator in the context 
of Government legislation and parliamentary scrutiny. The timeline of regulatory 
policy explains the regulatory policies that were outputs of energy regulators in this 
period and the procedures that produced them. The political context of these 
regulations is also explained. The period 2000 to 2016 includes the implementation 
of significant changes to the statutory powers of the regulator to act. Further, a 
connected but discrete Government policy area regarding the affordability of 
energy, ‘fuel poverty policy’, was the focus of significant reforms in part of this 
period.  
In Chapter 5, the distributional, recognition and procedural injustices of Ofgem’s 
regulatory policies between 2000 and 2016 are identified. Distributional injustices 
of inequitable pricing identify that those who secured the benefits of GB energy 
markets were not those in low income demographic groups. Instead, those with 
lower incomes and higher needs of affordable energy are those who paid the 
 
 
30 
 
highest price for energy in their homes. Recognition injustice is identified in the 
acknowledgement and understanding of the energy needs of some, which did not 
result in any action to respond to those energy needs. Finally, procedural injustice 
is identified in the manner in which participation was not equitable for different 
groups of policy actors seeking to engage in policy procedures.  
In Chapter 6, the way in which knowledges played a role within regulatory policy 
formulation between 2000 and 2016 are identified using the Tools of Policy 
Formulation (TPF) framework (Jordan and Turnpenny 2015). The formulation of 
policies at Ofgem provide a large number of opportunities to a range of policy 
actors to influence the way ‘consumers’ are known. However, the majority of these 
opportunities were evaluating and assessing options that already used the concept 
of purchasing consumers. This means that tools of policy formulation that were 
designed to include multiple perspectives failed to translate the knowledges of 
diverse perspectives into policy outputs. Instead, the existing way of ‘knowing’ 
people who use energy in their homes as consumers in the market was maintained 
between 2000 and 2016. 
In Chapter 7, the representation of the problem implicit – and in many cases 
explicit – within Ofgem’s regulatory policies between 2000 and 2016 is presented 
using the What is the Problem Represented to Be (WPR) framework (Bacchi 2009b). 
Ofgem’s regulatory policies see the overarching problem for energy regulation are 
consumers. The framework of market interactions requires consumers to act in a 
manner consistent with economic theory – to be motivated to act to secure high-
quality products and the lowest price. This study shows that people who use energy 
in their homes failed to act in the predicted manner, undermining the intended 
structure of the market and allowing firms to act in a harmful manner. Despite new 
characterisations of people who use energy in their homes present in regulatory 
procedures, the way of ‘knowing’ consumers as purchasers failing to act retained its 
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influence at Ofgem. The blaming of consumers for the outcomes of the energy 
market was not challenged by the accountability procedures which could do so, 
namely, the parliamentary Select committees. Instead, between 2000 and 2016, the 
expectations that consumers would engage in the energy market to drive efficient 
prices were maintained.  
In Chapter 8, the findings from each thesis chapter are discussed to respond to my 
overarching research question. Each chapter of the thesis identifies opportunities 
for ‘consumer’ knowledges to influence regulatory policy formulation. Through a 
lens of recognition and procedural justice, these opportunities to understand, 
acknowledge and act on diverse energy needs are identified. The lens of policy 
formulation reveals precisely how the influential concept of ‘consumers’ as 
purchasers led to the regulatory policies between 2000 and 2016. This is because 
despite the use of tools of policy formulation specifically designed to bring diverse 
views together, the opportunities to impact regulatory policies rarely went beyond 
assessing options using the way of knowing ‘consumers’ already embedded within 
Ofgem. The lens of problem representation identifies that these opportunities did 
not, ultimately, result in regulatory policy outputs that incorporate diverse energy 
needs because only one way of knowing ‘consumers’ was influential: consumers as 
purchasers. I argue that these combined insights contribute to a new way of 
understanding regulatory legitimacy and extends the understanding of energy 
injustice into the realm of regulatory institutions. 
Chapter 9 concludes this thesis by discussing what the findings of this thesis mean 
for the fairness of regulatory decisions that impact the affordability of energy. 
Regulatory legitimacy requires meaningful accountability of regulatory decision 
making. However, provision of opportunities to hold the regulator to account in a 
context where an overarching way of knowing about energy is unquestionable, does 
not meet this standard.  
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
 
2.1 Research Foundation 
 
In this literature review, I describe the three foundations for identifying whether 
regulatory policy can be described as fair in Great Britain. These three foundations 
are Regulatory Studies, Energy Justice and Energy Studies. 
Regulatory Studies is a useful resource for understanding the history of institutional 
arrangements in GB, including why an energy regulator governs its energy markets 
and the expectations of how the regulator will operate. I draw on research from 
Regulatory Studies to describe the independent economic regulation in democratic 
institutions and the procedures that held regulators to account through parliament 
under statutory powers granted by Government (Baldwin et al., 2012). Regulatory 
Studies does this by providing indicative experience for the analysis of governance 
structures, including regulatory agencies (Baldwin et al. 2012; Levi-Faur 2011) and a 
foundation to explore the possible impact of economic regulation as a source of 
policies that focus on markets, that have implications for people in their homes 
(Haber 2015; Haber and Heims 2016). In this field, justice is not specifically the 
focus of evaluation. Instead, regulatory legitimacy is identified as an important 
factor in maintaining an institution independent from, but accountable to, 
democratically elected bodies (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004; Levi-Faur 2011). 
Regulatory Studies does not, however, provide a foundation for understanding 
whether regulatory policy can be described as fair (Koop and Lodge 2017).  
Energy Justice research provides a framework to evaluate whether policy 
procedures and outcomes can be described as fair (Jenkins et al. 2014; Sovacool 
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and Dworkin 2015a). Fair is used interchangeably in this field with the notion of 
justice. Energy policies are deemed fair if they can be characterised as distributing 
benefits in an equitable way that recognises diverse energy needs within inclusive 
decision-making procedures (Sovacool 2013; Sovacool et al. 2016). This framework 
for evaluation has been applied to understand the extent to which energy 
affordability policy in the UK can be described as ‘just’ (Simcock, Walker, and Day 
2016b; Sovacool 2013; Walker and Day 2012). For example, using UK fuel poverty 
policy as a case study to identify how distributional injustices occur, Walker and 
Day (2012) describe the importance of understanding how different representatives 
who provide insight into diverse energy needs engage in policy procedures. 
However, while previous research had provided insight into how the Energy Justice 
framework could be applied to case studies, none applied it to a GB case that 
included the regulator, Ofgem. 
Energy Studies research includes case studies from Great Britain beyond energy 
regulation, describing the importance for energy policy-making procedures and 
their outcomes, of analysing institutional settings.  Previous research has described 
the importance of embedded implicit assumptions within decision making 
procedures regarding energy can shape policy outcomes (Devine-Wright 2012; Shove 
1997). Case studies regarding decision-making in energy policy formulation builds 
on research that describes the impact of embedded and implicit assumptions 
related to how the people who are the target of such policies are understood or 
‘known’ (Boswell 2009; Schneider, Ingram, and Ingram 2005). These case studies 
suggest that the way that people are ‘known’ within policy procedures could have 
important implications for inclusive policy making, which is explained by concerns 
in Energy Justice regarding just policy making and Regulatory Studies regarding 
legitimate regulation.  
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2.2 Regulatory Studies 
 
Regulatory Studies provided the foundation for this study, which sought to identify 
features of regulatory policy in Great Britain in order to ascertain the extent to 
which they could be said to be fair. Research in this field also provided findings that 
support this thesis by characterising the institutional features of regulators, 
describing how regulators can be characterised as legitimate and by providing 
examples of how different groups – specifically, citizens and regulated firms – are 
included in regulation (Baldwin et al. 2010a, 2012; Haber and Heims 2016; Levi-Faur 
2011). These are described in the sections below. 
The first area of Regulation Studies to investigate the fairness of regulation is 
research that analyses the implications of regulatory institutions, institutions being 
“cognitive, normative and regulative structures and activities that provide stability 
and meaning to social behaviour” (Scott 2006 p. 33), their empirical operation and 
their outcomes (Koop and Lodge 2017). The ‘regulatory state’ is a description of the 
institutional arrangement within a state as one where the prominent policy 
paradigm is the regulation of public and private markets, rather than ‘traditional’ 
taxation and spending (Baldwin, Cave, & Lodge, 2011; Lodge, 2008; Majone, 2001; 
Moran, 2003). Within the governance structure of the regulatory state, specific 
institutions are provided with powers under statute to regulate particular activities 
and/or markets. These regulatory institutions are characterised as ‘Independent 
Regulatory Authorities’ and are intended to ensure that delegated powers are 
enacted efficiently, due to separation from political uncertainty and embedded 
regulatory expertise (Christensen & Lægreid, 2002; Lodge, 2008; Maggetti, Ingold, 
& Varone, 2013; Moran, 2003). This model of expert regulators is articulated as a 
contrasting model to one where politicians or citizens participate directly in 
decision-making.  
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The focus of the literature about regulation in Great Britain focuses on the 
institutional arrangements of a governance model referred to as the “British model” 
(Baldwin et al. 2010b; Robinson 2007). The British Model, originating in Britain 
under the Thatcher and Major Governments between 1979 and 1997, consists of the 
economic regulation of sectors by an agency that is separate from Government. The 
agency contains experts in economic regulation, primarily areas of the economy 
that have in the past been nationally owned and have been transferred into private 
ownership. These sectors of the economy, commonly the utility sectors, are 
privately owned but must operate within a set of rules governed by the economic 
regulator, also known as an Independent Regulatory Agency (IRA). 
The proposed theoretical and empirical outcomes of the IRA structure, particularly 
in the European Union, provides the focus for the majority of the classical 
Regulatory Studies literature (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004; Levi-Faur 1999; Levi-
Faur and Gilad 2004; Lodge 2008; Majone 1994).This regulatory literature focuses 
on the economic regulation, mainly of utilities, to enhance economic efficiency and 
correct market failures. The focus of regulatory policy in the British Model is to 
create or nurture competition which, it was proposed, would ensure optimum 
economic outcomes (Eberlein 1999; Levi-Faur 1998). In this model, regulation is 
specifically limited to act as a proxy for competitive markets, with the aspiration of 
partially or entirely removing regulation over time, depending on the sector 
(Littlechild 2002). An important proposed benefit of this model was that private 
sector investment would be secured by the commitment of a regulatory agency to 
consistency of rules over time (Baldwin et al. 2010a; Ogus 2004). The British Model 
has been adopted by many states, leading academics to conclude that Britain is a 
leader in innovative approaches to regulation (Hodges and Steinholtz 2018). 
However, others note that the overriding concern of this model was for low 
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compliance costs to firms and would not necessarily lead to optimal societal 
outcomes (Tombs 2016; Weatherill 2007). 
The second area of research from Regulatory Studies that is important for 
understanding how regulatory procedures could be characterised as fair, is research 
regarding regulatory legitimacy. Regulatory agencies are separate from elected 
officials who can, in principle, ensure of the rights of citizens in relation to the 
regulated area (Baldwin et al. 2010a, 2010b). The British Model aimed to ensure 
that the regulatory agency was a legitimate rule setter for an industry, by 
incorporating procedures of accountability of the independent regulator (Cassese 
2004; Croley 1998; Ogus 2004; Pildes and Sunstein 1995; Prosser 1999). In GB this 
was through accountability of economic regulators to Parliament (Busuioc and 
Lodge 2016; Majone 1994; Scott 2000; Stirton and Lodge 2001). The extent to which 
economic regulators can be legitimate is summarised by Baldwin et al. (2012) who 
draw together regulatory theory, strategy and practice (Black 2008; Hancher and 
Moran 1989; Weatherill 2007) to describe five sources of legitimacy for regulators, 
along with some of the challenges in securing this legitimacy (Baldwin et al. 2012). 
These are described in Table 2.1 below. 
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Table 2.1 Regulatory Legitimacy  
(Baldwin et al. 2012) 
No. Legitimacy Claim Problem for Legitimacy Claim 
1 Legislative mandate –  
Authorization from elected 
legislature 
• Parliament’s intention may be vague 
• Objectives for regulation many be in tension 
• Discretion of how to deliver objectives is with 
regulator not legislators 
2 Efficiency –  
Legislative mandate is 
being implemented 
efficiently or efficient 
results are produced 
• Problems similar to legislative mandate claims above  
• Measuring efficiency is difficult 
• Distributional questions may be left out of accounts or 
posed with no solutions proposed 
 
3 Accountability –  
Regulator is accountable 
to and controlled by 
democratically elected 
representatives 
• Question of whether trade-offs between 
accountability and efficiency are acceptable 
• Body holding regulator to account may not be properly 
representative 
4 Due process –  
Procedures are sufficiently 
fair, accessible and open 
to expose the regulator to 
democratic influence 
• Question of who should be allowed to participate 
• Question of whether there is an acceptable trade-off 
between openness and accessibility and efficiency  
• Question of whether the mode of participation is 
appropriate 
5 Expertise –  
Specialized knowledge, 
skills and expertise have 
been applied in 
judgements made 
 
• Public is poorly positioned to evaluate expertise with 
difficulty in explaining reasoning to lay persons 
• Distrust of experts 
• Public desire for openness and accountability 
• Any conflicts between experts undermines public 
confidence 
• Public scepticism of neutrality of regulatory decisions 
where certain parties gain advantages. This may 
relate to public perception of experts as self-
interested or captured 
 
As described in Table 2.1, the five sources of regulatory legitimacy are a legislative 
mandate for institutional efficiency, accountability procedures, respected due 
process and relevant specialist expertise. Baldwin et al. (2012) describe the 
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challenges to these sources of legitimacy in terms of a regulator’s interactions with 
politicians and the public. 
Regulatory legitimacy is analysed in empirical work within Regulatory Studies by 
examining the procedures of accountability, particularly, legal statutes and 
accountability to parliament (Cohen and Sabel 2004; Froomkin 2000; Mashaw 2006). 
Both legal statute and procedures related to accountability to parliament - that aim 
to provide oversight of regulatory activities by elected representatives - are 
analysed, rather than participation (Baldwin et al. 2012; Jordana and Levi-Faur 
2004). Despite using terminology such as legitimacy and accountability (Koop and 
Lodge 2017; Levi-Faur 2011), these concepts are rarely defined or questioned. 
Instead, Regulatory Studies are “largely silent” on conceptual questions (Koop and 
Lodge 2017). Further, while the field of Regulatory Studies notes that historical and 
political context is vital to understand regulatory agencies (Ayres and Braithwaite 
1992; Levi-Faur 2011; Lowi 1972), the way in which concepts related to this context 
may influence regulatory agencies is rarely explored.  
A rare exception to the lack of engagement with the functioning of accountability 
procedures is a study by Julia Black (2008) analysing accountability of regulation 
across national borders. Black (2008) identifies that a key influence on legitimacy 
and accountability are “the values, interests, expectations, and cognitive frames of 
those who are perceiving or accepting the regime” (Black 2008 p. 144). However, 
while the context for regulatory legitimacy and accountability is noted as 
important, values and expectations are not analysed to understand the extent to 
which they may impact the outputs of the regulatory agency itself. The lack of 
empirical research within Regulatory Studies regarding the values that are 
embedded within regulatory agencies means that there is no insight in how values 
may support, or otherwise, participation in regulatory policy procedures. 
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The third area of Regulatory Studies research that can provide insight into the 
extent to which regulatory procedures in GB could be considered fair are those that 
relate to the participation of those outside the regulator. The majority of 
Regulatory Studies literature focuses on the participation of regulated firms in 
regulatory decision-making. There is a significant literature focused on the 
participation of privately-owned firms with economic regulators. Research on the 
interaction between economic regulators and regulated firms is the focus of an 
extensive literature regarding ‘regulatory capture’ (Hong and You 2018; Mulgan 
2000; Uhr 1993). This is primarily described in terms of the risk that private firms 
will influence the regulator to provide incentives and structures in a manner which 
solely benefits the shareholders of one of, or a group of, firms. Considerations of 
regulatory capture have drawn attention to the fact that powerful interest groups 
frequently influence regulators and benefit from influence that regulation affords 
them (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Stigler 1971). This consideration of capture 
focuses on the theoretical operation of incentives within institutions that focus on 
economic outcomes, such as the awarding of contracts (Baldwin et al. 2010b; 
Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004; Roberts, Elliott, and Houghton 1991). 
An additional topic related to “capture-by-firms” is the capture of regulatory 
institutions by the Government in institutional settings, where governance 
arrangements are designed in a manner to ensure the independence of regulatory 
institutions from political interference (Levi-Faur 2011; Roberts et al. 1991). This 
reflects the governance arrangements of IRAs which aim to provide consistent and 
predictable regulation for firms, based on economic expertise regarding the 
operation of a liberalized market (Baldwin et al. 2012; Ogus 2004).  
However, neither capture concerns regarding firms of Government consider the way 
in which particular ideas might similarly ‘capture’ a regulatory institution. The 
implications of regulatory agencies being restrained by a particular way of 
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regulating is identified and analysed by Sunstein who describes the impact of 
“epistemic capture” (Sunstein 2014). Sunstein (2014) uses case studies from US 
regulators’ use of cost-benefit analysis to explain how influential ideas limit the 
range of possibilities that are investigated and implemented. Rather than capture 
by specific firms or organisations at a point in time, epistemic capture explains the 
important role of particular types of ideas within regulatory procedures. Important 
to analysing regulatory outcomes, researcher needs to be able to differentiate 
between “undue influence – perhaps in the form of epistemic capture – or a 
desirable form of information gathering” (Sunstein, 2014 p. 33).  
The role that this type of capture might play beyond Sunstein’s (2014) investigation 
of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the US had yet to be applied 
in any other country or regulatory agency at the time of writing.  While research in 
Regulatory Studies had yet to analyse the impact of the role that ‘epistemic 
capture’ could play in GB regulatory policy development, the ideas that were most 
likely to be influential in GB economic regulation had been clearly identified. The 
framework of economic regulation of energy is from the field of economics and this 
may preclude the regulatory institutions from a focus on topics related to 
affordability. 
Rare consideration of participation in regulatory procedures, beyond considering 
regulated firms, can be found in two studies that focus on the consideration of 
‘regulatory participation’ of citizens in housing regulation (Haber 2015) and water 
regulation (Haber and Heims 2016). Regulatory participation in England and Sweden 
was described as impacting the interventions of regulators on behalf of vulnerable 
communities in society (Haber 2015; Haber and Heims 2016).  However, while 
Haber and Lodge (2015) and Haber and Heims (2016) identified a novel way of 
working in particular regulatory agencies where regulators engage with citizens, the 
field had yet to extend these findings into sectors beyond housing and water. 
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In the preceding section, three areas of regulatory studies are described as 
providing insight that was useful to understanding the extent to which regulatory 
policy in GB could be considered as fair. These are the institutional arrangements of 
Independent Regulatory Agencies within the British Model of economic regulation, 
the basis of legitimate regulation in accountability procedures and legal statue, and 
finally the participation of citizens and regulated firms in regulatory procedures. 
While the research described in this section provided a useful foundation, there 
remained significant gaps.  
GB energy regulation is the topic of a historic description of the implementation of 
the British Model to trace energy supply from direct management of a public service 
to policies of market creation (Helm, 2004; Pollitt, 2012; Wright, 2007). However, 
this institutional design in terms of regulatory policy making has implications. In 
particular, the implications of the institutions of the British Model of economic 
regulation are that the economic regulator focuses on the economic logics of 
market participants and market outcomes. With an economic focus on the people 
who use electricity and gas, people are understood as rational purchasing 
consumers (Deller and Vantaggiato 2014; Mantzari and Ioannidou 2019). Research 
had yet to explore the implications for regulatory legitimacy of a shift from citizen 
to consumer. Instead, the sole focus of concern was that the neutrality of 
structures seeking to embed economic experts might be overestimated (Baldwin et 
al. 2012; Bishop, Kay, and Mayer 1994; Ogus 2004).  
Research from Regulatory Studies also provided indicative experience for the 
analysis of governance structures, including regulatory agencies (Baldwin et al. 
2012; Levi-Faur 2011). Further, it provided a foundation for the exploration of the 
possible impact of economic regulation as a source of policies that focus on markets 
that have implications for people in their homes (Haber 2015; Haber and Heims 
2016). However, research from Regulatory Studies had yet to analyse the extent to 
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which regulation could be conceptualised as inequitable or unfair. As described in 
Chapter 1, inequitable outcomes of energy regulation were posed as a challenge for 
fair energy prices in GB. While this had yet to be the focus within Regulatory 
Studies, inequalities regarding the outcomes of policies regarding affordability of 
energy was a focus within Energy Justice research. 
2.3 Energy Justice 
Regulatory Studies provided the study with important insights into the role of 
economic regulators broadly and Ofgem specifically. However, it had yet to 
consider the role of fairness in energy regulation or extend empirical research into 
understanding how fairness might relate to regulatory legitimacy. As a 
consequence, this thesis also drew on the insights from research into Energy Justice 
research, which directly engages with concerns relating to fairness within energy 
policies in terms of the outcomes for people who need energy services (Heffron and 
McCauley 2017; K. Jenkins et al. 2018; Sovacool 2013).  
Energy Justice research focuses on the “just-ness” of energy policy procedures and 
outcomes, drawing upon two key arenas of normative research: the philosophical 
discussions of justice in society and the longstanding application of these 
philosophical discussions to issues regarding environmental policy (Heffron and 
McCauley 2017; Sovacool 2013; Sovacool et al. 2016; Sovacool and Dworkin 2015a). 
Energy Justice aims to provide an analytical framework for research to identify and 
reveal the values implicit in energy systems as they exist. This then enables 
decision-making regarding the transformation of energy systems based on positive 
ethical procedures and outcomes.  
Energy Justice is based on the more longer standing and wider ranging field of 
Environmental Justice research, which focuses on three concerns regarding 
injustice: distribution, recognition and procedures (Bickerstaff et al. 2013; 
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Schlosberg 2009, 2013; Schlosberg and Collins 2014). Distribution focuses on the 
way in which environmental hazards impact some groups but not others. 
Recognition concerns the way in which some groups, particularly along racial or 
ethnic lines, are excluded from the evaluation of the impacts of environmental 
hazards. Procedures involve the information that is available regarding 
environmental hazards, the availability of redress available for those they impact 
and the extent to which decision-making is unbiased and accessible (Goldthau and 
Sovacool 2012; Hunold and Young 1998; Walker 2012). 
These three types of injustice do not stand alone but can cause and reinforce one 
another, with those whose needs are already respected in society being more likely 
to have their needs recognised and acted upon through the redistribution of 
resources (Schlosberg 2009; Sovacool and Dworkin 2015a; Walker 2012). The 
implications from the findings of Environmental Justice research are explained by 
Schlosberg (2009) using the diagram reproduced below in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 Schlosberg Interactions of Environmental Injustice 
(Reproduced from Schlosberg, 2009) 
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In the diagram above, each of the three pillars of environmental injustice -
distribution, participation and recognition - are captured in the shaded boxes. The 
diagram identifies specific causes of environmental injustice (Schlosberg 2009; 
Walker 2012). The reasons for injustice (statements beginning with “Because”) have 
an effect on the pillars of injustice (represented with arrows).  It explains that 
distributional injustice can lead to discrimination in the allocation of resources. 
This limits the resources that some groups have that could ensure that their rights 
are recognised. This in turn means that unrecognised groups can face barriers to 
participating in policy procedures that relate to decisions in Environmental Policy. 
The participation in procedures that is required under procedural justice are 
therefore undermined by inequalities of participation in decision-making 
procedures. This in turn means that the chance to correct distributional inequalities 
is limited due to a lack of participation of particular groups.  
While Energy Justice research adopts much of the framework used in  
Environmental Justice research, it proposes two significant adaptations (K. Jenkins 
et al. 2018; McCauley et al. 2013). Firstly, it proposes that Energy Justice research 
should be practically minded, specifically seeking to engage with and be used by 
decision makers. Secondly, it proposes adaptations to distribution, recognition and 
procedural justice concerns to a focus on the energy system specifically. Energy 
Justice research therefore has “the intention that energy justice can exist as a 
solution-based framework that not only characterises injustices but can also help 
tackle them” (Jenkins and Martiskainen 2018, p.38). Energy Justice and 
Environmental Justice are distinct but the interaction of distributional, recognition 
and procedural injustice hold in both fields of research (Bouzarovski and Simcock 
2017; K. Jenkins et al. 2018; Sovacool and Dworkin 2015a). 
While some research incorporates recognition justice themes in concerns regarding 
procedural justice, the majority of contemporary Energy Justice research accepts 
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the centrality of recognition of all in analysing justice and therefore articulates 
findings in line with Jenkins et al. (2016) in that their analysis seeks to reveal 
distributional, procedural and recognition injustice . 
Energy Justice research adopts the structure of justice concerns as articulated in 
Environmental Justice and explores three “pillars” of justice: distribution, 
recognition and procedures (Sovacool 2013; Sovacool et al. 2016; Sovacool and 
Dworkin 2015a). Building on the insights and experience of empirical work in 
environmental justice (Schlosberg 2009; Walker 2012) and ethical considerations of 
the impact of energy policies (Sovacool 2013; Sovacool and Dworkin 2015a), a 
framework of questions can be applied to different contexts, countries and historic 
periods to reveal injustices (Jenkins, McCauley, and Forman 2017; Sovacool et al. 
2017).  
The first pillar of the energy justice framework is distributional justice. This 
focuses on identifying the way that energy resources and energy-related sources of 
harm are distributed within society, connected to the whole energy system (Heffron 
and McCauley 2017; Jenkins, Middlemiss, and Pharoah 2011). Distributional justice, 
both in energy policy and beyond, is traditionally the focus of social policy (Jenkins 
et al. 2017; Snell et al. 2015). Distributional justice concerns are the focus of 
policies regarding the provision of income to provide a safety net for particular 
demographics of individuals through the benefits system. In GB these policies were 
developed initially through primary legislation in Parliament with detailed 
formulation commonly sitting with the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP). 
Distributional policies in GB were formulated, implemented and delivered 
predominantly at the UK level at Westminster. 
However, the affordability of energy to people in their homes is affected by 
regulatory policy as well as the traditional arenas of social policy. The explicit 
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policies of distribution with regard to affordable energy in GB relates to the 
distribution of funds committed to ensuring particular groups have access to energy 
services; in particular, the policies that distribute funds to keep people warm in 
their homes (Simcock et al. 2016b). The role of the GB energy regulator and 
regulated firms in delivering these funds is described in Chapter 1. However, at the 
time of writing, there had yet to be research which describes the implications of 
the existing delivery mechanism of these schemes, i.e. regulated firms, on 
considerations of energy justice.  
The second pillar of the energy justice framework is recognition justice. 
Recognition justice concerns highlight the importance of respecting the different 
needs of communities and individuals (Honneth 1996; Jenkins et al. 2014; Young 
2011). Recognition is conceptualised as central to justice concerns due to the 
concern that groups can be stigmatised and excluded. In particular, low income 
groups can be stigmatised to justify situations of material deprivation (Bouzarovski 
2018; Snell et al. 2015). In this study, the most significant foundation for energy 
recognition justice was derived from the environmental and social justice analysis 
in the work of Nancy Fraser. Fraser (1998) argued that recognition justice analysis 
involves assessing the ways in which institutional power hierarchies and cultural 
norms stop policy procedures from granting all citizens equal respect. Central to 
Fraser’s proposals are two conditions for recognition justice. First, there must be 
equality of participation based on economic equality. Economic inequality between 
citizens will mean that they do not have equal recognition in policy procedures. 
Second, implicit institutional assumptions that “systemically depreciate some 
categories of people and the qualities associated with them” (Fraser 1995, p. 36) 
must be identified and removed. Importantly, these two dimensions of justice are 
not necessarily causal or necessarily separable. Rather, individual cases must be 
examined to review their interplay in particular institutional settings at particular 
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points in history to identify possible causes of recognition injustice related to either 
or indeed both. Frasers’ work set ambitious goals with a high bar for recognition 
justice in regulatory policy formulation. Both economic equality and embedded 
institutional assumptions are far broader issues than a single utility regulator. 
However, the energy justice framework that incorporates Fraser’s theoretical 
contribution (Fraser 1995) provided this study with an important lens to analyse 
concerns regarding recognition justice. 
Recognition injustice within the energy justice framework focuses on the energy 
implications of this theory. Rather than broader participation in society, the focus 
is on the specific goals of universal access to affordable, sustainable energy 
(Bickerstaff et al. 2013; Heffron and McCauley 2017; Jenkins et al. 2011; McCauley 
et al. 2013). This is in line with McCauley et al. (2013) who describe how ways of 
recognizing the vulnerability of misrepresented and under-represented people are 
required in the study of energy justice. While vulnerability is a single aspect of 
recognition, it is central to understanding regulatory policy formulation in GB. This 
element of research is strongly associated with the evolution of energy justice 
concerns with environmental justice.  For example, this particularly explains the 
unequal burden on particular communities in relation to highly polluting 
infrastructure. When considering the injustices of recognition, the needs of 
communities and individuals therefore need to be understood, articulated and 
actioned. In the context of energy services in the home, these different needs are 
connected to the variations between people with regards to the heating, lighting 
and cooling required for wellbeing. In the context of GB energy policy, these needs 
have been most frequently articulated as those of particular demographic groups. 
Hurlbert and Rayner (2018) investigated recognition justice in the context of 
Canadian energy justice for Aboriginal people (Hurlbert and Rayner 2018). In their 
study they found that following legal procedures to support parity of participation 
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does not deliver recognition justice. This is because there is inequitable recognition 
of Aboriginal peoples. Being provided with an opportunity to participate was 
insufficient to ensure that Aboriginal people were treated as equal citizens with 
policy procedures, despite the opportunities to contribute to the procedures 
themselves.  
The cases explored in Energy Justice research, such as this Canadian one, reveal 
that recognition injustice varies enormously across elements of the energy system 
and geographical location. One element of consistency across the cases, though, is 
the manner in which recognition injustice is identified. 
Firstly, there is consideration of the needs of individuals, communities and groups 
affected by an energy related decision. Researchers identify what steps are taken 
to understand the needs of effected groups. However, identifying and 
understanding energy related needs is insufficient for energy justice (Simcock et al. 
2016b; Walker 2012). Secondly, action needs to be taken to ensure that any 
identified inequalities or specific needs are understood and acted upon. The 
procedures of action then make up the third and final pillar of energy justice: 
procedural justice. 
Procedural justice relates to the procedures that are undertaken to distribute the 
benefits and costs associated with energy. Specifically, Procedural justice is the 
description within Energy Justice research for just inclusion in the procedures of 
developing and delivering policies at all levels. Decision-making regarding energy 
operates at a variety of different governance levels that vary by case. For example, 
the institutional design of individual countries will vary globally. Further, even 
within a particular country there may be different institutions and organisations 
that consider different elements of the energy system (Jenkins et al. 2014). For 
example, decision-making about the location of infrastructure commonly varies 
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significantly from decision-making regarding allocation of funding to households and 
market design (K. E. Jenkins et al. 2018; Walker 2012; Walker and Devine-Wright 
2008) . The commonality across the complexities of different cases of procedural 
justice is a concern about equitable participation within decision making.  
Reflecting the complexity of the different possible routes for procedures of policy, 
procedural justice has been further broken down into three measures: access to 
information, access to meaningful participation in decision making procedures and 
access to legal procedures for redress or to challenge the decision-making (Heffron 
and McCauley 2017; Jenkins et al. 2014; McCauley et al. 2013). Access to 
information includes information regarding the opportunities to engage in policy 
procedures and any relevant information about the policy impact, for example, the 
transparent publication of statistics related to the problem a policy seeks to solve 
and any data used to predict the future impact of a policy. This information is 
central to procedural justice because it provides the opportunity for existing 
policies or possible requirements of policy to be explained by those who are not 
already part of the institutional decision-making (Agyeman, 2013; Simcock, 2016). 
The second measure of access to legal procedures is the right to challenge 
outcomes and receive redress if policy outcomes are not just. This includes legal 
rights to participate in procedures of decision-making as they occur and then 
procedures to challenge the decisions made. These challenges are most regularly 
the focus of legal procedures (Heffron and McCauley 2017; McCauley et al. 2013). 
However, a notable feature of energy markets is the presence of alternative dispute 
mechanisms (ADR) whereby organisations provide mediation to investigate and 
make decisions regarding concerns (Baldwin et al. 2010b; Mantzari and Ioannidou 
2019; Ogus 2004). In the majority of European Union countries, including GB, these 
are Ombudsmen. The third measure of procedural justice is meaningful 
participation. This element of procedural justice has been the focus of the majority 
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of research regarding procedural justice within Energy Justice research, due to the 
enduring debates regarding the extent to which particular types of participation 
can be confidently proposed as “meaningful” (Bickerstaff et al. 2013; Simcock et al. 
2016b; Walker and Devine-Wright 2008).  
Before this thesis, the Energy Justice framework had not been applied to the 
regulatory policies of Ofgem between 2000 and 2016. However, it had been applied 
to affordable energy policies in Great Britain. In GB Energy Policy, an adaptation 
was proposed to apply the Environmental Justice interaction frame described in 
Figure 2.1 to affordable energy policy in UK (Schlosberg 2009).  
The seminal article by Walker and Day (2012) identified how the interaction of 
injustice took place in the Government policy area of fuel poverty.  ‘Fuel Poverty’ 
is a concept that is separate from poverty and was developed in the UK to describe 
the inability of particular households to afford energy (Boardman 2013; Isherwood 
and Hancock 1979). A household is identified as being ‘in fuel poverty’ if their 
spend on energy to heat and light the home exceeds 10% of income. This definition 
of ‘fuel poverty’ was adopted across the EU and was maintained in the UK, with the 
exception of England, from 2010 onwards (Department of Energy and Climate 
Change 2015a; Mould and Baker 2017). 
In their study, Walker and Day (2012) analyse experiences of fuel poverty advocacy 
and policy development to argue for the extension of concerns of injustice from the 
inequalities of distributional outcomes. Walker and Day (2012) describe an unequal 
distribution of three factors, arguing that households cannot, in practice, secure 
warmth due to these different distributional inequalities: inequality of income, 
inequality of price levels and inequalities of housing fabric.  
In addition to the distributional injustices, UK fuel poverty policy led to recognition 
of diverse needs because fuel poverty has different consequences for different 
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types of demographic groups. Their focus on recognition injustices relates to the 
failures of powerful policy actors to “accord some groups of people equal respect 
and equal rights as others” (Walker and Day 2012, p. 71). The elderly have higher 
energy needs related to affordable warmth but have, in some UK policies, had this 
need recognised. However, they conclude that this is unlikely to be the case for all 
groups in need of affordable energy in their home. Walker and Day (2012) apply 
their insight to interaction of injustices described by Schlosberg and is reproduced 
here in Figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2 Interacting Injustice of UK Fuel Poverty Policy 
Reproduced from Walker and Day, 2012 
 
Figure 2.2 explains the interaction of procedural, distributional and recognition 
injustice, resulting in inequalities in access to energy services. Distributional 
injustice applies the UK Government’s definition of fuel poverty at the time and 
concludes that fuel poverty is an injustice of income, energy price and energy 
efficiency. Walker and Day (2012) conclude that there are injustices of recognition 
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related to unequal accordance of respect and a lack of recognition of differential 
needs for energy services. Finally, their framework focuses on procedural injustices 
regarding Government policy and institutions of Government.  This insight has the 
foundation for understanding that identification as “fuel poor” or “eligible” for an 
assistance scheme can occur in a more or less just manner (Simcock et al. 2016b; 
Snell et al. 2014, 2015).  
Subsequent research since 2012 regarding issues connected to fuel poverty poses 
two important challenges to this articulation of the interactions of recognition, 
distributional and procedural justice. The first limitation of existing applications of 
Walker and Day’s (2012) adaption of the interaction of injustice from Environmental 
Justice is that it is limited in its engagement with the broader governance 
structures that impact fuel poverty and affordable energy. Specifically, it excludes 
consideration of the regulatory institutions that have an influence on energy prices, 
which, in turn, impact the policies related to fuel poverty. The second limitation of 
Walker and Day (2012) is that this model adopts the frame of inequalities in access 
to energy services as the three areas of fuel poverty policy in the UK – income, 
energy efficiency and energy prices. This focus on only three factors has been 
challenged for omitting the far broader range of factors that make up the lived 
experience of unequal access to energy services. This is due to the specific way of 
defining fuel poverty in the UK underpinned by statute (Warm Homes and Energy 
Conservation Act, 2000). While the definition used by Walker and Day (2012) 
reflects early academic work in the field of fuel poverty (Boardman, 2013; 
Isherwood and Hancock, 1979), contemporary studies have challenged the fuel 
poverty label as a useful one for describing unaffordable energy in the home. “Fuel 
Poverty” is argued to be limited in practice and has neared theoretical 
obsolescence (Bouzarovski and Petrova 2015; Day, Walker, and Simcock 2016). 
Instead, lived experience of limited access to energy must include access to 
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affordable energy and energy infrastructure. The application of this broader 
concept is intended to incorporate the social practices of households using energy. 
The term proposed to capture this broad conceptualisation is energy service 
poverty.  
Within the Fuel Poverty literature, these differences in definition are debated and 
tested in terms of practical delivery of government led programmes for carbon 
savings and income maximisation. The programmes focused on analysis of economic 
and engineering models of energy use on a technical rather than societal or political 
level. Contemporary research proposes that this technical focus risks a depoliticised 
and technical debate that fails to provide a platform for a needed debate on which 
groups in society have access to support from “Fuel Poverty” alleviation policies 
(Middlemiss and Gillard 2015; Simcock et al. 2016b). Specifically, research 
regarding low income families with children and disabled households to policy and 
programmes suggests that these groups are unjustly excluded (Middlemiss 2017; 
Snell et al. 2015).  Responding to the existing policy frame may incorporate the 
injustices of a limited frame embedded within that Government program (Simcock 
et al. 2016b; Thomson, Snell, and Liddell 2016). 
The implications of a specific definition are analysed by Middlemiss (2017) who 
identifies the consequences of the introduction of a new definition of Fuel Poverty 
in England in 2011. The shift in definition did pose a significant reduction in the 
overall level and the specific groups that made up households in fuel poverty in 
England. This analysis explains both the explicit change in fuel poverty definition 
within residential energy policy but also the implicit changes in the scale of the 
commitment of policy actors (from eradication to a condition that can only be 
alleviated) and the adoption of the broader discourse of the Coalition Government 
(2010-2015) of ‘austerity’, through targeting a far more specific group of ‘most’ in 
need (Gillard et al. 2017; Middlemiss 2017). 
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While the adoption of one term or another in academic discourses may engage with 
a similar if not identical concern about the injustice of excluding some from 
affordable, sustainable energy, this ongoing debate regarding definitions explains 
an important consideration for recognition justice. Further research is therefore 
required to analyse to what extent the Energy Justice framework of interacting 
injustice is fit for purpose with contemporary understandings of the significant 
limitation of the frame of ‘fuel poverty’ in the existing institutional setting 
(including that of the original authors, Gordon Walker and Rosie Day).  
The two limitations of Walker and Day (2012) – the adoption of the traditional fuel 
poverty frame and the narrow focus on government policy procedures – have been 
unevenly explored by subsequent research. As described above, the limitation 
regarding the adoption of the fuel poverty frame as defined within UK policy is the 
focus of existing research (Simcock et al. 2016a; Snell et al. 2015; Thomson et al. 
2016). However, the limitation a focus solely on UK Government policy has yet to 
be analysed. 
A focus on Government policy in understanding the possible injustices of 
unaffordable energy for people in their home could be a significant shortcoming for 
two reasons. Firstly, it excludes consideration of the regulatory agencies. As 
described in section 2.2, these institutions have had a significant role in the UK and 
their exclusion from analysis is likely to provide only a partial view of policy 
outcomes regarding the injustice of unaffordable energy.  
The limitations of analysis that does not engage with the key institutions regarding 
energy policy is likely to have important implications for understanding any unjust 
outcomes of policy. This is because procedural and recognition justice analysis 
specifically set out to reveal the inequalities that play out within procedures that, 
in the UK, play out within regulatory institutions. The possible implications for a 
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particular institution impacting the procedures and outcomes related to a policy, 
have been analysed by existing research and are described in the section below.  
 
2.4 How Energy Institutions “Know” Consumers 
Understanding how procedures occur within institutions that are developing and 
implementing energy policies provides insight into how those policies are shaped by 
the implicit assumptions of that specific institution (Cotton and Devine-Wright 
2012; Kuzemko 2014; Shove 1997; Shove and Walker 2014). Within the field of 
Energy Studies, research explains how these implicit assumptions are embedded 
and replicated in particular ways of understanding, or ‘knowledges’, regarding 
energy and the people who use energy (Devine-Wright 2007; Shove 1997).  An 
important underpinning assumption regarding ‘knowledges’ in policy making is that 
there is no single ‘correct’ way in which something could or should be understood. 
Instead, there are competing perspectives which are more or less likely to be used 
in forming a particular way of knowing (Fischer et al., 2015; Strassheim, 2015).   
Research regarding ‘knowledges’ explains the important role that the embedded 
nature of specific knowledges plays in prioritising particular types of knowledge and 
associated ‘experts’ (Nilsson et al. 2008; Nowotny 2003). Particularly relevant are 
the considerations of the institutional adoption of particular expectations regarding 
what is ‘useable’ knowledge within a policy arena (Boswell 2008; Weiss 1979). The 
types of ‘knowledges’ with their associated ‘experts’ then influence the acceptable 
policy institutions policy instruments (Geddes and Sullivan 2011; Hay 2002). The 
prioritisation therefore impacts the form and focus of policy and its resulting 
legislation and regulations (Frerichs 2011; Rischkowsky and Döring 2008). 
The way in which institutions have particular implicit assumptions associated with a 
particular sets of knowledges has important implications for the way in which 
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policies are developed in terms of their outcomes. This includes a key consideration 
of how particular individuals and groups are conceptualised and ‘targeted’ (Ingram 
& Schneider, 2015). Ingram and Schneider (2005) probe how particular ways of 
conceptualising and representing certain populations as ‘deserving’ or ‘undeserving’ 
impact policies.  This approach to policy research explains that policy narratives 
incorporate implicit and explicit understandings of a diverse range of values – from 
high level beliefs about the role of government in society to detailed definitions 
characterizing particular groups or individuals. This raises the important concern 
that the prioritisation of specific types of expertise can lead to undemocratic values 
being embedded in policy-making procedures (Ingram & Schneider, 2015; 
Strassheim & Kettunen, 2014). 
A rare study of decision-making at Ofgem identifies that the values associated with 
the economic focus of Ofgem does have implications for the types of topics that 
they engage with regarding affordable energy. In their study of Ofgem’s response to 
carbon reduction policies, Scrase and Ockwell (2010) describe how the manner in 
which regulatory policy problems were understood led to solutions focused solely on 
competitive procedures. This focus resulted in regulatory policies that attempted 
deliver efficient prices and failed to engage with discussions about unaffordable 
energy being associated with cold weather-related deaths (Scrase and Ockwell 
2010).  
In addition to the consideration of how implicit assumptions may influence the 
extent to which institutions engage, or fail to engage, with particular topics of 
policy, further case studies from Energy Studies describe the implications that these 
embedded implicit assumptions may have for the influence of particular concepts. 
The manner in which people are conceptualised in energy policy development and 
the implication for policy decisions, has been described focusing solely on people as 
‘consumers’ within energy policy, and include assumptions about a desirable level 
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of interaction with the market (Berg and Gornitzka 2012; Devine-Wright 2007; 
Wilhite et al. 2000).  This conceptualization of consumers as having a desirable 
level of market interaction results in a dominant concept of consumers in terms of 
‘deficits’ in understanding and / or behaviour (Catney et al. 2014; Devine-Wright 
2007). With regards to energy policies developed by GB institutions, this resulted in 
“…a social representation of the ‘energy public’ that is overwhelmingly 
characterized by deficits: of interests, knowledge, rationality and environmental 
and social responsibility” (Devine-Wright, 2007, p69). Thus, institutions that co-
ordinate procedures of policy development implicitly adopt the assumption that 
individuals who are given ‘better’ information and ‘appropriate’ incentives will 
change their behaviour and act in a manner consistent with environmental policy 
aims (Devine-Wright 2007, Hargreaves 2011, Shove and Walker 2014). For example, 
the UK government department responsible for environmental policy, DEFRA, had 
an understanding of behaviour of individuals as being characterised by “rational 
self-interest, attitude/motivation or habit” (Shove, 2012, p2).  
The analysis of how this understanding of ‘consumers’ characterised by ‘deficits’ 
identifies an important impact on how and when ‘non-industry affiliated groups and 
individuals’ are involved (if at all) in policy regarding the development and planning 
of energy networks. The conceptualisation of people as ‘consumers’ and 
‘customers’ is expressed negatively as: 
“…either expressing an absence of ability or interest, or by being conditional or 
bounded by effort, time, location, resources or degree of social influence. They 
conceived “people” as lacking interest, care, action, time, knowledge or 
understanding and hence were outside or “other” to members within the 
electricity industry.” (Cotton and Devine-Wright, 2012, p12) 
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Instead, ‘technical experts’ from within industry provide information to specific 
groups or subgroups of ‘the public’ at points in time selected by institutional bodies 
as set in statute (such as in Planning Regulations). Policy development and 
implementation regarding networks, therefore, is constrained in the manner and 
timing of those outside of the industry by specific understandings of ‘relevant’ 
perspectives. In the example of decision-making regarding electricity networks, 
there is an important implication as to how people are conceptualised in terms of 
how they are able to participate. The way that these experts conceptualize 
consumers is key because of the manner in which some can use their strategic role 
to transform or reinforce particular types of policy debates (Strassheim, Jung, and 
Korinek 2015).  
The concern regarding participation is considered in terms of the provision of 
opportunity to meaningfully participate in procedures in a non-discriminatory way 
(Chilvers 2010; Lovell 2007; Schlosberg 2009). In the UK there were procedures to 
include comments from members of the public and other interested parties as 
decisions were made regarding multiple elements of the energy system (Devine-
Wright 2007; Sovacool 2013; Walker and Devine-Wright 2008). However, the 
procedures aiming to include the public were criticised for being limited in their 
timeliness and creating a further set of barriers to participation in bounding what 
was an ‘official’ and acceptable way of participating and what was not (Chilvers 
and Longhurst 2016; Pallett and Chilvers 2013).  
While this literature engages directly with ways of knowing people, it had not, to 
date, engaged with how this relates to procedural or recognition justice concerns, 
despite a shared concern with inclusive energy policy development. Insight 
regarding the role that knowledges play in shaping procedures of policy 
development provided important insight for this thesis into the way in which 
particular experts and included (or not) and the implications that this might have 
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on how people who use energy are understood. As inclusive policy procedures are 
an important factor in the legitimacy of regulatory institutions, analysing ways of 
knowing consumers could provide insight to address the issues explored in this 
thesis by explaining the extent that Ofgem could be said to have had inclusive and 
therefore legitimate policy development procedures. 
2.5 Implications of Knowing Consumers in Regulation 
In this literature review I have described the existing research that provided partial 
insights into whether or not energy market regulation in GB between 2000 and 2016 
was just. Existing research that focuses specifically on regulators as institutions, 
i.e. Regulatory Studies, articulates justice concerns as regulatory legitimacy. 
Regulatory legitimacy is articulated as important but rarely researched empirically. 
Research from as early as Baldwin et al. (1998), has highlighted its importance and 
the vital need for a future research agenda to focus on questions of “the language, 
culture and consequence of regulation” (Baldwin et al., p. 40). However, academic 
research that responds to such questions was rare when this study was carried out 
and did not engage with electricity or gas regulation, despite the prominence of 
regulatory analysis of these sectors in Regulatory Studies  (Cafaggi and Pistor 2015; 
Pérez-Arriaga 2014). 
Beyond the research conducted in the field of Regulatory Studies, analysis of energy 
policy decision-making provided an alternative foundation of literature in Energy 
Studies. Research regarding the implications of how people who use energy are 
understood by those making policy, explains the importance of embedded implicit 
assumptions in understanding what kind of policies are seen as “possible, plausible 
or worthwhile” (Shove 2012, p. 2). 
Research described in section 2.4 concerns the influence of the concept of 
‘consumers’ in some spheres of energy policy-making. This body of research shows 
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that the most influential way of understanding people who use energy in their 
homes is that of a ‘consumer’ and that this embeds an assumption of deficits in 
understanding of energy. No research attempted to identify whether the same held 
true for Ofgem. This is particularly important for research within Regulatory Studies 
where the characterisation of ‘consumers’ is taken for granted. If people in their 
homes were predominantly conceptualised as ‘consumers’, the case findings from 
Section 2.4 suggest that the implications of institutional embedded implicit 
assumptions regarding ‘consumers’ is likely to reveal limits to participation in 
decision-making. The implications of these limits to is in providing an important 
insight into how procedural justice might be undermined. This in turn is likely to 
have implications for distributional and recognition justice as well as regulatory 
legitimacy. 
If implicit embedded assumptions within procedures do have the effect observed in 
other energy institutions of reducing the ability of citizens to participate equally in 
procedures, this would have an impact on whether these procedures were just. This 
in turn would have important implications for the legitimacy of the regulator. 
Further, embedded implicit assumptions could have an important effect on 
regulatory outcomes. Sunstein’s observation of ‘epistemic capture’ within some 
regulatory procedures in the US, describes a risk to regulatory legitimacy if the 
effects of powerful ideas within regulatory institutions are not acknowledged 
(Sunstein 2014). The implications of Sunstein’s results are particularly concerning 
considering the finding within Energy Studies that the way that experts 
conceptualize consumers is key because of the manner in which some can use their 
strategic role to transform or reinforce particular types of policy debates 
(Strassheim and Kettunen 2014).  
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New analysis is therefore needed to explain whether unjust regulatory policy 
formulation in GB undermines regulatory legitimacy. This requires direct 
engagement with the operation and outputs of regulatory institutions within GB and 
identification of the embedded implicit assumptions that shape them.  This thesis 
therefore investigated the extent to which regulatory policy formulation was 
affected by the way in which people who use energy in their homes were 
understood. Specifically, it will pose the question “What role did knowledges of 
‘consumers’ play in the formulation of GB energy market regulation between 2000 
and 2016?”. 
(Scott 2006)  
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Chapter 3 – Research Strategy & Methodology  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I explain the methodology I used to answer the question ““What 
role did knowledges of ‘consumers’ play in the formulation of GB energy market 
regulation between 2000 and 2016?”. In the sections below, I explain the detail of 
my methodological choices and their application. First, I identify how regulatory 
decision-making functioned in this period. What decisions were made? Who made 
them and where? This provided the foundation to identify the knowledges that were 
visible in publications of regulatory procedures. Previous research, as I explained in 
Chapter 2, found that describing the procedures used by decision makers would not 
be sufficient, because the embedded assumptions within institutions could limit the 
role of some knowledges and prioritise others (Cotton and Devine-Wright 2012; 
Shove 1997; Simcock and Walker 2015). To identify and analyse the role of 
knowledges within regulatory procedures, I therefore selected three frameworks to 
reveal institutional assumptions within procedures and their implications for policy 
outcomes.  
First, the Energy Justice framework (EJF) was chosen to reveal the extent to which 
knowledges of energy needs were acknowledged by regulatory policy makers in 
their decisions and the extent to which procedures included diverse insights 
regarding energy needs. Second, the Tools of Policy Formulation (TPF) framework 
traces the role of knowledges in the tools used by regulators to make policy, 
explaining how different knowledges play a role. Third, the What is the Problem 
Represented to be (WPR) framework exposes the implicit assumptions that explain 
why particular knowledges play a specific role in regulatory policy procedures. Each 
individual framework poses a series of questions which cumulatively provide insight 
into the role of knowledges within regulatory procedures. This novel combination of 
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three contemporary analytic frameworks enabled me to build insight through an 
iterative approach, uncovering important features of regulatory procedures not 
visible through analysis using a single framework. The insights available to future 
researchers from combining these three frameworks are explained in Chapter 8. 
Each of these frameworks requires insight into the detailed operation of regulatory 
procedures. I therefore produced this detailed insight by building a corpus of 
publicly available documents related to regulatory policymaking and transcripts of 
elite interviews that I conducted for this thesis. I then used documentary analysis, 
process tracing, thematic analysis of the corpus I built, to respond to questions 
posed by all three frameworks. However, this did not reveal sufficient detail of how 
and why some knowleges played a more prominent role than others. For a subset of 
questions in the TPF and WPR frameworks I also conducted qualitative content 
analysis in the manner explained in section 3.3. 
In summary, this chapter explains how each framework reveals important features 
of energy market regulation procedures that impact the roles that different 
knowledges of consumers played between 2000 and 2016. Having described the 
three frameworks that guided my analysis, I explain the data collection and analysis 
I undertook to answer my research question. 
3.2 Frameworks 
 
To reveal the role of different knowledges within regulatory policy procedures, I 
adopted three frameworks. In Chapter 2, my literature review identified that the 
role of different knowledges might have important implications for due procedure 
concerns in regulation and a concern with the fairness of outcomes of energy 
policies embedded within the contemporary multi-disciplinary field of Energy 
Justice. As I explained in Chapter 2, Energy Justice research aims to understand the 
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extent to which UK energy policy can be said to be just or unjust. Research in this 
field has addressed this by identifying the distributional, recognition and procedural 
justice implications associated with a particular energy policy or group of policies 
identified for analysis (K. E. Jenkins et al. 2018; Simcock, Walker, and Day 2016c; 
Sovacool et al. 2019). However, while this framework prompts analysis that can 
reveal injustices of procedures and recognition, it does not follow that this analysis 
will reveal why these injustices exist or how these injustices function. I therefore 
used two further frameworks to reveal how and why injustices occurred in 
regulatory policymaking between 2000 and 2016. 
Analysis that specifically engages with the way that policy-making procedures 
function, including the extent to which they recognise citizens to a greater or lesser 
extent, is the focus of policy studies (Burnham et al. 2008; Fischer et al. 2015; 
Schneider and Ingram 1993; Wodak and Meyer 2015). The theory and methods of 
policy analysis have been applied to energy policy but not to a great extent (Hoppe, 
Coenen, and van den Berg 2016; Sovacool 2014) However, Hoppe et al. (2016) note 
the urgent need for energy research to move beyond the traditional focus on 
economic oriented research and engineering evaluation, due to the transformations 
in societies needed to respond to the challenges of climate change (Hoppe et al. 
2016). They go on to argue that the theory and methods from policy studies are 
currently untapped but provide an important foundation on which to base studies 
that seek to understand policy procedures and their outcomes.  
Policy studies can contribute to understanding procedural and recognition justice by 
explaining the meaning making that affects the outcomes of policy procedures 
(Bacchi 2000; Fischer et al. 2015; Haas 2004). Policy studies incorporate an 
understanding that the meaning making occurring in policy procedures identifies 
limits on how people are ‘known’ in policy, building on the school of thought that 
holds that policy does not take a rationalistic path from ‘problem’ to ‘solution’ 
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(Bacchi 2009b; Fischer et al. 2015). Instead, areas of policy focus can be known in a 
wide range of ways; that is, there are competing ‘knowledges’ (Boswell 2008; Weiss 
1979). As not all ‘knowledges’ have equal influence in policy procedures (Haas 
2004; Nowotny 2003), so identifying which types of knowledges are accepted as 
‘expertise’ within particular debates, is key (Boswell 2009; Devine-Wright 2005b; 
Dunlop 2010). This is because the knowledges that are accepted as credible, salient 
and legitimate, have access to, and influence over, policy  (Boswell 2008; Cash et 
al. 2003; Shove 1997). This perspective from policy studies includes incorporating 
an understanding of how ways of knowing about ‘policy problems’ and of ‘relevant 
solutions’ came about historically and the role of existing contexts and coherence 
with traditions (Bevir and Rhodes 2003; Hay 2002; Marsh and Stoker 2002).  
In order to identify the role that knowledges of consumers play in the formulation 
of energy market regulation, I therefore adopted two frameworks from policy 
studies which provide a way to make visible the implicit assumptions in policy 
regarding the way problems are characterised and represented: “What is the 
Problem Represented to Be” (Bacchi 2009b) and “Tools of Policy 
Formulation”(Jordan and Turnpenny 2015). These, in turn, explain how and why 
policy procedures function (Bacchi 2009a; Jordan and Turnpenny 2015). These two 
frameworks from policy studies are explained in the sections below along with how I 
applied the Energy Justice framework. 
  
3.2.1 Tools of Policy Formulation 
 
In Chapter 1, I explained that the systems of energy regulation in Great Britain did 
not occur spontaneously but were instead designed and implemented in order to 
achieve a set of expected benefits: that competitive markets would result in energy 
prices that were lower than would otherwise be the case, while maintaining 
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investment in the energy system from private firms (Helm 2004; Ogus 2004). This 
governance structure meant that the policies influencing energy prices were made 
predominantly in Ofgem, within their procedures of developing and designing 
policies. A more detailed view was therefore needed to understand how ways of 
knowing at Ofgem played a role in regulatory procedures that resulted in regulatory 
policies. This detailed view is provided by focusing specifically on policy 
formulation: a series of interlinking tasks that resulted in a policy that impacted 
the operation of the energy supply market in GB.  
Policy formulation is the set of procedures that translate policy intentions into a 
policy that can be enacted and has an impact (Howlett 2010; Strassheim and 
Kettunen 2014; Wu et al. 2017). Policy formulation is enacted by individuals within 
institutions and organisations, as they consider evidence and make decisions. Policy 
formulation procedures are made up of five interlinking tasks, undertaken by policy 
formulators within institutions (De Ridder et al. 2007; Dunn 2015; Jordan and 
Turnpenny 2015). The first is problem characterization by policy makers who 
identify issues that require a response. The activities within policy characterization 
include selections of evidence to describe what the problem is and what its cause 
might be, in other words, to describe the nature of the problem (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1991; Kingdon and Thurber 1984; Thomas 2001). The second task is problem 
evaluation that sees policy makers determining the extent of the problem and its 
policy-relevant dimensions (Wolman 1981; Wu et al. 2017). The third task is 
objective specification where the aims to be met by the policy, and the timescales 
for meeting those aims, are set (Howlett 2010; Wu et al. 2017). The fourth task is 
the assessment of different options that might meet those aims (Howlett, 
Mukherjee, and Woo 2015; Wu et al. 2017). The fifth and final task is the design of 
policies: the choice of how a policy might be implemented to respond to the 
problem identified during the first task (Howlett 2010; Howlett et al. 2015; Wolman 
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1981). Policy formulation is a stage of policy making that has been acknowledged as 
opaque in research that analysed Government policy (Hargrove, 1975; Howlett and 
Geist 2012). Not only are formulation activities opaque, they include important 
decision-making procedures that are dominated by those with specialist knowledge 
within an institution (Giest and Howlett 2012; Wu et al. 2017). Policy formulation 
activities are: “a political netherworld, dominated by those with specialist 
knowledge [and] preferred access to decision makers” (Giest and Howlett 2012; p. 
19). 
I therefore set out to uncover the details of regulatory policy formulation with the 
expectations of generating similarly insightful findings. Each of the tasks of policy 
formulation includes drawing on the knowledges of policy makers (Giest and 
Howlett 2012; Jordan and Turnpenny 2015). Explaining the role of consumer 
knowledges within policy formulation tasks in energy market regulation can 
therefore identify which tasks were impacted by what type of knowledges. 
However, even understanding tasks that are undertaken by Ofgem was not 
sufficient to understand how knowledges were being used within tasks of policy 
formulation. This is because identifying the tasks is insufficient to understanding 
what actions the individual actors who are responsible for tasks are doing to 
conduct these tasks (Craft and Howlett 2012; Hisschemöller and Cuppen 2015; 
Howlett et al. 2015; Jordan and Turnpenny 2015; Thomas 2001). To reveal how 
knowledges were used, I identified the tools being used in policy formulation tasks. 
Tools of policy formulation are: 
“a technique, scheme, device or operation… which can be used to collect, condense 
and make sense of different kinds of policy relevant knowledge to perform some or 
all of the various inter-linked tasks of policy formulation.” 
(Jordan and Turnpenny, 2015; p. 269) 
 
 
68 
 
Tools of policy formulation are the mechanisms used by actors to conduct the tasks 
undertaken to produce policies. These include cost – benefit analysis, impact 
assessments, participatory procedures of gathering views, scenario evaluation and 
economic modelling (Dunlop and Radaelli 2019; Eliadis, Hill, and Howlett 2005; 
Howlett 2010; Jordan, Wurzel, and Zito 2013). Each of these tools gathers 
knowledge through a range of different activities, such as listing known costs and 
extrapolating from data the probable impacts or consequences. Specific tools are 
mandated by governments for use by regulators. For example, Ofgem was required 
to use impact assessments where policy decisions would have a material 
consequence for the profitability of firms and use participatory tools to evaluate 
proposals (Department of Business, Innovation and Skills 2011; Ofgem 2005c).  
In “Tools of Policy Formulation”, Jordan and Turnpenny (2015) propose a 
framework to identify which tools are being used to formulate policies. Specifically, 
the Tools of Policy Formulation (TPF) framework proposes that four particular 
aspects of tools are important to examine: actors, venues, capacities and effects. 
These are summarised in Table 3.1 and described below. 
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Table 3.1 Tools of Policy Formulation Analytical Framework   
(Summarised from Jordan & Turnpenny 2015, p. 20-23)  
 
TPF Question TPF Sub Question 
1. Who are the actors participating 
in policy formulation? 
Why did these actors develop and/or 
promote particular tools?  
 
Why were particular tools developed, 
when and by whom? 
 
What values do the tools embody? 
 
2. What factors shape the selection 
and deployment of particular 
tools in particular policy venues? 
 
How do tools and venues intersect in 
practice? 
3. What capacities are enabled by 
tools and the actors who employ 
them? 
What factors enable and/or constrain 
these capacities? 
 
Are there factors which may enable or 
constrain the availability of these 
capacities? 
4. What effects does the tool 
generate when employed? 
What substantive effects does the tool 
generate when employed? 
 
What procedural effects does the tool 
generate when employed? 
 
 
As demonstrated in Table 3.1, the TPF framework sets out four areas of focus. First, 
these tools are used by actors of policy formulation – the employees of the 
institutions with the relevant powers to translate the plans of governments and 
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regulators into the policies that impact citizens (Howlett et al. 2015; Jordan and 
Turnpenny 2015). Second, these actors use tools within venues – institutions that 
are usually within governments but can be in alternative institutions, such as 
regulators, and are the locations where policy formulation tasks are performed 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1991; Jordan and Turnpenny 2015; Timmermans and 
Scholten 2006). Analysing the venues of policy formulation incorporates the 
purposes of tools and what factors within a venue lead to the use of a particular 
tool. Third, the tools are expected to provide particular analytic capacities to the 
actors who are using them within the venues. 
In analysing the capacities related to tools of policy formulation, it is important to 
note that there are constraints regarding the way that analytic capacities are 
provided to actors by tools – the capacities linked to the tool itself and the 
capacities of the actor will both bound the scope of the analytic capacity (Jordan 
and Turnpenny 2015). Previous research has revealed the limitations of the scope of 
particular tools and their use by actors has provided insight regarding the capacities 
of actors using cost - benefit analysis and impact assessment tools (Adelle et al. 
2016; Atkinson et al. 2018; Dunlop and Radaelli 2016; Ferretti 2017; Jordan and 
Turnpenny 2015). Further, participatory tools are expected to extend the analytic 
capacity of actors of policy formulation by bringing new evidence from beyond the 
institution (Cuppen et al. 2010; Hisschemöller and Cuppen 2015; Hisschemöller and 
Hoppe 1995; Smith 2009). However, the embedded values of actors using 
participatory tools in Government policy limited the policy outcomes that resulted 
(Beierle 2010; Chilvers 2010; Hoppe 2018; Pallett and Chilvers 2013; Yearley, 
Forrester, and Bailey 2001). I therefore expected to generate similarly important 
insight from revealing the implications the use of tools had for capacities in 
practice between 2000 and 2016 within Ofgem. 
 
 
71 
 
The fourth and final focus area of the TPF framework is the analysis of the effects 
of the tools of policy formulation, including the intended and unintended effects of 
the tools (Jordan and Turnpenny 2015). In presenting the TPF framework, Jordan 
and Turnpenny (2015) two distinct types of effects of tools were identified: 
substantive effects and procedural effects. Procedural effects are influences on the 
procedures within policy formulation procedures, which could include new 
opportunities to identify particular problems to policy actors or engage with new 
ones (Elliott and Salamon 2002; Turnpenny et al. 2009). Substantive effects are 
outcomes of the tools on the way that problems are understood within policy 
formulation, which can result in new ways of securing policy goals (Lehtonen, 
Sébastien, and Bauler 2016; Smith 2009; Turnpenny et al. 2009). Previous research 
with a focus on energy systems beyond market regulation concluded that the 
embedded implicit assumptions within institutions shaped the way that people were 
known and therefore the outcomes of policies (Cotton and Devine-Wright 2012; 
Devine-Wright 2012; Scrase and Ockwell 2009; Shove 1997). By adopting the TPF, I 
intended to trace the impact of embedded implicit assumptions on the way that 
people were known within Ofgem and the impact that this had on the policies that 
resulted. Those who design or use tools may have a particular intention for a tool to 
have a particular effect (Elliott and Salamon 2002; Voß and Simons 2014). By 
incorporating analysis of the effects of tools in my thesis, I aimed to ensure that an 
empirical focus captured both the intended and unintended effects of tool use 
within Ofgem. 
3.2.2 What is the Problem Represented to Be? 
 
As I explained in Chapter 2, research analysing energy policies regarding climate 
change and energy infrastructure placement identified important consequences of 
specific discourses and their associated expectations of expertise on policy making 
procedures and outcomes (Cotton and Devine-Wright 2011, 2012; Devine-Wright 
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2012; Scrase and Ockwell 2010; Shove 1997; Wilhite et al. 2000). This research 
indicated that to answer my research question, identifying expectations regarding 
expertise would be central. Further, historically contingent ways of knowing are 
important because they operate as a key restraint on institutions and policy actors 
by constraining ‘conventional’ understandings and existing rules of procedures 
(Fischer et al. 2015). In understanding the role that particular knowledges play I 
also drew on the findings from research in diverse fields showing that the 
development of new ways of knowing can be a significant challenge in policy 
procedures (Chappells and Shove 2005; Jordan et al. 2013; Scrase and Ockwell 
2009; Weiss 1979). This has an important causal effect on how policies are 
developed due to the way that procedures can embed assumptions regarding what 
‘appropriate’ actions are, how they can be understood and who has relevant 
expertise (Fischer et al. 2015; Rein and Schön 1993; Yanow 2000). 
I therefore set out to incorporate into my analysis a framework that provided a 
structure that would reveal the roles of knowledges within regulatory policy 
procedures. Which historically contingent ways of knowing played a role? Which 
policy actors were considered ‘expert’ in relation to which types of knowledge? Did 
particular knowledges constrain policy procedures? To respond to these questions, I 
used Bacchi’s (2009) policy studies framework: “What is the Problem Represented 
to Be?” (WPR).  
The goal of the WPR approach to policy analysis is to interrogate the 
problematisations in selected policies, through scrutinising the premises and effects 
of the problematisations contained within them (Bacchi 2000, 2009a; Bletsas and 
Beasley 2012). This does not necessarily concern the intentions of policy actors but 
considers central the need for analysis to identify the deep conceptual assumptions 
embedded within policies (Bacchi 2009a). The WPR approach ensures a particular 
focus on assumptions that identifying categories and measurements of people in a 
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particular way, providing insight into how particular problem representations are 
considered relevant and which are not. The impact of these ways of knowing are 
not only theoretical but create decisions that have an impact on the policies that 
shape the lives of citizens. In this way, identifying and explaining assumptions 
within policy procedures draws out the connections between these assumptions 
embedded in policies and their impact in terms of lived effects. I therefore 
incorporated into the research design for this thesis a framework for policy analysis 
that directly responds to the role of different ways of knowing within policy, by 
tracing the impact of the way policy problems are conceptualised by powerful 
policy actors (Bacchi 2000; Bacchi and Bonham 2014; Bletsas and Beasley 2012; 
Fischer et al. 2015).  
The WPR framework incorporates an expectation that historically contingent 
knowledges will impact the operation of policymaking and policy outcomes. The 
WPR framework has a theoretical foundation in the work of Foucault and therefore 
incorporates the idea that policies are not responding to problems that exist in the 
social world but construct a specific and contingent problem (Bacchi 1999; Bacchi 
and Bonham 2014; Foucault 1991). The procedures construction of a policy problem 
is ‘problematization’ (Bacchi 2009a; Fischer et al. 2015). Identifying and describing 
how policy procedures result in a particular problematization can be revealed by 
probing policy proposals, to explain the role of implicit assumptions (Bacchi 2009a).  
This allows analysts to expose normative positions and statements and test claims 
of ‘inevitable’ or ‘obvious’ policy responses to problems. It is important to note 
that Bacchi (2009) does not argue that there are not real issues that exist in society 
and cause harm. Rather, ‘policy problems’ are specific representations of the social 
world with specific, contingent understandings (Bacchi 1999, 2000; Bacchi and 
Bonham 2014). Bacchi argues that analysis should therefore uncover how issues or 
‘problems’ are analysed, classified and regulated (Bacchi, 2012). While this 
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approach originated in Bacchi’s work on policy related to gender (1999), it has been 
used as a framework for policies regarding equality (Cumming-Potvin and Martino 
2018; Maximova-Mentzoni and Egeland 2019), public health (Jackson et al. 2016; 
Lancaster, Duke, and Ritter 2015), education (Bottrell and Goodwin 2011; Holloway 
2019) and welfare support schemes (Browne-Yung et al. 2016; Goodwin and 
Robinson 2016; Norocel 2016; Pantazis 2016; Roulstone and Prideaux 2012). At the 
time of conducting this research, it had not, however, been used to analyse energy 
policy. I investigated problematizations to uncover assumptions and accepted 
knowledge that related to a particular circumstance and historical context of 
energy regulation in GB. 
Importantly, WPR explains why policies benefit one group and fail others, by 
revealing the implicit assumptions within policies through identification of problem 
representations (Bacchi 2009b). Investigating problem representations can expose 
the assumptions and accepted knowledge that rest on particular circumstances in a 
particular historical context (Bacchi 2009b, 2012; Bacchi and Bonham 2014; Bletsas 
and Beasley 2012). The representation of specific ‘problems’ are not developed and 
embedded in isolation (Bacchi and Goodwin 2016). Instead, problem 
representations are connected to the historical and social context that surrounds 
them (Bacchi 1999, 2009b; Bacchi and Goodwin 2016). This is key to exposing the 
contested and context dependent nature of policy responses to issues, through 
identifying how issues or ‘problems’ are analysed, classified and regulated (Bacchi 
and Bonham, 2012). Identifying and analysing how policy ‘problems’ are 
represented reveals the implicit assumptions that are operating within policy 
procedures (Bacchi 2012). Understanding these implicit assumptions can, therefore, 
reveal how certain groups of people benefit from a particular policy or set of 
policies (Bacchi 1999, 2012; Schneider and Ingram 1993; Schneider et al. 2005).  
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The WPR approach is intended to guide analysis through a series of questions, set 
out in Table 3.2, to critically interrogate public policy (Bacchi 2009b, 2012; Bletsas 
and Beasley 2012; Turnbull 2013). This framework enables the analysis of how 
problems are presented within a policy document and to draw conclusions regarding 
which powerful discourses influenced it and the consequences in terms of the 
influence of different ways of considering this problem. The WPR framework is 
presented as a research strategy rather than a methodology per se, but provides a 
framework in the form of a series of questions to develop analysis (Bacchi 2009b). 
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Table 3.2 “What is the Problem Represented to Be” Questions  
(Summary of Bacchi, 2009, p. 11 – 13) 
 
 1. What is the policy or 
regulation proposing? 
 
2. What are the implied 
representations? 
 
Analyse “What is the 
Problem Represented to 
Be?” in the policy 
What practices and 
procedures have led to 
this representation? 
 
Can / has the ‘problem’ 
been thought about 
differently? 
 
How/where has this 
representation of the 
‘problem’ been 
produced disseminated 
and defended? 
 
What concepts, 
characterisations and 
categories are used? 
 
 
What are the silences? 
 
 
How could it be 
questioned, disrupted 
replaced or 
reproblematised? 
Identify what the effects of 
the problem representation 
are 
 
What are the lived 
effects? 
What are the discursive 
effects? 
Reflect on “What is the problem represented to be”? by the researcher 
 
 
I posed the questions described in Table 3.2, which are the detailed stages of the 
WPR framework, through coding the policy proposals contained in policy texts (as I 
go on to describe in detail in section 3.2). As set out by Bacchi (2009b), I began 
with a single specific policy or legislative document and expanded my examination 
to associated texts such as parliamentary debates, ministerial pronouncements, 
related government reports and media statements, to build a fuller picture. Each 
question was posed in turn multiple times against similar policy texts, due to the 
embedded nature of problematisations.  
A development in terms of the application of WPR includes interviews with those 
involved in policy making to draw out further detail of the context of policies and 
the practices which shape policy making (Bacchi 2012; Bletsas and Beasley 2012). In 
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addition, I followed the later adaptation of the WPR framework and incorporated 
the transcripts of interviews into the analysis (Bletsas and Beasley 2012). Following 
contemporary applications of the framework (Goodwin and Robinson 2016; 
Maximova-Mentzoni and Egeland 2019; Norocel 2016), I included transcripts from 
interviews with policy actors to incorporate an understanding of how the people 
involved in policy procedures represented problems in their own descriptions of 
events, within policy-making and understandings of solutions to policy problems ( I 
describe my use of interview transcripts in section 3.2.2 below). As described in 
Table 3.2, there are two groups of questions to investigate problem representation: 
the explicit procedures and procedures regarding a policy and the implicit meaning 
making within those procedures (Bacchi 2000, 2009b; Bacchi and Goodwin 2016). 
Implicit meaning making within policy can be identified by exposing the discourses: 
identifiable patterns of meaning making that are based on a shared understanding 
of social objects (Bryman 2016; Wetherell, Taylor, and Yates 2001a, 2001b) and 
that can be traced as they influence policy processes and outcomes. Particularly 
valuable in comparing the role of knowledges within policy processes, is the 
concept of framing. Frames are powerful ways of constructing a way of 
understanding a policy problem that provide boundaries to simplify often complex 
topics (Bacchi 2000; Hajer 2002; Strassheim 2017). Identifying problem 
representations allows researchers to uncover the contingent discourses and frames 
as partisan and context-dependent rather than a ‘natural solution’ to a constructed 
policy problem (Bacchi and Goodwin 2016; Fischer et al. 2015; Strassheim et al. 
2015). 
Identifying the representation of the problem then enables the effects of a policy 
to be identified. Both the policy itself and the analysis produced by the researcher 
have the same questions posed in turn. The questions posed assume that any policy 
proposal put forward (including those of a researcher) may reflect deep seated 
 
 
78 
 
cultural assumptions. This approach incorporates an assumption that the discourses 
within policies are not neutral. They have effects, results and outcomes that shape 
the lives of citizens. The impact of responding to the questions described above, in 
response to the data collected as part of this thesis, is discussed in section 3.3. 
3.2.3 Energy Justice Framework 
 
In Chapter 2, I explained that the Energy Justice framework had been applied to a 
range of case studies related to energy systems from multiple countries by 
researchers from multiple disciplines (Halff, Sovacool, and Rozhon 2014; McCauley 
2018; Sovacool 2013; Sovacool et al. 2017). In this section I briefly link the 
preceding discussion to my research. Researchers who have applied the Energy 
Justice framework broadly adopt a focus on three pillars of justice in terms of: 
“…distribution, recognition, and procedures. We did so on the understanding that 
if injustice is to be tackled, one must (a) identify the concern – distribution, (b) 
identify who it affects – recognition, and only then (c) identify strategies for 
remediation – procedures.”  
Jenkins et al. 2016 p. 15 
I therefore set out to identify distributional, recognition and procedural justice 
concerns of regulatory policies between 2000 and 2016. I adopted the series of 
questions posed in previous research conducted with the Energy Justice framework, 
which I list in Table 3.3.  
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Table 3.3 Energy Justice Framework 
Synthesis of frameworks from Jenkins, McCauley, and Forman (2017) and Sovacool et al. 
(2017) (Jenkins et al. 2017; Sovacool et al. 2017) 
Energy Justice Pillar Question 
Distribution  Is right to fairly access energy services 
respected? 
Is intragenerational equity considered? 
Are energy services affordable for all? 
Recognition Are diverse needs for energy services 
recognised? 
Are intersections of needs responding to 
evolving identities in modern societies 
recognised to respond to links between 
energy justice and other forms of 
injustice, e.g. political or socio-
economic? 
Procedures Are due procedures respected? 
Are procedures transparent? 
Are decision makers accountable? 
Are energy injustices actively, 
deliberately opposed? 
 
I posed each of the questions in Table 3.3 in turn to the data collected, as I go on to 
describe in section 3.3. When posed to regulatory policy, this meant that I was able 
to identify three features of regulatory policies: first, distributional outcomes of 
regulatory decisions that were made in the period studied; second, the extent to 
which diverse energy needs were understood by the regulator and whether they 
were acted upon; third, whether the procedures followed in the regulatory policy 
making met the standards that would meet the expectations of procedures that 
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deliver Energy Justice. Further, identifying these three separate factors enabled me 
to trace interactions of injustice in the manner set out by Schlosberg (2009), as I 
described in Chapter 2. In order to reveal the injustices embedded in the regulatory 
policy procedures and identify their outcomes, I therefore needed to identify those 
procedures and collect data regarding the manner in which those procedures 
functioned. I explain my data collection and approach to analysis in section 3.3.  
3.2.4 Combining frameworks 
 
In order to analyse policy formulation in GB between 2000 and 2016, I developed a 
coding frame that included each of the questions from TPF, WPR and EJF (set out in 
Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3). This initial coding frame was then extended in line with 
themes that emerged as I analysed my data. The application of each of these 
frameworks in previous research had included a shared focus on texts related to 
policy making, often in combination with  interviews to provide an explanation of 
the relevant context (Bacchi 2009b; Bletsas and Beasley 2012; Jordan and 
Turnpenny 2015; Simcock et al. 2016a). I therefore combined documentary analysis 
and elite interviews in the manner described in the sections below.  
 
3.3 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
In order to answer the question “What role did knowledges of ‘consumers’ play in 
the formulation of GB energy market regulation between 2000 and 2016”, I used 
public domain documents from online archives and conducted elite interviews. This 
combination is common in policy analysis (Bryman 2016; Burnham et al. 2008; Marsh 
and Stoker 2002) as it combines the benefits of the two both approaches: insight 
from the formal mechanisms of governance as published in text (Bazeley 2013; 
Kracauer 1952; Mayring 2004; Yanow 2000) and context from those involved in the 
procedures surrounding the policy-making described within those texts (Davies 
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2001; Harvey 2011; Lilleker 2003; Richards 1996). As demonstrated in Figure 3.1 
below, my data collection and analysis consisted of four phases.  
Figure 3.1 Phases of Data Collection and Analysis 
 
 
The first three phases of findings from my analysis (Phase 1 to Phase 3 in Figure 3.1) 
extended the data collected in each phase. Embedded within my data collection 
and analysis were regular periods of reflection to take stock of my approach and, in 
line with the WPR framework, to scrutinise “What am I representing the problem to 
be?” I used a highly iterative approach of analysing individual policy documents and 
interview transcripts on multiple occasions, as different stages of analysis revealed 
new insights. I describe my procedures of data collection and analysis in full in the 
sections below. 
3.3.1 Documentary Analysis 
 
Phase 1 consisted of documentary analysis. Documentary analysis is adopted as a 
common foundation for policy analysis as:  
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“Political texts are the concrete by-product of strategic political activity and have 
a widely recognized potential to reveal important information about the policy 
positions of their authors. Moreover, they can be analysed, reanalysed, and 
reanalysed again without becoming jaded or uncooperative.”  
(Laver et al. 2003, p. 311) (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003) 
Part of the centrality of documentary analysis to policy analysis in GB relates to the 
fact that decision-making institutions are required to meet measures of 
transparency and publish documents that explain the procedures undertaken and 
policy scope decisions (Burnham et al. 2008; Keman 2014). When collecting texts 
for this thesis I began with the online archive of regulatory documents from Ofgem 
which was made available in full in 2012. I opened every document in the archive 
and used keyword searches to identify whether each document included relevant 
content relating to GB domestic retail energy policy, to create a documentary 
corpus of regulator policy formulation. These keywords are listed in Appendix Table 
A4. To ensure that all relevant documentation regarding market regulation that 
could have impacted domestic energy users was identified, each document was 
reviewed individually to ensure that I only excluded documents focused on 
transportation of gas, the transmission and distribution of electricity, wholesale gas 
and electricity markets, carbon reduction programmes and retail supply of business 
customers of all sizes. Where a document included multiple areas, which included 
an element of domestic retail, the text was included for analysis. For example, 
reviews conducted by regulators in 2009, 2011 and 2015 included domestic 
consumers, business consumers and wholesale markets (Competition and Markets 
Authority 2014; Ofgem 2008b, 2011h). This meant that if the title and description 
chosen by Ofgem in their online archive failed to reflect that it did impact domestic 
retail markets, I did not exclude it in error.  
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This resulted in an initial documentary corpus of 511 PDF texts which I loaded into 
the Qualitative Content Analysis software Nvivo. Documents regarding retail market 
for domestic consumers included policy decisions, stakeholder consultations, 
responses from stakeholders, submissions to parliamentary inquiries and research 
reports. Of these documents, 133 were authored by Ofgem and 378 were responses 
to Ofgem stakeholder consultations. I conducted a pilot analysis using a subset of 
documents related to a single market review, conducted by Ofgem between 2008 
and 2009. This pilot included 6 Ofgem publications and 72 stakeholder consultation 
responses. This tested my initial coding frame and I found that the questions from 
the frameworks both identified knowledges that were present in regulatory policy 
documents and provided insight into the role of these knowledges.  
 
The pilot also enabled me to begin procedures tracing. Procedures tracing is the 
linking of events described within documents to build visibility of a chain of events 
(Bennett and Checkel 2015; Pouliot 2015). Procedures tracing links these texts to 
each other to identify how they relate to each other and how ideas translate into 
policies that have an effect in that they “Narrate the unfolding of history and 
disaggregate it in smaller bits of time” (Pouliot 2015, p. 237). I found that the 
contents of the documents included a description of linked policy events, context 
and events needed for procedures tracing. Further, during the pilot I found that 
applying the coding frame allowed for the identification of themes based on the 
frameworks and supported my identification of emerging themes (my coding frame 
is described further below). I was therefore confident that my approach would 
result in the benefits of thematic analysis - building familiarity with the data that I 
had collected, reveal connections and differences and identify any patterns across 
the time period studied (Braun and Clarke 2013; Holloway and Todres 2003; Ryan 
 
 
84 
 
and Bernard 2000). I therefore proceeded to read the 511 documents and 
conducted thematic analysis and procedures tracing.  
 
Procedures tracing in phase 1 revealed examples where policy discussions occurred 
beyond Ofgem. For example, a series of individual documents from the Ofgem 
archive described the announcement of a market review, a series of consultations 
on problems identified within that review, a document describing the Retail Market 
Review decision and reports (Ofgem 2010f, 2011h, 2012i, 2012k, 2012m, 2012l, 
2012o, 2013j, 2013k). However, there was also a House of Commons Select 
Committee report on the work of Ofgem (House of Commons Select Committee on 
Energy and Climate Change 2011).  
 
At this stage, I reflected on my approach to the analysis of the documentary corpus. 
This first reflection resulted in the identification of the shortcomings of focusing 
entirely on the Ofgem archive. The Ofgem archive included documents that 
explained engagement with other institutions through a review at the Competition 
and Markets Authority (CMA) and engagement with Parliamentary inquiries in the 
Houses of Parliament, the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly.  
Phase 2 therefore began with a search of the relevant online archives of each of 
these institutions using a keyword search (listed in Appendix Table A4). This 
keyword search identified 32 further documents connected to the procedures 
contained within the Ofgem archive, along with further parliamentary inquiries that 
had not been referred to in the Ofgem archive, bringing the corpus to 543 texts. I 
conducted thematic analysis of the 32 texts from beyond the Ofgem archive and 
extended my procedures tracing to incorporate the additional institutions. This 
expanded my procedures tracing to incorporate the formal interactions between 
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Ofgem and the UK Government, CMA and the UK Parliament.  The results of my 
procedures tracing are presented in full in Chapter 4. 
 
When I completed my thematic analysis of the corpus of a total of 543 texts, I 
reviewed the findings against the frameworks from policy studies that I had chosen, 
i.e, WPR and TPF, to reflect on the extent to which the questions from these 
frameworks had been answered. As a result of this second reflection, I identified 
that further detail was required to answer three framework questions. I needed 
further analysis for the TPF framework to identify what values the tools of policy 
formulation embodied. I also needed further analysis to explain the two related 
WPR questions of “What is the Problem Represented to Be” and the interaction of 
concepts, characterisation and categories used in problem representations in 
regulatory policy decisions. To analyse the texts at a more detailed level, so as to 
answer these three questions, I decided to use qualitative content analysis of 
documents authored by Ofgem and the CMA related to policy decisions, to provide 
more detailed insight into these three questions. Qualitative content analysis 
enabled me to probe the concepts and characteristics that made up the 
characterization and representation of problems within the formulation, by 
analysing the implicit and explicit ideas and meaning making within the corpus 
(Kracauer 1952; Mayring 2004). I adopted these themes as nested codes and then 
revisited the corpus to identify any further contributing insight against that theme 
and reviewed the procedures tracing to consider whether there were further links 
that I had not yet identified. I identified which documents in my corpus contained 
regulatory policy by listing those that related to a regulatory policy decision – even 
where that decision was not to take action. I therefore conducted qualitative 
content analysis on a subset of 37 documents from my corpus, as listed in Table 
3.3. This excluded research reports and responses to consultations from policy 
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actors beyond Ofgem that provided the context of these decisions. However, both 
types of document were cited within documents discussing regulatory decision 
making, which meant that my qualitative content analysis was able to incorporate 
the role of cited documents where they had a role in problem representations or 
the embodiment of values within tools. This qualitative content analysis phase 
resulted in identifying a further 22 themes to add to my coding frame and use for 
an additional thematic analysis of the documentary corpus. 
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Table 3.4 Regulatory Policy Documents for Qualitative Content Analysis 
Subset of 37 regulatory policy texts selected for Qualitative Content Analysis 
Publication name  Author 
Social Action Plan: Improving Social Obligations Proposals Document (Ofgem, 2000a) 
The Social Action Plan (Ofgem, 2000b) 
Review of domestic gas and electricity competition and supply price regulation (Ofgem, 2001c) 
Making Markets work for customers – Vol I, II & III (Ofgem, 2003a, 2003b, 2003f) 
Domestic Market Review (Ofgem, 2004b) 
Social Action Strategy, Ofgem (Ofgem, 2005e) 
Energy Supply Probe Call for Evidence (Ofgem, 2008c) 
Energy Supply Probe Initial Findings Report (Ofgem, 2008d) 
Addressing Unfair Price Differentials (Ofgem, 2009j) 
Energy Supply Probe Remedies (Ofgem, 2009i) 
Addressing undue discrimination (Ofgem, 2009a) 
Debt and Disconnection Review (Ofgem, 2008a) 
Vulnerable Customer Disconnection (Ofgem, 2009l) 
Notification of modifications of standard licence condition 27.11 (Ofgem, 2010e) 
Retail Market Review  (Ofgem, 2010h) 
Retail Market Review Findings and initial proposals (Ofgem, 2011k) 
The Standardised Element of Standard Tariffs under the Retail Market Review (Ofgem, 2012t) 
Retail Market Review - Updated Domestic Proposals (Ofgem, 2012p) 
Draft domestic licence conditions for the Retail Market Review proposals (Ofgem, 2012h) 
Retail Market Review - Final Domestic Proposals (Ofgem, 2012o) 
The Retail Market Review – Implementation of Simpler Tariff Choices and 
Clearer Information 
(Ofgem, 2013k) 
Implementation of the domestic Standards of Conduct – decision to make 
licence modifications 
(Ofgem, 2013g) 
Proposal for a new Consumer Vulnerability Strategy (Ofgem, 2012l) 
Energy Affordability: helping develop Ofgem’s Vulnerable Consumers Strategy (Ofgem, 2012i) 
Consumer Vulnerability Strategy (Ofgem, 2013c) 
Consultation on a proposal to make a market investigation reference in respect 
of the supply and acquisition of energy in Great Britain 
(Ofgem, 2014a) 
Energy Market Investigation, Issues Statement 
(Competition and Markets Authority, 
2014) 
Energy Market Investigation, Updated issues statement 
(Competition and Markets Authority, 
2015b) 
Energy Market Investigation, Provisional decision on remedies report 
(Competition and Markets Authority, 
2016c) 
Energy Market Investigation, Final Report  
(Competition and Markets Authority, 
2016b) 
The Energy Market Investigation (Database) Order 2016 
(Competition and Markets Authority, 
2016d) 
The Energy Market Investigation (Restricted Meters) Order 2016 
(Competition and Markets Authority, 
2016e) 
The Energy Market Investigation (Prepayment Charge Restriction) Order 2016 
(Competition and Markets Authority, 
2016f) 
Decision to make modifications to the gas and electricity supply licences to 
reform the switching processes for indebted prepayment meter customers 
(DAP) 
(Ofgem 2015f) 
Proposals to improve outcomes for prepayment customers (Ofgem, 2015i) 
Prepayment meters installed under warrant: final proposals (Ofgem, 2016f) 
The Future of Market Regulation (Ofgem, 2016j) 
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By this stage in my research, I had conducted three iterations of thematic analysis 
and two interactions of procedures tracing, based on documentary analysis. 
However, there are two important limitations to documentary analysis: the 
emerging bias of the researcher and the reliability of the content of documents 
(Bazeley 2013; Bryman 2016; Kvale 1996). Nonetheless, documentary analysis is one 
of the most reliable methods available to policy analysis when elite  interviews are 
used to triangulate findings (Harvey 2011; Lilleker 2003; Richards 1996). I therefore 
combined my use of documentary analysis with elite interviews, as I go on to 
describe in section 3.3.2. 
3.2.2 Elite Interviews  
 
There are multiple ways I could have gone about developing insight into the context 
of these texts in order to respond to my research question (Burnham et al. 2008; 
Pierce 2008). In order to reveal the role that ways people were know in policy 
procedures, I sought to identify and describe the meanings, behaviours and 
experiences of the individuals involved in those procedures and therefore aimed to 
gather qualitative data on those experiences (Bazeley 2013; Miles, Huberman, and 
Saldaña 2014; Seale et al. 2004; Silverman 2016). Elite interviews focus on drawing 
out insight from influential interviewees who have unique knowledge based on their 
experiences in a particular setting or position (Burnham et al. 2008; Davies 2001). 
Further, those close to the development and implementation of policies can 
describe the intended or expected effects of policy and the logics implicit within 
those expectations (Kvale 1996; McEvoy 2006). While previous qualitative studies 
regarding energy policy decision making adopted either focus groups or participant 
observation (Sovacool, Axsen, and Sorrell 2018) I did not for two reasons, both of 
which are associated with the findings from my documentary analysis. First, I 
wanted to secure a detailed narrative from the experiences from different 
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organisations and institutions to comment on regulatory policy procedures. I 
therefore sought to hear directly from an individual without responding to others in 
a focus group. Further, the range of organisations and institutions I had identified 
meant that some participants were likely to be geographically dispersed, meaning it 
would be a challenge to convene a group in a time and location convenient to 
participants.  
While focus groups would not have been appropriate for my research design, 
participant observation through an ethnographic approach might have been an 
insightful option given that ethnography enables the researcher to directly 
experience the embedded implicit assumptions of a setting in their own experience 
(Bryman 2016; Mackenzie 1994). This could have been within one of the teams 
within Ofgem or an organisation engaging with Ofgem to try and shape the way that 
regulatory policy “knows” consumers. However, choosing a single organisation 
would not have provided an insight into the range of regulatory policy actors I had 
identified within my documentary analysis or provide insight into the full period of 
analysis. Instead, I conducted elite interviews in the third phase of research as 
individual discussion seemed most likely to result in insights about any differences 
in the use of knowledges (Davies 2001; Harvey 2011; Plas and Kvale 1996; Richards 
1996).  
The elite interviews were conducted via telephone which I recorded and 
transcribed in line with the consent provided by interviewees. While face to face 
interviews can provide insight regarding nonverbal behaviour and support the 
building of rapport with the interviewer, conducting telephone interviews had the 
benefit of flexibility in terms of securing time with interviewees (Bailey 1994; 
Bazeley 2013; Bryman 2016; Halperin and Heath 2016). I expand on my use of 
telephone rather than face to face interviews in section 3.4. 
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I adopted the Research Ethics Policy of the University of East Anglia (University of 
East Anglia 2018). This included securing informed consent for the recording of 
interviews and providing descriptions of the research methodology which explained 
that interviews and documents would be analysed. Interview transcripts were held 
securely on the University of East Anglia servers in a password protected file. 
Interviewees were anonymised in my research. Keeping the identity of  
interviewees can be a challenge due to the fact that few people hold particular 
positions within an individual organisation within a particular time span (Bryman 
2016; Burnham et al. 2008). For example, naming “an Ofgem CEO” would not be 
sufficient as particular regulatory activities occur within the time span of a 
particular set of regulatory activities. In order for the identity of interviewees to 
remain confidential, interviewees are described in terms of the type of organisation 
or institution they worked for with no associated time period. Interviewees are 
listed by their code in Table 3.4. The confidential nature of the interview was 
described in the initial email requesting participation and restated at the beginning 
of the interview. I secured informed consent to record via email in advance of the 
interview and at the beginning of the interview itself. Five interviewees paused in 
description of the events to request a restatement of confidentiality before 
continuing their description of events. In these interviews I restated that neither 
their name or the name of their institution or organisation would be named and 
explained the way that their narrative would be presented in any output in terms of 
illustrative quotes. Interviewees were also informed that they could withdraw their 
participation at any time with no negative consequences.  
In line with the UEA research policy, participants also received a debriefing which 
included a description of the timelines of publication of interim findings of this 
thesis in presentations at the University of East Anglia and at a research 
presentation event in Westminster. All interviewees were invited to the latter, 
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along with other interested parties. The event presented the interim findings of this 
thesis alongside Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) research and participants were 
invited to pose questions. Five interviewees accepted the invitation and posed 
questions regarding the findings. This supported my confidence that the insights 
provided by interviewees had been used authentically.  
I developed a topic guide for use in interviews which reflected the three 
frameworks explained in section 3.2 and my insight from the initial iterations of my 
documentary analysis in the first three phases, described in Figure 3.1. The topic 
guide, Table A5 in the appendix, focused on three themes: the interactions of 
organisations formulating regulatory policy; any differences between those 
organisations; and their ways of knowing consumers. Potential interviewees were 
contacted via the professional social network LinkedIn (43 requests), through 
constituency office contacts for elected representatives (11 requests) and via an 
email of introduction from Professor Waddams Price from CCP (2 requests).  
Potential interviewees were approached on the basis of three criteria: the role of 
their organisation in the provision of knowledge in regulatory decision-making; their 
participation in  procedures contained within policy texts which made up my 
documentary analysis; and on two occasions, suggested interviewees from 
participants. In my decision-making, I included consideration of the formal role of 
the individual at the time of interview, their past roles in the energy industry and 
their level of seniority. I aimed to incorporate experiences from individuals who 
could comment on both the strategic direction of regulatory policy and its aim and 
the detailed delivery of policy-making activities (Davies 2001; Plas and Kvale 1996; 
Richards 1996).  
Initially, this included three groups of regulatory policy actors: those working within 
economic regulators; those with a formal role linked to democratic governance, 
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such as civil elected representatives; and organisations seeking to influence 
regulatory policy formulation, such as third sector organisations and regulated 
firms. First, I approached regulatory policy actors who worked in teams who 
focused on the domestic retail market from Ofgem and the Competition and 
Markets Authority, where analysts were assigned to the energy market 
investigation. Within the second category, democratic governance, were the 
traditional policy makers within Government, i.e., civil servants, ministers and 
Secretary of State. However, I also approached elected representatives to 
participate. My procedures tracing had identified parliamentary committees, 
including UK House of Commons and House of Lords committees investigating 
energy regulation and committees within the devolved administration, with 
inquiries relating to affordable energy. I therefore approached elected 
representatives who sat on committees and chaired parliamentary committees. 
While the majority of policy formulation occurred at the UK Government level, my 
documentary analysis identified actors in devolved administrations due to the 
devolution of fuel poverty policy. The third group of interviewees I approached to 
participate were from organisations who sought to influence regulatory policy 
decisions. This included third sector organisations and regulated firms. I approached 
interviewees visible in my documentary analysis. This included campaigning 
organisations, charities and the statutory consumer advocate.  
I identified during my literature review that studies of policy procedures that 
combined documentary analysis and interviews had a number of participants 
ranging from 12 to 30. I therefore aimed to interview at least 30 individuals in my 
research. Interested interviewees were sent an overview of the questions via email 
that we would discuss if they decided to participate. When interviews were 
completed, I transcribed them in full. Transcribing the interviews allowed me to 
engage deeply with the recording on multiple occasions,  to pick up audible non-
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verbal behaviour, develop familiarity with the narrative of interviewees and begin 
to note possible nested codes (Braun and Clarke 2013; Bryman 2016; Holloway and 
Todres 2003; Ryan and Bernard 2000). After completing and transcribing 10 
interviews, I regularly noted the implicit discussion of topics that had been linked 
to considerations of energy justice in the academic literature reviewed in Chapter 
2. I therefore decided to adapt my topic guide for interviews to explicitly consider 
the three pillars of energy justice for the remaining interviews. 
When I had conducted and transcribed 30 interviews, I reflected on the insights that 
had emerged from my transcription and the narrative of interviewees. I concluded 
that many similar examples and experiences had emerged from interviewees with 
similar backgrounds and interviewing more individuals from organisations with a 
similar role in regulatory policy formulation was unlikely to provide additional 
insight. However, as I conducted my interviews, I found that the interactions 
between organisations and individuals was more complex than I had expected. I 
noted interactions of organisations on a whiteboard as they progressed. I could see 
that the interactions described by interviewees were far more complex than the 
formal interactions identified in my procedures mapping. I therefore conducted a 
mapping exercise to analyse the interrelationships between individuals, groups and 
organisations (Miles et al. 2014). This mapping, presented in full in Chapter 8 in 
Figure 8.1, suggested that rather than my original three categories of regulatory 
policy actors, there were six: regulatory governance actors, democratic governance 
actors, market participants, representatives, monopoly providers and advisors. I 
reviewed my interviewees against my mapping and the descriptions of different 
groups from my interview transcripts of those involved in energy supply market 
regulation. In retail market regulation, there were no monopoly providers engaged 
in regulatory formulation – these were focused on network regulation. I therefore 
reviewed the remaining five categories of policy actors to ensure that I had 
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interviewees from each. This reflection revealed two significant gaps in invited 
interviewees in terms of organisations: small charities and regulated firms who 
were not ex-monopolies. I therefore approached further interviewees from these 
two groups. At the end of this procedure, I had completed and transcribed 35 
interviews. This included 7 individuals from regulators (regulatory governance), 5 
within democratic governance institutions, 8 with a formal role in representing a 
particular group (representation), 8 who played an informal advisory role and 7 
market participants from regulated firms.  
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Table 3.5 Elite Interviewees 
 
Interviewee System location Anonymised reference 
1 Regulatory Governance RG1 
2 Regulatory Governance RG2 
3 Regulatory Governance RG3 
4 Regulatory Governance RG4 
5 Regulatory Governance RG5 
6 Regulatory Governance RG6 
7 Regulatory Governance RG7 
8 Democratic Governance DG1 
9 Democratic Governance DG2 
10 Democratic Governance DG3 
11 Democratic Governance DG4 
12 Democratic Governance DG5 
13 Representation Re1 
14 Representation Re2 
15 Representation Re3 
16 Representation Re4 
17 Representation Re5 
18 Representation Re6 
19 Representation Re7 
20 Representation Re8 
21 Advisory Ad1 
22 Advisory Ad2 
23 Advisory Ad3 
24 Advisory Ad4 
25 Advisory Ad5 
26 Advisory Ad6 
27 Advisory Ad7 
28 Advisory Ad8 
29 Market Participant Ma1 
30 Market Participant Ma2 
31 Market Participant Ma3 
32 Market Participant Ma4 
33 Market Participant Ma5 
34 Market Participant Ma6 
35 Market Participant Ma7 
 
Of the 35 individuals, 12 had previously held roles in another organisation or 
institution linked to energy market regulation. I explain these links in a discussion 
of policy formulation actors in Chapter 6. When I concluded my interviews, I 
thematically analysed the interview transcripts. I then extended my coding frame 
to include a further 9 themes which had emerged from the interview transcripts. 
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Having completed my interviews, I moved to Phase 4, a final analysis of the full 
corpus. With the interview transcripts, the corpus consisted of 578 texts. I used this 
completed coding frame to revisit the documentary analysis for a final iteration of 
thematic analysis. This meant that the full corpus was analysed in line with 21 
codes which resulted from the frameworks explained in section 3.1, with a further 
31 nested codes that I identified in response to my data analysis. This ensured that 
each document was analysed under the full coding frame. This full coding frame is 
presented in sections in the Appendix in Tables A1, A2 and A3. This fourth and final 
phase of analysis ensured that I connected insight from interviewees to the 
procedures described in documents. This was particularly central to reveal the 
silences within the documentary subset of regulatory policies. Where there was a 
theme that had emerged from interviews that was not adopted as relevant in the 
documents published by Ofgem or the CMA, it was identified as a silence of 
regulatory policy between 2000 and 2016, as I go on to describe in Chapter 7. 
3.4 Positionality  
 
Particular to my experience of conducting my research was my experience as a 
participant in many of the activities of regulatory policy development before and 
during my PhD research. Before beginning the PhD, my career was based on 
engaging with the regulator, government and devolved administrations regarding 
affordable energy policies on behalf of an energy supply firm. Further, my PhD was 
funded by the Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) at the University of East Anglia 
where there was regular engagement with economic regulators, including Ofgem. 
As a member of CCP, I delivered research briefings directly to individuals working 
for economic regulators, contributed to CCP responses to stakeholder consultations 
conducted by Ofgem and participated in workshops funded by Ofgem for their 
employees. Finally, while writing up my thesis part time, I took a role for the 
statutory consumer advocate as a researcher and later, head of department. There 
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was therefore no point at which there was any relevant or meaningful distance from 
the procedures of regulatory policy formulation I sought to analyse. In setting out 
my research design, I therefore sought to ensure that the way I was embedded in 
some of the procedures I was analysing, provided benefits while maintaining a 
consistent reflexive focus on the extent to which my engagement with regulatory 
procedures might impact my research.  
The core benefit of a previous career in, and enduring links with, procedures of 
regulatory policy formulations, related to the interviews I conducted in two areas: 
access to interviewees and building rapport in interviews. First, I had an extensive 
network of direct contacts as a base for my approaches for participation. However, 
I was concerned that solely interviewing individuals whom I had worked directly 
with might have resulted in an overly narrow experience of regulatory procedures. I 
therefore asked my existing network for advice and introductions to possible 
interviewees and limited interviewing people I had worked with people where 
another option was not available. This approach, along with the typically high 
turnover of staff within the regulator and government, meant that I had only 
worked directly with two of my 35 interviewees. My links to the CCP were also 
important, with Professor Waddams-Price of CCP introducing me to 2 further 
interviewees and 6 interviewees noting in the interview their familiarity with CCP 
research. Second, my long-standing familiarity with the technical terminology of 
energy markets and professional network together, led to a smooth building of 
rapport during the interview itself. As explained in section 3.3.2, rapport with face 
to face interviewees can be easier than telephone interviews. However, when an 
interviewee was distracted from a description by being unable to remember an 
event, name or number, I was able to give the detail and the interview could 
continue smoothly.  
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The most significant challenge to beginning the study given my embeddedness in 
the policy procedures being evaluated, was maintaining a reflexive focus on the 
implications of my experiences in responding to the data collected (Hanson 2013; 
Leigh 2019; Munkejord 2009; Weber and Mitchell 1996). This was an important 
contributing factor to my use of the WPR framework which includes analysing the 
problem representations of the researcher in their analysis and presentation of 
findings. This included analysing my own problem representations in the thesis as 
systematically as analysis of the data collected in my research. This resulted in two 
adaptations to the original research design of my PhD funding proposal. My original 
research design reflected two assumptions based on my experience of regulatory 
policy making before my PhD: that distributional concerns were distinct from 
economic regulation and that fuel poverty was a separate policy issue from energy 
price policy. As I conducted my research, it was clear from interviewees and much 
of the documentary analysis that fuel poverty and regulation had become 
overlapping issues that were connected in the work of many charities and third 
sector organisations. Further, the distributional outcomes of economic regulation 
were not only a core concern of those beyond the regulator engaging in energy 
market regulation activities: the CMA investigation (which completed after I had 
begun my PhD) found a clear, and concerning, distributional impact of energy 
market regulation (Competition and Markets Authority 2016b). I therefore adopted 
the EJF to ensure that distributional outcomes were a primary and explicit concern 
within my analysis, rather than an implicit motivation, in conducting my research. 
A final way in which my positionality impacted my research design was my 
motivation to connect my findings to practical recommendations for future 
procedures of regulatory policy formulation. This led to the adoption of the TPF and 
EJF frameworks, both of which had been used by researchers to reveal concerns 
and shortcomings regarding the procedures of policy making (Jordan and Turnpenny 
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2015; Simcock et al. 2016a). While the WPR provides a powerful lens for revealing 
concerns regarding policy procedures, it was not designed to result in practical 
recommendations for policy makers (Bacchi and Bonham 2014). However, many 
researchers using the WPR have chosen to do so (Goodwin and Robinson 2016; 
Holloway 2019; Roulstone and Prideaux 2012). Using this combination of 
frameworks provided me with the confidence of systematic prompts to reflect on 
the impact of my positionality (through examining my problem representation) 
alongside frameworks that had historically been used to make practical 
recommendations regarding policy making. My recommendations that resulted from 
my analysis are in section 9.2.2. 
In presenting my positionality in this thesis, a final contributing factor to the 
manner in which this research was conducted and impacted by my individual 
experiences as a researcher, are my choices related to data collection. As a 
neurodivergent researcher with restricted mobility, conducting interviews with 
participants or data collection in physical archives were simply impractical. Analysis 
of contemporary documents available on online archives secured me access to the 
data required for documentary analysis. Further, telephone interviews from an 
office at CCP adapted with reasonable adjustments meant that I was able to focus 
on interacting with the interviewee and securing a strong contribution from 
individuals towards understanding their perspective on the policy procedures I was 
analysing.  
3.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have described the analysis I undertook to understand the role of 
different knowledges in the procedures of energy market regulation in GB between 
2000 and 2016. This was a highly iterative process with insights from each stage of 
analysis guiding new insight using the three different frameworks. In order to 
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present the findings of my analysis clearly, my empirical work is presented over 
four separate chapters. First, the outcome of procedures tracing alone is described 
in Chapter 4. This provides an explanation of the series of regulatory activities 
undertaken by Ofgem and the Competition and Markets Authority between 2000 and 
2016. I then describe the findings from the three separate frameworks 
independently: EJF in Chapter 5, TPF in Chapter 6 and WPR in Chapter 7. Each 
framework draws on the full corpus of publicly available texts and interview 
transcripts. Presenting the findings from each framework separately enables the 
contribution of each individual framework in revealing the role of knowledges in 
regulatory policy procedures to be reflected on. I then bring together the insights 
from the combined analysis, alongside a reflection on the experience of combining 
these three frameworks, in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 4 – GB Energy Market Regulation 2000 – 2016 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In order to answer the research question “What role did knowledges of ‘consumers’ 
play in the formulation of GB energy market regulation between 2000 and 2016?”, 
the events relating to energy market regulation needed to be identified. In this 
Chapter, I present an overview of those events between 2000 and 2016 that 
provided the historical context for the analysis presented in subsequent chapters. 
As described in Chapter 1, this thesis focuses on the activities of the Office for Gas 
and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) and events described in this chapter are therefore 
predominantly related to the activities of Ofgem. However, the events are not 
exclusively related to Ofgem. Instead, as described in Figure 4.1, the period 2000 to 
2016 saw scrutiny by committees in the Houses of Parliament, adaptations of 
Ofgem’s statutory role by Governments and a review of the competitiveness of the 
energy market by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). 
Figure 4.1 describes the events of energy market regulatory activities in their 
political context between 2000 and 2016. This includes elections, Acts of 
parliament relating to energy regulation and parliamentary committee inquiries 
relating to the energy market and to energy affordability in people’s homes. A full 
list of these political event can be found in Table A6 in the appendix of this 
chapter. Figure 4.1 also includes the outputs of economic regulators – Ofgem and 
the Competition and Markets Authority – regarding the energy supply market with a 
focus on people in their homes.  A full list of regulatory outputs included in Figure 
4.1 is included in Table A6 in the appendix. Plotting the events in this way reveals 
the points at which parliamentary and government activities had implications for 
regulatory decisions and vice versa as a foundation for the analysis in subsequent 
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chapters. Further, I have identified the connections – direct and indirect – between 
different regulatory activities. The majority of regulatory outputs between 2000 
and 2016 comprise not a single output but rather, multiple outputs that are directly 
linked. For example, the Energy Market Probe saw a series of seven directly linked 
outputs which began with a call for evidence and regulatory policy proposal and 
closed with a decision and the implementation of new rules in the supply licence. I 
also use the content of outputs to reveal the indirect connections between 
independently conducted work that nevertheless explicitly noted the findings or 
outcomes of previous work. For example, each set of regulatory outputs that make 
up regulatory activities regarding vulnerable consumers, note their predecessor’s 
reviews and evidence regarding the experiences of vulnerable consumers in the 
energy market.  
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Figure 4.1 Procedures Tracing of affordable Energy Policy and Regulation in GB 
2000 - 2016 
 
 
 
This broad range of energy market regulation activities was due to the interaction 
of energy sector specific regulation, elected representatives and competition 
authorities in GB (Helm 2004). While Ofgem had specific powers regarding energy 
markets these were granted via laws that could be changed (Deller et al. 2018). 
Ofgem was also required, via Government guidance, to consider the impact of fuel 
poverty in its decisions (Ofgem 2005e). This means that Ofgem faced scrutiny 
regarding energy market operations, energy affordability in households and its 
connection to fuel poverty policies by elected representatives and committees. 
Further, Ofgem was able to refer the energy market to competition authorities and 
did so in 2014 (Ofgem 2014a).  
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Despite the involvement of governments, committees and other competition 
authorities, the majority or regulatory policies resulted from the activities of 
Ofgem. The operation of the market was in line with the regulations that it 
monitored, enforced and in some circumstances, changed. These regulations were 
set out in a set of licences which set the boundaries of the behaviour of firms in the 
energy market (Ofgem 2016e). When considering energy market regulation in 
relation to people who use energy in their homes, the relevant licences were the 
domestic supply licences for electricity and gas energy supply firms. In addition to 
the formal licences, there was a further layer of rules set out in codes of practice – 
mandatory industry codes and voluntary codes of conduct (Ofgem 2003c). In 
addition to directing energy supply firms through the supply licences, Ofgem also 
produced guidance related to these codes (Ofgem 2003c, 2012h; Ofgem and 
Energywatch 2003). Monitoring, enforcing and changing energy regulations should 
be done transparently and in a manner that ensures an opportunity for all to 
interact with the regulator (Department of Business, Innovation and Skills 2011). 
Ofgem noted that its publications relating to its regulatory activities were aimed at 
securing responses from energy supply firms, customers, consumer organisations 
and representatives, academics and other interested parties (Ofgem 2008b). 
Considering energy market regulation between 2000 and 2016 therefore means 
including a diverse range of actions of the regulator and interactions between 
organisations and institutions. In this chapter, I distinguish between the activities of 
the regulator – which includes all the events related to regulations and their design 
and development – and regulatory outputs. I use the term regulatory outputs to 
describe the decisions that resulted from regulatory activities which articulated an 
intention of having an impact on the way that the market was regulated e.g. 
through a new regulation or statement of strategy. Regulatory outputs are distinct 
from outcomes in that the latter are the consequences of regulatory outputs. In this 
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Chapter I present regulatory outputs relating to the supply of energy to domestic 
consumers chronologically, to provide an overview of energy market regulation 
between 2000 and 2016 in line with the focus on three periods of regulatory events. 
I begin with the creation of Ofgem and its focus on developing retail markets 
between 2000 and 2009 in Section 4.2.1. This time period saw a stability in 
approach from Ofgem in the energy supply market (Ofgem 2004b, 2008e). However, 
in 2009, Ofgem began implementing reforms it articulated as accelerating the 
benefits of competition to more consumers (Ofgem 2008d). The regulatory activities 
undertaken to attempt this acceleration occurred between 2009 and 2013 and are 
presented in section 4.2.2. Finally, in section 4.2.3 I present events between 2014 
and 2016 when the impact of energy regulation on the competitiveness of the 
energy market was reviewed (Competition and Markets Authority 2014).  
4.2 Regulatory Events 2000 – 2016 
4.2.1 Regulatory policies to introduce competitive retail markets in energy 2000 
– 2009 
 
The Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) was granted statutory powers to 
regulate energy markets by the Utilities Act of 2000. Ofgem was to “to protect the 
interests of consumers, wherever appropriate, by promoting effective competition” 
(Utilities Act 2000, c. 27) . Concern regarding the affordability of energy was not 
noted in the Utilities Act but was instead the focus of Government fuel poverty 
policy in the Warm Homes Act (2000). Though Ofgem did not have specific duties 
regarding fuel poor consumers, it did need to consider guidance from the Secretary 
of State with regard to impacts of its policies of fuel-poor households. Further, 
Ofgem was to have regard to the interests of low-income consumers, the 
chronically sick, the disabled, pensioners and consumers in rural areas (Utilities Act 
2000). In line with the need to consider the interests of consumers specifically 
listed in the statute, the first publication of the new regulator was “The Social 
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Action Plan” (Ofgem 2000b). This plan described how vulnerable and fuel-poor 
consumers should be protected from energy supply firms, though not in a way that 
neutralised the benefits of competitive markets. The Social Action Plan set out 
three activities to protect fuel poor and vulnerable consumers and enable those 
groups to benefit from competitive markets. First, Ofgem described supply licence 
changes to put in place rules that forced energy supply firms to offer new ways for 
energy consumers to pay their bills and energy debt. Second, the Social Action Plan 
committed to a regular reporting cycle on indicators and a good practice 
publication relating to the debt collection activities of energy suppliers and the 
provision of energy efficiency advice that could support fuel-poor and vulnerable 
consumers. Third, Ofgem committed to commissioning research that considered 
barriers to fuel-poor and vulnerable consumers in accessing the benefits of 
competitive markets. Ofgem argued that these three activities responded to the 
concerns raised in 2000 that unaffordable energy bills and the resulting energy debt 
could be avoided if all consumers had access to a range of ways of paying energy 
suppliers and advice on how to use less energy in the home. The result of the 
activities were supply licence conditions setting out a more diverse way of paying 
bills, an annual report on debt repayment and good practice guidance published 
jointly between Ofgem and the statutory consumer advocate, Energywatch (Ofgem 
2002; Ofgem and Energywatch 2003). This guidance encouraged energy supply firms 
to voluntarily provide accurate bills and to identify and help customers who were 
“unable to manage their affairs” (Ofgem and Energywatch 2003, p. 5) with advice 
about using less energy in the home. There was a particular focus on good practice 
regarding Pre-Payment Meter (PPM) consumers – people who used metering 
equipment that does not provide energy without paying in advance for their energy. 
This group were of particular concern due to the fact that they would not be able 
to switch supplier if they were in debt. Further, the cost of running the 
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infrastructure that allowed PPM metering technology was costly to run and these 
costs were charged to PPM consumers. Accessing a meter to pay in arrears required 
a good credit score, which meant that few PPM customers reported moving onto a 
credit meter (Ofgem 2000b; Ofgem and Energywatch 2003).  
 
In 2001, Ofgem concluded that competition was sufficiently well established that no 
price regulation was required for any part of the retail market for domestic energy 
consumers (Ofgem 2001b). This decision was on the basis that consumers reported 
being aware that they could switch supplier and that if they did so, there were 
significant savings that could be secured. Further, the ex-monopoly providers – 
regulated firms who operated before privatisation - had lost market share. Overall, 
the findings from the review of domestic competition indicated that competition 
was well established, effectively protecting customers’ interests, and continued to 
develop well. Ofgem therefore concluded that remaining price controls on 
electricity and gas could be lifted from April 2002.  
 
Whether the introduction of retail markets in energy supply was successful was a 
topic of a consultation in 2003 called “Making Markets work for Customers”(Ofgem 
2003a, 2003c) . In this consultation, Ofgem set out, for the first time, its priorities 
for energy customers. These were security of supply and safety, arrangements that 
facilitated the engagement of consumers with the market and protecting vulnerable 
consumers - low income consumers, the chronically sick, the disabled, pensioners 
and consumers in rural areas (Utilities Act, 2000). In a similar way to 2001, Ofgem 
concluded that competitive markets had continued to develop well and that this 
was proven by a high awareness among consumers that they could switch supplier, 
that savings were available in energy markets for people who switched and there 
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had been a fall in the market share of ex monopoly energy firms. One concern was, 
however, that the sales and marketing regulations that were due to be removed in 
line with a sunset clause in 2004 would still be required in the future (Ofgem 
2003b). This was because consumers required accurate information to ensure that 
they could make choices between suppliers and therefore, regulations on 
information provided to consumers by salespeople would be maintained. Ofgem 
concluded its review by proposing that the supply licences in 2003 struck the right 
balance between ensuring that a minimum universal service was available to all, 
and regulation did not distort competition through too much regulation (Ofgem 
2003c). 
Confidence that the energy market was competitive and delivering benefits to 
consumers was maintained again in the Domestic Market Review of 2004 (Ofgem 
2004b). However, Ofgem noted three concerns. First, Ofgem raised the concern 
that the information provided to consumers might require improvement to see more 
benefit from lower prices after switching suppliers. Second, there was a concern 
that switching might be particularly difficult where metering infrastructure needed 
to be changed. Third, Ofgem noted a concern that too much regulation might be a 
barrier to entry for new energy suppliers who would otherwise enter the market 
and drive down prices and increase innovation through increased competition. The 
Domestic Market Review did not implement any changes to energy supply licences 
in response to these concerns but implemented a reporting cycle to track progress 
towards improvements instead. There was therefore no need to restrict what 
energy supply firms offered their consumers in terms of products or the price of 
energy charged (Littlechild 2019; Ofgem 2004b). Ofgem measures suggested that 
ex-monopoly providers had excessive market power, that consumers knew that they 
could switch supplier and that there were savings available in the energy market 
(Ofgem 2004b, 2004a). 
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The delivery of competitive markets by Ofgem was not a concern of Government 
energy policy between 2000 and 2007. Instead, Energy Acts simply expanded the 
statutory duties of the regulator to reflect reforms elsewhere in the economy – first 
in terms of better regulation in the Energy Act of 2004 and then in relation to 
sustainable energy in the Energy Act of 2008. There was, however, a concern 
regarding energy supplier behaviour with regard to disconnections of homes with 
energy debt, following a case of two pensioners dying after being disconnected by 
British Gas. As discussed in Chapter 1, this case resulted in significant concerns 
being raised in the press and in parliament (Akbar 2003; House of Commons Select 
Committee on Trade and Industry 2005). While its analysis indicated that the energy 
market was working well for domestic consumers, Ofgem did respond to the 
concerns raised by elected representatives and the public by undertaking a review 
(Press Association 2004).  
Ofgem then conducted a review of Social Action Strategy (Ofgem 2005e) focused on 
energy supplier behaviour regarding debt and disconnection. This strategy noted 
that measures to support vulnerable energy consumers should be designed as far as 
possible to avoid the inhibition of competition. It went on to welcome a new self- 
regulatory safety net to stop vulnerable consumers being disconnected in the winter 
months. Ofgem reiterated that its role was to protect consumers by promoting 
competitive markets which kept prices as low as possible, drawing a distinction 
between its focus and that of poverty and social exclusion, which was for 
Government to tackle. The stance of distinguishing affordable energy as a concern 
for Government and the competitive market as the concern of the regulator, was 
reiterated at the Select Committee Inquiry on Debt and Disconnection (House of 
Commons Select Committee on Trade and Industry 2005). In line with its 
predecessor committees regarding the affordability of energy, the committee 
concluded that monitoring energy supply firms, particularly with regard to PPM 
 
 
110 
 
customers, should be sufficient, with broader concerns about accessing affordable 
energy to be the focus of Government fuel poverty programmes (House of Commons 
Select Committee on  Business and Enterprise 2008; House of Commons Select 
Committee on Trade and Industry 2001, 2002; National Audit Office 2004). No 
changes in enforceable rules were therefore introduced by the energy regulator in 
2005. Instead, the Social Action Strategy maintained four existing activities within 
the regulator: it ensured compliance with regulations by energy supply firms; it 
contributed to Government led debates on fuel poverty; it encouraged energy 
companies to consider debt prevention policies; and it considered how best to 
inform consumers about how to lower their bills. While the Social Action Strategy 
did not lead to any new regulations for energy supply firms, Ofgem began a review 
of their monitoring activities to measure debt prevention, in order to encourage 
good practice (Ofgem 2005e). 
Alongside regular reporting regarding energy suppliers’ activities relating to 
vulnerable consumers with Social Obligations reporting, retail market reports were 
subsequently published in 2005, 2006 and 2007 and confirmed Ofgem’s confidence 
that the competitive retail market for domestic energy consumers was working well 
(Ofgem 2005a, 2006, 2007b) . This conclusion was shared by the House of Lords 
Committee on Regulators which concluded that utilities regulation was working 
well, with the exception of water regulation which had not yet adopted a path to a 
competitive retail market (House of Lords Select Committee on Regulators 2007). 
This conclusion was shared with the public in January 2008 in a press release named 
“Market is sound—Ofgem assures Chancellor”(Ofgem 2008e).  
The conclusion drawn in January 2008 by the regulator articulated a confidence 
reiterated throughout the period 2000 to 2008. The view that the retail market in 
energy was a success was shared by elected representatives in Government and 
Select Committees over this period. The regulator permitted uncapped electricity 
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and gas prices in the domestic energy supply market and explained that this had not 
damaged competition. Instead, the measures used to define good competition for 
consumers – that there were choices which meant savings could be made and an 
awareness of how to engage with the market – showed success. However, as I go on 
to describe in the section below, by the end of 2008, the consensus that the 
competitive retail market was working well for consumers was broken. 
4.2.2. Regulatory policies to accelerate the benefits of a competitive retail 
market 2008 – 2012 
 
When energy prices rose in 2008 the Chancellor of the Exchequer criticised profits 
made by energy firms and included a demand that energy supply firms voluntarily 
commit to £150 million a year to supporting their most vulnerable customers for 
three years in the 2008 budget (Ofgem 2008f). Then, less than a month after its 
buoyant press release, Ofgem announced the “Energy Supply Market Probe”(Ofgem 
2008b). The Energy Supply Market Probe, explained Ofgem, responded to public 
concerns regarding the energy market and set out to evaluate the energy market in 
terms of supplier market shares, energy prices (both retail and wholesale), barriers 
to entry for companies trying to enter the energy supply market and consumer 
experiences of the market. The intervention of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was 
not, however, noted. Ofgem noted that it expected the full cooperation of energy 
supply firms in responding to the concerns raised in the Energy Market Supply Probe 
and that the alternative to Ofgem’s own review was a referral to the Competition 
Commission (Ofgem 2008b, 2009f). Further,  Select Committees in the House of 
Commons raised their own concern regarding energy affordability and encouraged 
Government fuel poverty policies to raise ambition in responding to the challenges 
(House of Commons Select Committee on  Business and Enterprise 2008; House of 
Commons Select Committee on Work and Pensions 2008). However, consideration of 
regulation did not raise concerns about competitive markets as a cause of energy 
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affordability challenges. Instead, the Select Committee inquiry on “Energy prices, 
poverty and profits” supported the  scope of the Energy Supply Market Probe in its 
focus on ensuring domestic consumers could access accurate information, face low 
barriers to switching suppliers and move between different types of products 
(House of Commons Select Committee on  Business and Enterprise 2008).  
On the basis of analysis conducted as part of the Energy Supply Market Probe, 
Ofgem concluded that competitive markets had developed well but that the 
transition from monopoly provision to fully competitive retail markets needed to be 
accelerated in two areas – price differentials and the lack of market engagement 
from some consumer groups (Ofgem 2008d) . Government ministers agreed with this 
assessment but argued that Ofgem’s focus on competitive markets as the primary 
manner in which domestic energy consumers should be protected, was not 
sufficient (Miliband 2009). The Government therefore introduced the Energy Act 
2010 which gave the Secretary of State the power to instruct Ofgem to control 
energy supply firm’s tariff offerings to domestic consumers and communications 
regarding prices (Energy Act 2010). Further, the Energy Act of 2010 introduced a 
new procedural step to consider using solutions to address consumer detriment 
instead of, or alongside, measures to promote competition.  
Ofgem did, however, describe a scope of intervention that would meet the 
concerns articulated by the debate surrounding the Energy Act and described new 
regulations regarding price differentials and an increase in market engagement 
(Ofgem 2009f). First, Ofgem concluded that there were four areas concerning: price 
premiums to consumers who were in the “home” area of an ex monopoly provider; 
electricity only contracts; PPMs and contracts purchased offline (rather than signing 
up using the internet). Ofgem was concerned because the price differences 
identified in their analysis did not reflect differences in cost between providing 
services (Ofgem 2009g). Ofgem therefore proposed new regulations to ensure that 
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energy supply firms provided information that would prompt consumers and reduce 
unfair price differentials. In order to evaluate whether price differentials were 
unfair, Ofgem considered four market interventions: a price cap, a ban on cross 
subsidies between deals, a ban on discrimination based on being located in an ex 
monopoly provider area and a ban on price differences that were not cost reflective 
(Ofgem 2009g). Ofgem concluded that it would act to stop undue discrimination and 
implement new supply licence conditions to ensure that the only differences 
between prices were based on cost (Ofgem 2009a) . This specifically banned the 
practice of charging a higher price to customers who were within the “home” area 
of ex monopolies’ historic geography. That is, the region where an energy supply 
firm had been a monopoly provider before privatization. Ofgem noted that the cost 
reflective nature of pricing should be a feature of a fully functioning competitive 
market and therefore, added a sunset clause to the new rules (Ofgem 2009b). 
Second, the Energy Supply Probe concluded that not all consumers were fully 
benefiting from market engagement and that there were concerning differences 
between some prices (Ofgem 2008d). Three groups were identified by Ofgem as 
least likely to benefit from competitive markets in 2008. The first group were older 
people who had often never switched their energy supplier and were unlikely to 
compare prices online to secure the best deals. The second were low income groups 
who did switch supplier but through face to face salespeople who did not accurately 
compare offers, so were unlikely to access the best deals. Further, low income 
groups were less likely to pay by direct debt and more likely to use PPM, thereby 
paying the associated higher prices. Further, low income groups might not be able 
to switch if they were in debt with their current supplier, due to caps relating to 
the amount of debt allowed to be outstanding when a consumer switched supplier. 
The third group were consumers in rural locations off the gas grid who did not 
benefit from products with a discount for being supplied with both electricity and 
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gas and were therefore unable to secure some of the lowest prices available in the 
energy market for domestic consumers.  
In order to accelerate market engagement by all groups, Ofgem argued that new 
regulations were needed to ensure energy suppliers provided an annual overview of 
energy costs with a prompt to engage with the energy market (Ofgem 2009f). There 
were two areas where Ofgem sought improvements from energy supply firms but 
did not set out to change rules (Ofgem 2009f). Firstly, Ofgem noted that a voluntary 
code of good practice coordinated by the Energy Retailers Association – the industry 
body representing energy supply firms - regarding sales procedures had not resulted 
in a significant enough improvement across the industry.  Therefore, an overarching 
set of guidelines that set out the principles of treating customers fairly and more 
reliable procedures for switching supplier would be encouraged through a preamble 
to the supply licence drafted by Ofgem and a good practice code. New rules were, 
however, needed to ensure that salespeople provided accurate information to 
consumers who were considering switching. The new rules to instruct energy supply 
firms on information would empower consumers to make well informed decisions. 
However, not all of these rules would be within the energy supply licence, which 
could result in any rule-breaking activity being fined by the regulator. Instead, only 
the provision of an annual prompt to switch supplier and its layout and the rules for 
face to face salespeople were added to the licence. Secondly, the rules that were 
considered in the review regarding switching with a debt when paying via a PPM and 
the rules governing prices changes could need changing, Ofgem argued, but would 
be the focus of future reforms (Ofgem 2011g). 
Against the backdrop of these concerns regarding the energy market, Ofgem 
reviewed the conduct of energy suppliers with regard to debt and disconnection 
procedures in a separate programme of work (Ofgem 2008a). It concluded that 
strong progress had been made in protecting vulnerable consumers from 
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disconnection by their energy supply but concluded that there was some concerning 
inconsistencies in approach between energy supply firms, despite an industry 
association voluntary code (Ofgem 2009h). In 2009, in partnership with the 
consumer advocate, Ofgem proposed that ongoing monitoring of energy supply firms 
and the voluntary code was sufficient in most areas, with two exceptions (Ofgem 
2009h). The first exception was the proactive identification of vulnerable customers 
during the procedures related to debt collection and disconnection from energy 
supply. The second was the reconnection of a home that had been disconnected in 
the summer before the winter months. Though Ofgem stated that both of these 
factors were implicit within the existing supply licence, the extent of the 
inconsistencies between energy suppliers in acting in line with their expectations 
meant that new wording in the supply licence conditions was required. The change 
was to include the explicit requirement that energy supply companies proactively 
identify vulnerable consumers (Ofgem 2010e). The voluntary code of conduct and 
the existing rules were articulated as sufficient while further consideration of the 
need for regulation was conducted (Ofgem 2009h).The conclusion of this review 
over a year later was that a new licence condition was required to clarify that an 
energy supply firm must check the circumstances of a domestic energy customer 
before disconnecting their energy supply (Ofgem 2010c). However, this rule did not 
secure a reconnection timeline or prescribe the proactive identification described 
in the initial review (Ofgem 2009h). 
Ofgem concluded the Energy Supply Probe noting that the best way to deliver 
positive outcomes for energy consumers was to ensure that there was a vibrant 
market (Ofgem 2009f). The reforms described focused on improving the functioning 
of the market overall but in particular for vulnerable households. However, Ofgem 
concluded in 2010 that the reforms proposed by the Energy Supply Market Probe did 
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not result in the level of acceleration of access to the benefits of a competitive 
market that was required (Ofgem 2010f). 
In 2011, Ofgem published a set of proposals that included radical reforms for the 
domestic energy market: the Retail Market Review (Ofgem 2011h). These reforms 
noted increasing concerns regarding the increasing price of energy to domestic 
consumers. The Retail Market Review would, argued Ofgem, make competition 
work more effectively so that its benefits could be realised by consumers. While 
this had also been a concern identified by the Energy Market Supply Probe, Ofgem’s 
evaluation in 2011 identified that only the rules in enforceable licences regarding 
price differentials had made an impact. The remaining changes – rules of the 
information provided by salespeople and unenforceable guidance on treating 
customers fairly – had not led to improvement to consumer engagement. In fact, 
engagement in the energy market by consumers had deteriorated under key metrics 
on making effective choices (Ofgem 2011h) . Noting that consumers had found it 
difficult to make a well-informed choice of supplier, Ofgem proposed new rules of 
tariffs and information provision. This included a cap on the number of tariffs that 
could be offered by an energy supplier and a restriction to the design of that tariff 
and more prescriptive rules around the provision of information about tariffs 
(Ofgem 2011h, 2012o). Finally, having concluded that unenforceable guidance 
introduced in 2009 had not had an impact on energy suppliers’ activities, the 
overarching standards of conduct relating to treating customers fairly were added 
to the supply licence. Following a consultation procedure, Ofgem published updated 
proposals in 2012 with an initial scope of new rules that would limit each supplier 
to four tariffs and that each tariff would have no more than two types of charges 
(Ofgem 2012k). To make comparing this limited number of tariffs easier, each 
supplier would have to provide information annually to prompt their customers to 
switch. This proposal had the explicit backing of the relevant Select Committee, 
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that argued in 2012 and 2013 that change was needed and that Ofgem’s approach 
was sensible (House of Commons Select Committee on Energy and Climate Change 
2011, 2012). The Government’s position was less sanguine, with the Energy Act of 
2013 taking powers to deliver the Retail Market’s Reviews proposals on reforming 
tariffs if Ofgem’s implementation was delayed (Energy Act 2013). 
Ofgem argued in 2012 that due to an increase in affordability challenges in 
households it was more important than ever that consumers were able to shop 
around to find the best deal (Ofgem 2012i). The final proposals of the Retail Market 
Review included seven adaptations of existing rules and five new licence conditions 
– a significant increase in the number of regulations proposed by a single review, 
which resulted in a prescriptive standard that energy suppliers were to implement. 
Ofgem concluded its review stating that its proposals made it radically easier for 
consumers to make better choices about their energy supply.  
In addition to reforms in the way in which customers could interact with the energy 
market, Ofgem also reviewed its approach to protecting vulnerable consumers in 
2012. It argued that its approach set out in the Social Action Strategy of 2005 
required development in the context of the Equalities Act of 2010 (Ofgem 2012h). 
The strategy focused on promoting best practice among energy suppliers, ongoing 
research insight at Ofgem and innovative approaches to advice provision. Ofgem 
also noted that as the energy regulator, it had a role in sharing energy market 
expertise with other organisations and institutions with regards to the affordability 
of energy. Ofgem set out the idea of a network to connect with grassroots 
organisation and with other sectoral regulators. The strategy did not, however, 
recommend any new rules to protect energy consumers (Ofgem 2012h, 2013c). 
Instead, Ofgem noted that they would assess the outcomes of existing rules in line 
with the overarching attempt to simplify the licences that governed the activities of 
energy supply licences. Ofgem concluded that a new overarching definition would 
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frame their work in vulnerable consumer activities in terms of priorities and 
assessment of interventions (Ofgem 2013c). The new definition adopted was “when 
a consumer’s personal circumstances and characteristics combine with aspects of 
the market to create situations where he or she is: significantly less able than a 
typical consumer to protect or represent his or her interests in the energy market, 
and/or significantly more likely than a typical consumer to suffer detriment, or that 
detriment is likely to be more substantial.” (p12, Ofgem 2013a). Ofgem described 
that the new definition included the six characteristics of consumers in the Utilities 
Act, alongside a further 28 considerations for energy supply firms (Ofgem 2013c). 
These are described in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 Energy vulnerability factors considered by Ofgem 
 
Utilities Act 
2000 
Vulnerable Consumer Strategy (2013) 
 
Personal 
circumstances 
Property Capacity to 
protect or 
represent own 
interests 
Equalities 
Act (2010) 
Age - over 65  Living alone Living in a rural 
area and off the 
gas grid 
Living with 
physical health 
issues 
Age  
Age – under 5 Not having 
internet access 
Living in private 
rented 
accommodation 
Living with 
mental illness 
Disability 
Has a chronic 
illness 
Being on a low 
income 
Living in a cold, 
inefficient home 
Suffering from a 
cognitive 
impairment 
Gender 
reassignment 
Lives in a 
rural location 
Being 
unemployed or 
being made 
redundant 
 Having a 
learning 
disability 
Marriage and 
civil 
partnership 
Low income Being a full-time 
carer 
 Literacy or 
numeracy 
difficulties 
Pregnancy 
and 
maternity 
Disabled Being a lone 
parent 
 Having a speech 
impairment 
Race  
 Leaving care for 
the first time 
 Not speaking 
English as a first 
language 
Sex 
 Experiencing 
relationship 
breakdown 
  Sexual 
orientation  
 Experiencing 
bereavement 
  Religion or 
belief 
 
As a result of the procedures of developing the Consumer Vulnerability Strategy 
(2013), Ofgem concluded that its first priority from the strategy for their work with 
energy supply companies was to ensure that consumers were identified as 
vulnerable by adding customers to the Priority Services Register – a scheme to 
provide additional services to vulnerable consumers. Further, Ofgem looked to 
review what support might be needed for consumers in vulnerable situations to 
ensure there was suitable support to access the energy market.  
The period 2008 to 2012 saw a significant increase in regulatory activities to 
intervene in the retail energy market in GB. As described in this section, this saw 
new rules introduced regarding the number of tariffs energy supply companies could 
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offer, how those tariffs were designed and how they were described to consumers. 
Further, the consensus that the GB retail energy market was working well for 
domestic consumers had broken down, with Government introducing powers to 
allow the Secretary of State to intervene if the benefits of the competitive market 
were not accelerated. However, key features of energy regulation were maintained 
from 2000. Specifically, the desirability of a competitive market as a mechanism to 
reduce energy prices was maintained. Further, the separation of affordability as a 
concern for Government as distinct from regulation of the market continued (Ofgem 
2013c). Competitive retail markets were still the focus of energy regulation – the 
difference in this period was that regulation focused on accelerating the market’s 
reach (Ofgem 2009f, 2011h).  However, despite the regulatory activities regarding 
the provision of information to all consumers in the retail market and a redesigned 
Vulnerability Strategy, Ofgem did not see an acceleration of all domestic consumers 
benefiting from the competitive market (Ofgem 2013e).  
  
4.2.3 Regulatory policies to review GB retail energy market regulation 2013 – 
2016 
 
In spite of the major regulatory changes between 2008 and 2013 described above, 
the impact on the energy market appeared to be minimal (Ofgem 2014a). Instead, 
Ofgem referred the energy market to the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) 
three months after the Retail Market Review reforms took effect. Citing the review 
of the energy market conducted jointly with the CMA and the Office of Fair Trading 
– the State of the Market Report 2014 - Ofgem argued that six years of regulatory 
reforms under the threat of a referral to the Competition authorities had been 
insufficient (Ofgem 2014a; Ofgem, Office of Fair Trading and Competition and 
Markets Authority 2014). The wide reaching referral had two elements that 
considered residential consumers: whether ex monopoly energy companies had a 
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market advantage that led to them being able to charge high prices and weak 
consumer response to available products in the energy market (Ofgem 2014a). 
In 2014, the CMA published its scope, which was to investigate which features of 
the energy market in GB could have had an Adverse Effect on Competition (AEC) 
(Competition and Markets Authority 2014). This included a consideration of whether 
energy supply firms faced weak incentives to compete on price, given that there 
were a large number of inactive consumers who did not engage in the market. The 
CMA considered three possible sources of weak incentives to compete: regulatory 
interventions by Ofgem, poor behaviour of energy supply firms and domestic energy 
consumer inactivity in the energy market. After its two-year investigation into the 
energy market, the CMA concluded that all three sources contributed to weak 
incentives for energy supply firms to compete.  
First, Ofgem’s regulatory interventions had damaged the competitive market 
(Competition and Markets Authority 2015b). In the Governance AEC, the CMA 
pointed to e undue discrimination of the Energy Supply Probe and  tariff 
simplification from the Retail Market Review as particularly damaging regulatory 
outputs (Competition and Markets Authority 2015a; Ofgem 2013k). In its final 
report, the CMA highlighted two important contributing factors in the regulatory 
outputs that damaged competition: a lack of rigorous analysis by Ofgem and the 
role of energy supply firms in developing the rules that governed the industry. 
Instead of robust policy procedures focused on delivering competition, the CMA 
identified energy supply firms shaping key industry procedures through code 
governance (Competition and Markets Authority 2016b). Further, robust decision- 
making at Ofgem was weakened by a political debate on direct intervention by the 
Secretary of State, in the Energy Acts of 2010 and 2013 respectively (Energy Act 
2010; Energy Act 2013). The CMA therefore recommended that the policy making 
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responsibilities between the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and 
Ofgem should be made clearer.  
Second, the CMA considered that the impact of energy supply firms’ behaviour on 
weak consumer responses resulted in an adverse effect on competition 
(Competition and Markets Authority 2015b). The CMA concluded that the ex -
monopoly providers were able to charge higher prices to inactive consumers and 
had been doing so (Competition and Markets Authority 2016b). This problem was 
particularly significant for consumers who had a PPM. PPM consumers were less 
likely to switch and faced additional complexities in switching supplier, relating to 
the amount of energy debt they were using their meter to repay. Further, the PPM 
market was constrained by infrastructure that only allowed for a capped number of 
tariffs to be offered. This meant that PPM consumers did not have access to as wide 
a variety of innovative products as other consumers may have had. The CMA 
therefore introduced a new price cap – the first since 2002 – for all PPM consumers, 
until they received a meter that was connected to new infrastructure which 
allowed a fully competitive range of deals (Competition and Markets Authority 
2016e). Further, the CMA encouraged Ofgem to review the experience of PPM 
consumers switching with a debt, in addition to the reforms delivered in 2015 that 
increased the amount of debt a PPM consumer could be in and switch supplier 
(Competition and Markets Authority 2016b; Ofgem 2015i). 
Third, the CMA considered the impact of consumer decision-making on the 
competitive energy market (Competition and Markets Authority 2015b). The CMA 
concluded that in order for the competitive market in energy to be a success, 
consumers needed to engage with the market more by switching supplier. Ofgem 
reporting at this time described that while consumers were aware that they could 
switch supplier, there had been very little change in the number who did so (Ofgem 
2015j, 2016b). The CMA therefore introduced new rules for consumers with complex 
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metering types to be prompted to switch supplier and for a new database to be set 
up of all inactive consumers. Inactive consumers on this database would receive 
communications on the deals available in the energy market with advice on how to 
switch supplier (Competition and Markets Authority 2016d, 2016f). However, the 
investigation did not conclude that the market structure had enabled any cartel-
like behaviour in price setting (Competition and Markets Authority 2015b). In fact, 
the retail market for domestic consumers showed features of a well-functioning, 
mature market in that it had a range of energy suppliers offering a range of 
products (Competition and Markets Authority 2016b).  
During the investigation by the CMA, regulatory policy debates focused on analysis 
and publications. There were therefore few other regulatory events. There were no 
further statutory powers granted to Ofgem in legislation and the Select Committee 
on Energy and Climate Change focused on articulating the importance of price 
comparison websites and clear communications from energy supply companies in its 
recommendations (House of Commons Select Committee on Energy and Climate 
Change 2013, 2015). In this context, Ofgem’s activities were predominantly focused 
on interacting with the CMA’s investigation. There were two exceptions: its 
vulnerability strategy and the initiation of a review of how it regulated the retail 
energy markets (Ofgem 2015e, 2016j, 2016e).  
First, in 2015, Ofgem reviewed its progress in relation to the aims of its Consumer 
Vulnerability Strategy of 2012 (Ofgem 2015e). Ofgem concluded that it needed to 
extend the strategy to incorporate its new role in administering government social 
programmes, as set out in the Energy Act of 2011, but that the priorities and 
approach remained consistent with its 2013 Consumer Vulnerability Strategy (Ofgem 
2013c, 2015e). The area that was prioritised from reviewing progress on the 
Vulnerability Strategy in 2015 was in relation to PPM consumers (Ofgem 2015e). 
Ofgem considered how to ensure PPM customers could access more competitive 
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tariffs and ensure that they were treated fairly by energy supply firms (Ofgem 
2015i). Explaining that the CMA had signalled that their recommendations were 
likely to include recommendations in the PPM market, Ofgem concluded that they 
would focus on two topics: a voluntary code to allow PPM Consumers to switch even 
when they had a debt to an energy supplier (Ofgem 2015f) and the charges when 
energy supply companies installed a PPM without the consent of a customer (Ofgem 
2015i, 2016f). Ofgem’s decision was to ban installation of a PPM without consent, 
where doing so would exacerbate vulnerability and to cap the charge an energy 
supplier could apply to a customer’s bill for the installation of a PPM (Ofgem 2016h, 
2016f).  
Second, Ofgem noted the CMA’s work in identifying that Ofgem’s prescriptive rules 
had resulted in an adverse effect on competition and launched a consultation on 
moving to principles-based regulation (Ofgem 2016j). Operating under principles, 
energy supply firms would need to work out what consumers needed rather than 
follow a set of tick boxes from the regulator, focusing instead on outcomes that 
should be achieved. This new way of regulating, argued Ofgem, would future-proof 
regulation and deliver what was right and fair for consumers. Ofgem noted that the 
change would result in better protection for consumers as it would allow them to 
benefit from innovation but ensure that energy supplier poor behaviour was 
reduced. Further, Ofgem argued, principles-based regulation, which removed 
unnecessary prescriptive rules, represented better regulation. In December 2016, 
Ofgem published the conclusion to this review in a “Regulatory Stances” statement 
(Ofgem 2016e). This statement set out to clarify to external stakeholders the 
approach Ofgem intended to take when undertaking its activities. In discussing the 
supply market, Ofgem confirmed that effective competition should be promoted to 
deliver for consumers. In a separate section on consumer vulnerability, Ofgem 
noted that it needed to act to protect the interests of consumers in vulnerable 
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situations and would continue to deliver its Consumer Vulnerability Strategy (Ofgem 
2013c). The strategy described in setting out an intention to use principle based 
regulation to encourage a flourishing competitive market returned to the logic set 
out in Ofgem’s 2001 decision to cease price regulation (Ofgem 2001b). Ultimately, 
consumers would benefit most where innovating firms competed to drive down  
energy prices and the regulators role was to support the operation of the market 
(Ofgem 2001b, 2016e). 
In the period 2013 to 2016, regulatory activities focused on reviewing the 
implications of the rules that set out the structures of the retail market for 
domestic consumers. This review saw the retraction of many of the reforms 
introduced between 2009 and 2012, in order to re-establish the competitive market 
structure introduced in 2002. Reforms for domestic energy consumers focused most 
on the provision of information to consumers in order to enable accurate decision- 
making. One significant exception was the intervention to limit the charges for PPM 
consumers, both in terms of prices and installation costs. However, neither of these 
reforms related to the campaigning regarding the impact of these charges on PPM 
consumers themselves. Instead, the CMA and Ofgem focused on the lack of 
competitive pressure in these areas, meaning regulation was required until the PPM 
infrastructure was changed to allow a fully competitive market (Competition and 
Markets Authority 2016e; Ofgem 2016h). 
4.3 Conclusion 
 
This thesis began by pointing to the gap in expectations between a market regulator 
focused on competitive prices and the public and their representatives on energy 
affordability. In presenting this account of regulatory policy formulation between 
2000 and 2016, I have identified that this gap in expectations is rarely visible in 
regulatory outputs between 2000 and 2016. It is notable that the main feature of 
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the entire period of 2000 to 2016 is not a difference in expectations between 
market regulators on the one hand and elected representatives on the other. 
Instead, there is a remarkably consistent consensus on the overarching 
arrangements that dictate access to affordable energy – a competitive retail 
market. Indeed, the consensus predominantly extends from an agreement that a 
competitive retail market is the correct arrangement, to consensus that the GB 
energy market has most of the features of a well- functioning market (House of 
Commons Select Committee on Energy and Climate Change 2012; Ofgem 2004b, 
2008d, 2012k). Disagreements regarding the policies to deliver affordable energy 
instead focus on the Government’s fuel poverty policy and its support for affordable 
energy through improvements to the fabric of homes rather than market 
arrangements and the behaviour of some energy supply firms (House of Commons 
Select Committee on  Business and Enterprise 2008; House of Commons Select 
Committee on Energy and Climate Change 2013; House of Commons Select 
Committee on Trade and Industry 2001, 2002, 2005) . As there was broad consensus 
that the retail energy market was structured in an optimal manner, regulatory 
outputs focused on energy supply firms to conduct the procedures that enabled 
consumers to switch suppliers and ensure the market operated as it should (Ofgem 
2003c, 2010c, 2011g, 2011h, 2015f). That their approach to regulating energy 
supply firms followed the principles described by Government that unnecessary 
regulation is a burden on innovation and should therefore be avoided, is noted 
regularly in Ofgem regulatory outputs in this period (Ofgem 2003c, 2008a, 2009b, 
2012e, 2012h, 2013c, 2013g, 2014a, 2016e). Instead, Ofgem used a combination of 
good practice guidance, encouragement of voluntary codes of conduct by industry, 
in addition to enforceable rules (Ofgem 2003c, 2008a, 2016e).  
There were three points at which the gap in expectations regarding access to 
affordable energy was visible and the consensus that the market was working well 
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broke down: in 2008, 2010, 2014. On each occasion, the structure of the retail 
market was reformed by regulators by considering competitive outcomes 
(Competition and Markets Authority 2014; Ofgem 2008b, 2009f, 2010f, 2012i). While 
each period can be broadly considered to have focused on a different set of 
regulatory activities – introducing the market, accelerating its benefits and 
reviewing its structure – all maintained the focus on the competitive market as the 
procedure to deliver positive benefits to domestic consumers. Even where 
legislation was introduced to provide powers to the Secretary of State to intervene 
if the regulator did not do so (Energy Act 2010; Energy Act 2013), these powers 
were not used before the end of 2016. The role of price in energy affordability was 
known but not accepted to be the focus of regulatory activities; instead, it was the 
responsibility of Government (Ofgem 2000b, 2005e, 2007c, 2008f, 2013c, 2015e). At 
each of these three points – 2008, 2010 and 2014 – the regulatory activities that 
followed discussed, to some extent, fairness (Ofgem 2009g, 2010f, 2013g, 2016e, 
2016j). The Energy Supply Market Probe included a consultation on unfair pricing 
differential. The Retail Market Review Incorporated Standards of Conduct into the 
supply licence to ensure customers were treated fairly. Ofgem’s Regulatory Stances 
document of 2016 included an aim that outcomes were right and fair. However, this 
is not in line with the articulation of fairness that is invoked by the campaigns 
noted in Chapter 1 and in Energy Justice scholarship in terms fair access to 
affordable energy services (Simcock et al. 2016a; Walker and Day 2012). Instead, 
the Ofgem consultation on unfair pricing differentials in the Energy Supply Probe 
was followed by a consultation on undue discrimination – the economic definition of 
costs are inappropriate when they are not connected to the energy user who causes 
those costs to a supply firm (Ofgem 2009g, 2009a, 2009b) . The Retail Market 
Review insisted that energy supply firms must not unfairly hide accurate 
information and used trust in energy suppliers as a measure of whether energy 
 
 
128 
 
suppliers were acting fairly (Ofgem 2013g, 2015j, 2016b). Finally, right and fair 
outcomes for consumers in a market are not necessarily those articulated as fair by 
justice campaigners who discuss a right to energy services in the home (Day et al. 
2016; Gillard et al. 2017; Halff et al. 2014; Sovacool 2013). These differences in 
conceptions of fairness and their implications for the different ways that consumers 
might be known in energy market regulation, form a central part of subsequent 
chapters in this thesis. 
It is clear that regulatory activities regarding energy market regulation at Ofgem 
were focused on understanding consumers and the way that they engaged with the 
market. However, there was a logistical separation between regulatory activities 
that considered consumers in the market and another entirely distinct group of 
‘vulnerable’ consumers. That protecting some consumers was inevitable was 
accepted in regulatory activities but such protections was not to undermine the 
competitive retail market in its development or delivery (Ofgem 2000b, 2005e, 
2013c). This separation had important implications for influences on way that 
consumers are known in market regulation and therefore implications for answering 
the research question “What role did knowledges of ‘consumers’ play in the 
formulation of GB energy market regulation between 2000 and 2016?”. The analysis 
in subsequent chapters evidences this. I begin by applying the EJF to reveal the 
injustices in the energy market regulation between 2000 and 2016. 
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Chapter 5 – Energy Justice Analysis of Energy Market 
Regulation in Great Britain 2000 – 2016 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The political and public narratives of the energy market between 2000 and 2016 
raised significant concerns regarding the fairness of access to affordable energy. 
The extent to which the energy market could be described as fair can be analysed 
using the Energy Justice framework (Deller et al. 2018; K. Jenkins et al. 2018; 
Simcock 2016). By conceptualising fairness in energy markets as energy justice, I 
undertook an analysis underpinned by the interacting features of procedural, 
recognition and distributional justice. Further, by adopting a framework that 
specifically sets out to identify the way in which energy policy procedures 
understand diverse energy needs, I illustrate the influence the different ways of 
knowing consumers had at Ofgem between 2000 and 2016.  
Each of the three features of energy justice provides a different lens through which 
to examine the features of regulatory policy making in Great Britain that might 
contribute to the justness of energy market regulation. As described in Chapter 3, 
the full corpus of documents and interviews was coded against the concepts of 
distribution, recognition and procedural justice. In each of the sections below, I 
present the findings from my analysis against each of the individual pillars before 
outlining their interaction between 2000 and 2016.  
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5.2 Distributional Justice 
The third and final pillar of the energy justice framework is distributional justice. 
Energy Justice scholarship, in line with Environmental Justice concerns, focuses on 
identifying the way that benefits and harms of energy policies are distributed 
within society (Jenkins et al. 2016; Schlosberg and Collins 2014; Sovacool 2013). In 
the context of affordable energy in GB, there were two related areas with 
consequences for the distribution of the benefits and costs associated with energy 
prices. Firstly, there is the access to the distribution of funds related to ensuring 
that particular groups have access to affordable energy services through funded 
programmes (Bouzarovski and Simcock 2017; Walker and Day 2012). The 
distributional justice of funds related to GB programmes to increase access to 
affordable energy services were not incorporated into regulatory policy outputs 
between 2000 and 2016. Instead, formal regulatory outputs explained that Ofgem 
oversaw the distribution of funds in line with criteria set out by Government policy 
makers (Department of Energy and Climate Change 2015b; Ofgem 2014h). The 
second element of distribution - access to low prices secured through market 
engagement – was the focus of three regulatory policy procedures which are 
described in the sections below. 
 
5.2.1 Ofgem Energy Supply Market Probe  
The Energy Supply Market Probe was an evaluation of the GB Energy Market 
conducted by the regulator, Ofgem (Ofgem 2008b, 2008d, 2009f, 2009g, 2009a, 
2009b). As described in Chapter 4, the announcement coincided with a period of 
concern regarding the prices charged to people using energy in their home by 
energy supply companies. The initial report which opened the Energy Supply Market 
Probe stated:  
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“Concerns have been expressed about the operation of Great Britain's gas and 
electricity retail supply markets for domestic and small business consumers. These 
concerns are heightened by recent price increases, caused by hikes in global fuel 
prices. It is even more important that retail markets work well when prices are as 
high as they are now.  
Overall, the transition from monopoly gas and electricity supply ten years ago to 
competitive markets is well advanced and continuing to develop. Many consumers 
have benefited from lower prices, better service and a wider range of deals on 
offer.” 
(Ofgem 2008c, p. 2) 
This quote explains the position of Ofgem throughout the consultation procedures 
that ran from 2008 to 2009: that the introduction of competitive retail markets in 
GB was a success and that consumers were benefiting from the existing market 
structures (Ofgem 2008b, 2009f). However, there were regulatory outputs from the 
Energy Supply Market Probe that considered and responded to the distribution of 
costs and benefits of the energy market from 2000 to 2008 regarding the allocation 
of costs and the pricing between geographical areas. Before 2008, the way in which 
different prices were offered were based on the costs associated with each 
associated product (Ofgem 2005b). This meant that there were higher prices for 
those in particular geographical areas, with particular metering types and who were 
identified as posing a risk of unpaid debt (Ofgem 2009g, 2009d). The costs 
associated with serving these customers were seen to be sufficiently similar to 
require the same level of prices per unit of energy, with no additional surcharges 
(Ofgem 2005b). However, in 2009 in their consultation on Unfair Pricing 
Differentials, Ofgem argued: 
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“One of the key findings of Ofgem’s recent Probe into GB retail energy markets 
was that, despite the market working well in many important respects, a 
significant number of consumers remain disadvantaged by persistent unfair price 
differentials and that vulnerable consumers are disproportionately affected… In 
considering action in this area by way of licence change, we aim to guard against 
the most harmful effects of unduly discriminatory pricing on consumers whilst 
being concerned not to hinder innovation or the further development of 
competition…We would need to be sure that such a condition is a proportionate 
measure and serves to help, rather than hinder, progress towards an effective 
competitive market.” 
(Ofgem 2009e, p. 3) 
This quote explains the tension implicit throughout the consideration of 
intervention under the Energy Supply Market Probe consultations: the identification 
of harm to some consumers, particularly those who are vulnerable, but a limitation 
to actions regarding any distributional interventions that would pose a risk to the 
competitive market in GB (Ofgem 2008d, 2008d, 2009f).  
As described in Chapter 4, the regulatory output from the Energy Supply Market 
Probe was the removal of price differentials between consumers on Pre- Payment 
Meters (PPMs) and those who paid their bill in arrears quarterly and between 
consumers who lived within an energy supplier’s ex-monopoly region. In terms of 
distribution of the costs and benefits of the market, the former aimed to reduce 
the price for consumers on a PPM were not the topic of further regulatory scrutiny. 
However, one interviewee noted that this subsidy of PPM became a feature of the 
energy market saying: 
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“You can use a broad definition which is anything that is not cost reflective is a 
cross subsidy. So, for example, we now have to subsidise PPM and indeed we did so 
previously”.  
Ma2 
The latter regulatory output, the policy to remove the price disparity in and out of 
ex-monopoly regions, saw the increase in prices for all consumers (Hviid and Price 
2012), with no distribution of any additional benefits of lower prices to consumers. 
Further, the final output did not incorporate any of the narratives regarding 
fairness or pre-payment pricing, instead focusing on the calculation of undue 
discrimination between geographical locations, linked to ex-monopoly providers.  
5.2.2 Ofgem Retail Market Review (2010 – 2012) 
The Retail Market Review was launched following concerns that the outcomes of 
changes made to the Energy Supply Market Probe regulatory licence condition had 
not resulted in lower prices for people who used energy in their homes (Ofgem 
2010f, 2011h, 2012k, 2012i). In particular, there was still a significant difference 
between prices for those who engaged with the market by switching energy supply 
firm and those who did not. This difference was sufficiently significant to result in 
discussions within the regulator of whether more significant regulation was required 
to prompt people who used energy in their homes to engage with the market. As 
the initial consultation report stated in 2012: 
“Building on the findings of our 2008 Energy Supply Probe, Ofgem’s Retail Market 
Review has demonstrated that further action is needed to make energy retail 
markets in Great Britain work more effectively in the interests of consumers. 
Consumers are at risk from a number of features in the market which reduce the 
effectiveness of competition.” 
(Ofgem 2011b, p. 2) 
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The outcome of the Retail Market Review was new regulations to make the 
comparison of different energy supply firms simpler (Ofgem 2013g, 2013k). Each 
energy supply firm was restricted to offering only four products and each one had 
to be described in a comparable way (Ofgem 2013k, 2013j). The proposed 
distributional outcome of this policy was to ensure that more people benefited from 
lower energy prices that were associated with market engagement. The Retail 
Market review stated: 
“Our proposals on simpler tariff choices aim to make the market simpler and 
facilitate consumers‟ ability to be aware, access, assess and act on information 
available to them. To be clear, our policy intent is that consumers should face 
fewer tariff choices to make comparisons between them easier.” 
(Ofgem 2012d, p. 11-12) 
Whether these outcomes would have occurred or if the lower prices would have 
been definitively removed from the market is unknown, due to the regulatory 
policies implemented following the Retail Market Review being overturned by the 
Competition and Market Authority who removed the regulation, arguing that: 
“Overall, our finding is that certain aspects of the ‘simpler choices’ component of 
the RMR rules (including the ban on complex tariffs, the maximum limit on the 
number of tariffs that suppliers are able to offer at any point in time, and the 
simplification of cash discounts) are a feature of the markets for the domestic 
retail supply of electricity and gas in Great Britain that gives rise to an AER 
(Adverse Effect on Competition).” 
(Competition and Markets Authority 2016a, p. 45) 
The restriction to four tariffs per energy supplier may have, in time, resulted in 
more consumers engaging in the market and therefore securing the benefits of low 
prices. However, in the time it was in place, there was no evidence that new types 
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of consumers secured lower prices. The potential for a more distributionally just 
scenario, where the majority of consumers secured the benefit of lower energy 
prices, was therefore not a consequence of the Retail Market Review.  
5.2.4 Competition and Markets Authority Energy Market Investigation (2013 – 
2016) 
The Competition and Markets Authority began an investigation into the GB energy 
market in 2013 following a referral from Ofgem (Ofgem 2014a). The wide-ranging 
review included investigating the different prices charged in relation to different 
products (Competition and Markets Authority 2015b). The three recommendations 
which had an impact on the distributional outcomes of the energy market related 
to: prices for people who paid for their energy using a PPM; the removal of 
regulations related to the Retail Market Review; and a specific programme to 
prompt people who had not recently switched energy supply firms to do so 
(Competition and Markets Authority 2016f, 2016e, 2016d).  
These distributional implications were that the benefits of engaging with the 
market should be shared by more people who used energy in their homes. Of 
particular concern in the regulatory policy outputs of the Competition and Market 
Authority was the lack of choice for those on PPMs and the difference in prices for 
those who engaged with the market and those who did not: 
“The options to switch are far more limited for the 4 million households on 
prepayment meters. For these customers, a transitional price cap will be 
introduced which will reduce bills by around £300 million a year…our view is that a 
combination of features concerning energy supply specifically to the prepayment 
segments gives rise to an AEC (Adverse Effect on Competition) through reducing 
suppliers’ ability and/or incentives to compete to acquire prepayment meter 
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customers and to innovate by offering tariff structures that meet customers’ 
demand.” 
(Competition and Markets Authority 2016a, p. 43) 
This led the CMA to conclude that PPM prices should be capped to ensure that they 
did not face prices that were not kept low by the effects of competition, until a 
new meter type was widely available. The distributional consequences were that 
those on PPMs secured lower prices and access to more affordable energy than 
would have otherwise been the case.   
For consumers on all meter types, the distributional justice implications of the 
Competition and Markets Authority relate to the manner in which different costs 
were associated to different products: 
“We have identified a combination of features of the markets for the domestic 
retail supply of gas and electricity in Great Britain that give rise to an Adverse 
Effect on Competition through an overarching feature of weak customer response. 
Overall, our view is that the overarching feature of weak customer response gives 
suppliers a position of unilateral market power concerning their inactive customer 
base and that suppliers have the ability to exploit such a position through their 
pricing policies: through price discrimination by pricing their standard variable 
tariffs materially above a level that can be justified by cost differences from their 
nonstandard tariffs; and/or by pricing above a level that is justified by the costs 
incurred in operating an efficient domestic retail supply business.” 
(Competition and Markets Authority 2016a, p. 37) 
 
For the first time, the CMA identified a scenario of probable cross subsidy where 
energy supply firms allocated costs specifically to the prices of those who did not, 
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or were unlikely to, engage with the energy market. This scenario had been 
described as a possible option for large energy supply firms by the Chief Executive 
Officer of a new energy company, OVO, who stated that if an energy company once 
help a monopoly position: 
“You take all of your indirect costs, such as social, environmental and regulatory 
costs, and you put them on your sticky customers, because you know that you can 
charge them more than customers that switch, and then you offer really good 
deals to attract new business or to attract customers that are leaving” 
(House of Commons Select Committee on Energy and Climate Change 2012, p10.)  
This meant that those who did not engage with the energy market were likely to be 
paying energy prices that included the costs associated with their usage, the energy 
systems that ensured its delivery, policy programmes delivered by energy supply 
firms and costs associated with the provision of services to other people. 
Specifically, those who did not engage with the market provided a cross subsidy to 
those who did. In its Final Report, the CMA explained that: 
“The above overarching feature of weak customer response, in turn, gives 
suppliers a position of unilateral market power concerning their inactive customer 
base. In relation to unilateral market power, our finding is that suppliers in such a 
position have the ability to exploit such a position, for example, through price 
discrimination by pricing their SVTs (Standard Variable Tariffs) materially above a 
level that can be justified by cost differences from their non-standard tariffs 
and/or pricing above a level that is justified by the costs incurred with operating 
an efficient domestic retail supply business.” 
(Competition and Markets Authority 2016a, p. 595) 
The CMA’s conclusion, as shown by Figure 5.1, was that higher prices were charged 
to those who did not engage with the market through switching. This distributional 
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concern regarding this outcome was heightened by evidence presented within the 
energy market investigation – which showed that those in vulnerable situations were 
least likely to engage with the energy supply market. The outcome, therefore, of 
the market up to 2016 was that more vulnerable households, such as those on low 
incomes, were subsidising lower energy prices for those who were not in vulnerable 
circumstances. 
Figure 5.1 Demographic characteristics of who benefitted from the 
energy market 
 
2016 CMA Energy Market Investigation findings visualised in “Consumer 
vulnerability: challenges and potential solutions” (CMA, 2019; p21) 
 
The CMA investigation clearly identified who did and did not secure the benefits of 
the energy market structure between 2000 and 2016. A market structure which 
provided its lowest prices to those who engaged in switching behaviour meant that 
those who secured benefits were more likely to be of working age, have stayed in 
education the longest, have the highest incomes and not have a disability. Finally, 
those who were registered with their energy company as being in vulnerable 
circumstances were less likely to switch supplier to secure a lower price. This 
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distribution sees the least vulnerable in society secure lower prices for their 
energy.  
5.2.5 Distributional Justice in GB Energy market regulation 2000 - 2016 
 
My analysis of the period 2000 to 2016 identified three regulatory outputs that had 
the potential to impact the distribution of the benefits and costs of the energy 
supply market in Great Britain. The Energy Supply Market Probe, Retail Market 
Review and CMA Investigation each set out concerns that too few were benefiting 
from the low prices available to consumers who engaged with the market 
(Competition and Markets Authority 2015a; Ofgem 2008d, 2010f, 2014a). Each 
maintained a consistent focus on the need to ensure that consumers had the 
information required to make decisions when they engaged with the market. 
Further, each acknowledged that consumers who paid in advance for their energy 
through a PPM were least likely to benefit from lower prices that might result from 
competing energy firms. Only the regulatory output from the final procedures, the 
CMA investigation, went beyond providing information to consumers in a new way, 
by capping energy prices for those with a PPM. However, none of the regulatory 
outputs between 2000 and 2016 were sensitive to the demographic characteristics 
of those who benefitted from switching energy suppliers. Instead, the least likely 
people to benefit from the energy market were some of the most vulnerable groups 
in society (Competition and Markets Authority 2016b; Deller et al. 2018).  
 
5.3 Recognition Justice 
Recognition Justice is secured where diverse energy needs are understood, 
articulated and actioned in energy policies (Hurlbert and Rayner 2018; Lovell 2007; 
Schlosberg 2013; Walker and Day 2012). Between 2000 and 2016, Ofgem undertook 
a large range of activities in order to understand the needs of energy consumers, 
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acknowledging and understanding diverse energy needs through research that 
included large scale surveys and qualitative interviews (Ofgem 2004a, 2012f, 2013e, 
2015j). The Competition and Markets Authority also undertook survey research to 
provide insight regarding energy-related needs as part of its Energy Market 
Investigation (Competition and Markets Authority 2016b). My analysis identified four 
significant opportunities for achieving recognition justice between 2000 and 2016. 
These were through the acknowledgement and understanding of diverse energy 
needs from the Consumer Vulnerability Strategy (Ofgem 2013c), the Consumer First 
Programme (Ofgem 2009e, 2015c), the Social Scheme Reporting (Ofgem 2008f, 
2010d, 2011e) and Social Obligations reporting (Ofgem 2000a, 2015e).  
5.3.1 Ofgem Consumer Vulnerability Strategy  
 
The Consumer Vulnerability Strategy as a review of the enduring work of the 
regulator regarding vulnerable consumers (Ofgem 2013c) included a review of how 
the regulator ensured energy supply firms identified their vulnerable customers and 
the support measures that were therefore offered. The new proposals within this 
policy were that the regulator and energy supply companies adopt a dynamic 
concept of consumers in vulnerable situations. This new concept would include 
protected characteristics from the Equalities Act 2010, characteristics from 
Ofgem’s statutory duties (Utilities Act 2000) and existing industry practice (Ofgem 
2012h). In 2012, Ofgem explained that: 
“As part of this Strategy, we propose to embed a more sophisticated understanding 
of the nature of vulnerability, which would in turn be reflected in our expectations 
of suppliers and distributors as a matter of best practice. This approach would 
recognise the dynamic and multi-dimensional nature of vulnerability, which may 
vary over time and in different settings as a result of their changing circumstances 
and capabilities.” 
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(Ofgem 2012h, p. 4) 
This proposal would mean a significant extension of those who the regulator 
expected to receive specialist support from those energy supply firms that adopted 
insight into the diverse range of energy needs, in response to a definition of 
consumers in vulnerable circumstances. The content of this specialist support was 
not prescribed in the policy. However, the aims of the new definition were 
specifically articulated to encourage energy supply firms to provide a supportive 
structure in which people who used energy in their homes would articulate their 
energy needs to firm and the firm would respond to those needs. 
The majority of these needs discussed within the strategy are focused on continued 
access to energy through the actions of energy distribution firms. How energy 
supply firms should respond to the needs identified was to be the aim of future 
discussions between industry, regulator and third sector organisations who worked 
with consumers in vulnerable situations. 
“We will work with a range of stakeholders within the energy market and 
organisations outside of the energy market who deal with vulnerability issues. 
Engagement will allow us to learn from others as well as sharing our own 
perspective and insight.”  
(Ofgem 2013c, p. 26) 
The implication for recognition justice related to the Consumer Vulnerability 
Strategy (Ofgem 2013c), could serve as a positive example of distributive justice 
with support schemes distributing benefits to being extended to support those in 
need. Ofgem noted that: 
“This Strategy prompts us to identify which consumers are more at risk in the 
energy market, in which situations are they at risk and, importantly, understand 
why. By better identifying the reasons why consumers are vulnerable in a 
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particular situation – rather than simply labelling them as “elderly‟ or “disabled‟ – 
we aim to better target our interventions.” 
(Ofgem 2013c, p. 12) 
However, identification did not automatically result in action to support a 
household. Instead, the willingness to reduce energy prices for vulnerable 
consumers remained the choice of energy firms (Ofgem 2012h, 2012f, 2013c). 
Further, the costs of any support offered by energy supply firms were not allocated 
based on need for affordable energy (Ofgem 2013c, 2015e). Instead, the costs of 
supporting consumers in vulnerable situations was applied in accordance with the 
pricing decisions of energy supply firms. Further, the strategy did not impact the 
supply licence rules that ensured the action of energy supply companies in the 
period analysed by this thesis. Instead, firms were able to adopt the definition on a 
discretionary basis until 2017 (Ofgem 2015e).  
5.3.2 Consumer First Research Programme (2007 to 2016) 
One manner in which Ofgem sought to gain insight into energy consumers was the 
2007 launch of an ongoing programme of commissioned research rather than ad hoc 
surveys. The programme included a survey with questions regarding perceptions of 
and engagement in, the energy market and a series of deliberative focus groups. 
During a Select Committee hearing in 2007 (House of Lords Select Committee on 
Regulators 2007), Sarah Harrison from Ofgem described the programme as 
responding to: 
“… the changing horizon of consumer representation in the energy market and 
increasingly complex sets of decisions that the board has to turn to, particular in 
the area of sustainability, that are requiring us really to think about how shall we 
engage in the future with consumer interests, especially domestic consumers’ 
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interests and how can we best understand those interests so we can contribute 
them to our thinking and our decision making.” 
(House of Lords Select Committee on Regulators 2007, p. 82)  
As explained by this description to the House of Lords Select Committee, the 
Consumer First Research Programme sought to build the understanding of 
consumers within Ofgem and include the interests of consumers in regulatory 
decision-making (House of Lords Select Committee on Regulators 2007). The 
Programme incorporated consideration of both the energy supply market regulation 
and energy distribution regulation powers of Ofgem. Insight from Consumer First 
was published by the regulator and cited during policy development procedures 
from its launch in 2007.  
Despite its ongoing provision of research over time, it is not clear whether the 
understanding provided by the findings was consistently used in regulatory 
procedures for energy supply market regulation. The survey research findings were 
quoted in the logic for launching the market reviews in the Energy Supply Probe 
(Ofgem 2008d), Retail Market Review (Ofgem 2010f) and Competition and Markets 
Authority referral (Ofgem 2014a). However, the number of consumers reporting 
that they engaged with the energy market remained broadly consistent despite the 
regulatory policies that specifically sought to encourage more consumers to engage 
in the market (Ofgem 2004a, 2015a, 2016b). Further, there was limited visibility of 
the focus group findings within the regulatory outputs, as I demonstrate in Table 
5.1. 
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Table 5.1 Consumer First Panel – Focus Group influence on energy regulation 
2000 – 2016 
Table lists Consumer First Panel reports along with citations in regulatory policy outputs 
 Report Name Cited in Regulatory Policy 
1 Energy Market, Billing and Price Metrics 
(Ofgem 2009e) 
Cited in Energy Supply Market Probe 
Remedies (Ofgem 2009f) 
2 Tariffs Structures (Ofgem 2010b) 
 
None cited  
3 Supplier Standards of Conduct and 
Prompt Pay Discounts (Ofgem 2010a) 
None cited  
4 Energy Market and Tariff Structures 
(Ofgem 2011b) 
Cited in Retail Market Review (Ofgem 
2013k) 
5 Consumer engagement with the energy 
market, information needs and 
perceptions of Ofgem (Ofgem 2012a) 
None cited 
6 Consumer views on Tariff Comparison 
Rates (TCRs) (Ofgem 2012b) 
Cited in Retail Market Review (Ofgem 
2013k) 
7 Priority Services Register (Ofgem 2013b) Cited in Consumer Vulnerability Strategy 
(Ofgem 2013c) 
8 Change of Supplier Procedures (Ofgem 
2013a) 
 
None cited  
9 Affordability, Environmental and Social 
Schemes (Ofgem 2014c) 
 
Cited in Prepayment meters installed under 
warrant: final proposals (Ofgem 2016f) 
10 Consumer engagement and trust in the 
energy market - Retail Market Review 
Reforms (Ofgem 2014d) 
 
None cited 
11 Third Party Intermediaries and Price 
Comparison Websites (Ofgem 2015d) 
 
None cited 
12 Exploring Trust and some Retail Market 
Review Remedies (Ofgem 2015b) 
 
None cited 
13 Switching Suppliers for Domestic 
Customers in Debt (Ofgem 2015c) 
None cited 
 
Of the thirteen deliberative focus groups discussing energy market regulation, only 
five were cited in regulatory outputs (line 1,4, 6 7 and 9 in Table 5.1). This suggests 
that the use of focus groups to understand energy needs was, at best, limited. 
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5.3.3 Social Scheme Monitoring 
 
Between 2008 and 2016, energy supply firms delivered programmes of support on 
behalf of the UK Government to people who use energy in their homes. This 
included provision of discounts for energy bills and energy efficiency measures. The 
scope of the support provided was defined by the UK Government in terms of 
budget to be spent between 2000 and 2016. From 2010, the UK Government 
specified the targeting of support through the majority of these schemes. This 
incorporated the needs of two groups: households in fuel poverty needing housing 
fabric improvements; and bill reductions for low income pensioners. The period 
from 2008 to 2016 also saw an increase in the number of schemes designed by the 
Government, delivered by energy supply firms, under monitoring from the 
regulator. Table 5.2 below explains two key features: that there was only 
transparency of costing in two of the four energy bill funded assistance schemes 
and that those energy bill funded schemes offered a far lower level of support. 
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Table 5.2 Social Schemes to support energy consumers 2000 to 2016 
 
Original table created with data from the Department of Energy and Climate Change, Ofgem, 
National Energy Action and the House of Commons Library (Department of Energy and 
Climate Change 2015a; House of Commons Library 2016a; National Energy Action 2019; 
Ofgem 2008f, 2010d, 2011e, 2015e) 
 
 
The procedures for monitoring the delivery of social schemes which responded to an 
understanding of energy related needs was conducted by Ofgem. However, the 
targeting decisions that related to responding to those needs did not inform the 
regulatory decisions. Instead, the monitoring of social schemes reflected the 
distinction between the mandatory scope from Government-designed programmes 
and the discretionary elements co-ordinated by individual energy supply firms. 
Monitoring against the mandatory scheme was made up of reporting against 
milestones, with fines for any energy supply firm that did not reach the relevant 
targets. While the social schemes were designed within the Department of Work 
and Pensions and the Department of Energy and Climate Change, initially, their 
operation and development sat within the energy regulator. The regulator was 
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entirely responsible for the scoping of the Voluntary Agreement between 2008 and 
2010 and agreed the distribution of access to Warm Home Discount, with the 
exception of low-income pensioner households (Department of Energy and Climate 
Change 2015b). Support beyond the mandatory scope defined by government was 
encouraged but not prescribed within energy regulation (Ofgem 2000b, 2005e, 
2013c). 
It is therefore not consistently the case that the acknowledgement and 
understanding of energy needs that related to the experience of delivering social 
schemes contributed to recognition justice. Instead, the targeting of support 
focused on the group identified by the Government as most in need: low income 
pensioner households. Those outside of this group might receive the Cold Weather 
Payment or support through a Corporate Social Responsibility programme but this 
support was not based on insight into diverse energy needs developed within the 
regulator. Instead, formal regulatory procedures gathered insight regarding the 
impact of the schemes they monitored but did not, between 2000 and 2016, act 
upon this insight.  
 
5.3.4 Social Obligations Reporting 
Ofgem required energy supply firms to provide quarterly information on how each 
firm provided services to repay debt and identifies and registered some households 
as ‘vulnerable’ or ‘in vulnerable circumstances’ (Ofgem 2002, 2005e, 2013c). This 
reporting was published annually by the regulator alongside an analysis of provision 
of these services and any trends of concern to the regulator. Between 2000 and 
2016, trends that were identified as concerning to Ofgem included disconnection 
for debt and the installation of PPM systems without consent. The analysis 
conducted by the regulator in the Social Obligations report described the needs of 
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households to access energy on an ongoing basis and therefore have continuous 
supply, while they had a debt to repay to an energy supply firm. The need to retain 
connection to an energy supply is described as particularly important to consumers 
who are identified as vulnerable. The need for continuous energy supply was 
reflected in the recommendation by the regulator that no registered vulnerable 
consumer should be disconnected from their energy supply. The Preventing Debt 
and Disconnection Report (Ofgem and Energywatch 2003) describes this situation 
stating: 
“The industry responded via the Energy Retail Association (ERA) by introducing a 
safety net for vulnerable consumers. Suppliers have also worked to identify 
vulnerable consumers and all the major suppliers have signed onto and 
implemented the ERA commitment that vulnerable consumers will not be 
disconnected.”  
(Ofgem and energywatch 2003, p. 4) 
This recommendation was adopted into a voluntary code of conduct in 2004 (Energy 
Retail Association 2004). As the installation of a PPM without consent could also 
result in an interruption to the supply of energy, a further voluntary code of 
conduct was implemented in 2016 (Energy UK 2016). Under this latter code of 
conduct, a registered vulnerable consumer would not have a PPM installed without 
consent. 
Social Obligations Reporting and its associated annual analysis by Ofgem between 
2000 and 2016, provided acknowledgement and understanding of energy needs. 
However, there were two constraints to the extent that this secured recognition 
justice. Firstly, the resulting action was not prescribed by the regulator to respond 
universally to energy needs. The insight into the harmful practices of firms 
regarding debt collection and disconnection procedures did not lead to new 
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regulations that ceased poor practice. Instead, the choice to respond to these 
needs was at the discretion of individual energy supply firms. Secondly, the 
recognition of energy needs was associated with being identified and registered as 
being ‘vulnerable’ or later, being in a ‘vulnerable circumstance’ (Ofgem 2000a, 
2005e, 2013c, 2015e). The procedures of securing this recognition was 
predominantly based on an individual declaring vulnerability and being registered 
onto the energy industry ‘Priority Service Register’ (PSR). The PSR could enable 
recognition justice as it is was a register that included information regarding 
specific characteristics linked to energy need, such as medical equipment which 
requires a continuous energy supply. However, Ofgem noted that only a minority of 
those who could be registered on the PSR did so (Ofgem 2013c) . This restricted the 
extent to which the energy needs of people were recognised. 
5.3.5 Recognition Justice in GB Energy Regulation 2000 – 2016 
 
Between 2000 and 2016 there were four ways in which regulatory procedures 
proactively sought insight into the energy needs of people in their homes: through 
the enduring social obligations and social scheme reports, the Consumer First 
Programme and the Consumer Vulnerability Strategy (Ofgem 2000a, 2005e, 2013c). 
As described in Chapter 2, recognition justice within energy policy requires that 
diverse energy needs are understood, articulated and actioned. The evidence listed 
above identifies that the recognition justice considerations of understanding of 
diverse needs was visible to the regulator between 2000 and 2016. Further, third 
sector organisations were specifically sought to ensure that these needs were 
articulated and identified as central to developing regulatory policies which 
considered the needs of vulnerable consumers (Ofgem 2013c, 2015e). However, 
insights within the regulator were not consistently actioned between 2000 and 
2016. Instead, only the affordable warmth needs of low-income pensioners were 
recognised and acted upon under the direction of UK Government Policies that 
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made up the Social Schemes monitored by Ofgem as listed in Table 5.2. In line with 
Walker and Day (2012), the analysis found that this support was focused on the 
need for affordable warmth of low-income pensioners. 
5.4 Procedural Justice  
 
Procedural justice is defined as policy procedures that deliver on three factors: 
redress, transparent procedures and meaningful participation (Heffron, McCauley, 
and Sovacool 2015; Jenkins et al. 2016). While the preceding sections have 
described specific regulatory activities between 2000 and 2016, this section 
describes the “just-ness” of the procedures followed by regulatory policy makers. In 
the context of affordable energy in GB, procedural justice is of particular interest 
to research that seeks to explain procedures that create, sustain or embed 
distributional inequalities (Young, 1990; Walker and Day, 2012). In the following 
sections, an analysis of the policy development between 2000 and 2016 procedures 
of Ofgem is presented. Regulatory policy procedures in GB energy regulation 
followed the same procedures between 2000 and 2016. As described in Chapter 4, 
this included the transparent publication of policy-making procedures open to all, 
publication of decisions and in many cases, the outcomes of those decisions via 
regulatory reporting. These procedures contributed to Ofgem meeting the 
procedural justice requirements of transparency and participation between 2000 
and 2016. 
The first feature of procedural justice is transparency of procedures and decision- 
making (Jenkins et al. 2016; Simcock et al. 2016a; Walker and Day 2012). These 
were both requirements of economic regulators in the UK (Department of Business, 
Innovation and Skills 2011). Ofgem published accounts, non-confidential 
proceedings from meetings, data regarding market outcomes and logics of decision- 
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making. When undertaking changes to regulation, consultation papers are published 
alongside non confidential responses in line with UK Government guidance (Cabinet 
Office 2018). As the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills' Principles for 
Economic Regulation said in 2011: 
“Decision-making powers of regulators should be, within the constraints imposed 
by the need to preserve commercial confidentiality, exercised transparently and 
subject to appropriate scrutiny and challenge.” 
(Department of Business, Innovation and Skills 2011, p. 4)  
The majority of these were transparently published and all were able to submit 
evidence to be considered within the procedures. As identified in Chapter 4, 
between 2000 and 2016 these included regulatory consultations and parliamentary 
committees in the House of Commons and House of Lords. Full minutes were 
published, and, in some cases, debates were broadcast and recorded. This practice 
of publication enables scrutiny of policy procedures. The result of this transparent 
monitoring of outcomes of the energy market and energy policy procedures means 
that a great deal of information is in the public domain.  
However, the extensive variety of information available in the public domain does 
not necessarily translate into the kind of accountability mechanism that is theorised 
within energy justice scholarship (Schlosberg and Collins 2014; Sovacool 2013). 
Interviewees from third sector organisations, charities and trade associations 
explained that the provision of opportunities to scrutinise policy was insufficient 
when resources were limited and the topics within energy regulation were often 
highly technical and therefore difficult to engage with. In line with interviewees 
from third sector organisations, charities and noted by a regulator and market 
participant, one interviewee explained: 
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“Between the consumer organisation and industry, I mean, the disparity is massive 
you know - it genuinely is a struggle for us to fathom it.” 
Ad6 (In line with Ad2, Ad4, Ad7, Re4, Re5, Re6, Re7, RG5, Ma5) 
Ultimately, the link between the transparency of procedures and access and the 
ability to hold powerful institutions to account, relies on people with the resource 
and expertise to do so (Schlosberg and Collins 2014; Simcock et al. 2016a; Walker 
and Day 2012). 
The second feature of procedural justice in the Energy Justice Framework is 
meaningful participation (Heffron et al. 2015; Sovacool 2015; Sovacool and Dworkin 
2015a). As described in Chapter 2, analysis from Energy Justice research describes 
two important factors in meaningful participation: equal opportunity to contribute 
to procedures that develop and design policies and equal respect within those 
procedures (Heffron and McCauley 2017; Jenkins et al. 2011; Walker and Day 2012). 
Injustice in energy policy-making procedures occurs when there is uneven 
participation in decision making procedures. As described in Chapter 4, in the 
procedures to develop and design energy regulations between 2000 and 2016 there 
were a large range of opportunities to participate in regulatory policy design. One 
regulator interviewed argued: 
“One of my observations would be that there is no shortage of opportunities for 
consumer representatives at and their organisations to be involved in policy-
making the opportunities are all there.” 
RG4 (In line with RG2, RG5, RG6, RG7, DG1, Ma2) 
However, interviewees did not report that opportunities to engage with regulatory 
procedures were equal or that there was equal respect for all participants. This 
narrative that emerged from the interviews had two characteristics. First, some 
interviewees reported that only large energy supply firms had the resources to take 
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up the opportunity to engage with regulatory procedures. The availability of 
resources to engage with this range of organizations is highly inconsistent among 
the organizations represented by interviewees. Although one interviewee from large 
energy firm articulated no challenges in engaging with this range of organizations, 
the majority of interviewees reporting a significant challenge in prioritizing which 
organizations to engage with. This was particularly visible with interviewees from 
third sector organisations, following cuts to funding between 2009 and 2016. 
Instead, one interviewee linked to a democratically elected institution noted that 
third sector organizations wanted to participate: 
“…but their resources are cut. They are scrabbling around for some money”  
DG5 (in line with DG2, Ad2, Ad3, Ad4, Ad5, Ad6, Ad7, Re2, Re3, Re4, Re5, Re6, Re7) 
Second, the knowledge of the energy supply firms regarding their customers meant 
that their expertise was valued more highly by policy makers than other evidence. 
Interviewees from third sector organisations also pointed to an inequality in the 
respect they perceived as receiving from their contribution to discussions. Rather 
than being able to articulate the impact as they saw it into regulatory policy 
debates, interviewees from third sector organisations described being required to 
articulate their suggestions in terms that were seen as priorities for the energy 
regulator. One interviewee noted: 
“We have to frame any concern we have in relation to generally competition or 
efficiency objectives. Because if we could frame them as competition policy issues 
are much more likely to be tackled. Because they would be regarded, by them 
[Ofgem], as genuine”. 
Re3 (in line with DG2, Ad2, Ad3, Ad4, Ad5, Ad6, Ad7, R1, Re2, Re4, Re5, Re6, Re7, Ma1) 
It is therefore not clear that the regulatory policy procedures that provide 
opportunities to scrutinise the regulator due to their transparency or participate in 
 
 
154 
 
procedures result in procedures that meet the standards of procedural justice. 
Instead, the experiences of interviewees from charities and third sector 
organisations, and noted by policy makers in Government, elucidate the concerns 
regarding equitable access to procedures and inequalities between participants in 
terms of influencing regulatory policy outputs.  
The third and final feature of procedural justice are procedures that deliver redress 
(Jenkins et al. 2014; Walker and Day 2012). Procedures of redress contribute to 
energy justice in that they provide restorative justice following harm that results 
from the action or inaction of a particular individual or organisation (Bickerstaff et 
al. 2013; Heffron and McCauley 2017). However, within the period 2000 to 2016 
there are no examples of redress for consumers that reflect the restorative aims of 
redress within the energy justice framework. Ofgem did not articulate their 
procedures of redress as directly supporting individual consumers. Instead Ofgem 
note in 2016:  
“We do not deal directly with individual disputes between consumers and energy 
companies.”  
(Ofgem 2003g, p. 6) 
Instead, redress in terms of energy policy in GB related to three procedures for 
consumers via legal mechanisms: securing compensation due to an individual 
complaint via Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) through the Energy Ombudsman; 
a judicial review and fining energy companies to deter future licence breaches and 
(Graham 2016; Ofgem 2003g; Public Law Project 2019). Individual redress through 
ADR related to complaints made by individuals against their energy supplier. The 
extent to which such individual interactions secured redress following harm, 
sufficient to meet the aims of restoring the individuals’ circumstances to before the 
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actions of an energy supplier, is beyond the data collected for this thesis. However, 
Ofgem do note in their Consumer Redress Impact Assessment in 2011 that: 
“Consumers may not wish to participate in a time-consuming arbitration or legal 
procedures. This is likely to be very small relative to the actual footprint of 
consumer harm; past cases investigated by Ofgem have concerned hundreds of 
thousands or millions of consumers at a time.”  
(Ofgem 2011f, p 2) 
Further, whether ADR schemes are accessible to all consumers or sufficient to 
overcome the unequal bargaining power and unequal information between energy 
suppliers and individual consumers, has yet to be proven (Hodges and Voet 2018; 
Main 2005). It is therefore not clear that the regulatory policies of Ofgem provided 
a route to securing redress that met the restorative aims of the Energy Justice 
Framework.  
The second recourse to redress between 2000 and 2016 in GB energy regulation was 
a Judicial Review whereby redress could occur if a Government or regulator had 
made a policy that caused evident harm. In this scenario, an organisation such as a 
firm or charity would bring a case to court that a public body had broken the law 
(Public Law Project 2019). A minority of interviewees explained these procedures in 
a general sense with some scepticism regarding whether they had a meaningful 
role. For example, one interviewee echoed the views also expressed by five other 
respondents in saying,  
“I couldn’t see the energy minister of the time being marched off to the Tower [of 
London] for not having met the [fuel poverty] target” 
DG3 (In line with Re5, Re8, Ad2, Ad3, Ad5) 
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The third procedure to secure redress was the fining of energy supply firms who had 
breached their supply licences. For the majority of the period studied there was no 
formal regulatory mechanism for redress for consumers via energy firm fines. 
Instead, fines for licence breaches up to 10% of energy firm turnover were paid to 
the Treasury (Ofgem 2003g). This changed in 2014 following a change in powers 
under the Energy Act of 2013 which meant that Ofgem could provide redress to 
consumers. In their 2014 Enforcement Guidelines, Ofgem listed the possible redress 
options as: 
“  measures offering compensation or other redress to consumers who have 
suffered loss as a result of the conduct  
 measures offering consumers the option to terminate (but not vary) their 
contract 
 where the consumers who have suffered loss as a result of the conduct cannot be 
identified (or cannot be identified without disproportionate cost), measures 
intended to be in the collective interests of consumers (e.g. a payment to an 
appropriate consumer charity) 
 measures intended to prevent or reduce the risk of the infringing conduct re-
occurring, including where this may improve compliance with consumer law more 
generally” 
 measures intended to enable consumers to choose more effectively between 
parties supplying or seeking to supply goods or services. 
(Ofgem 2014b, p. 20-21) 
However, the powers enshrined in the Energy Act of 2013 were not used by the 
regulator to directly compensate consumers within the period of this study. Instead, 
redress payments were directed to charities to support vulnerable energy 
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consumers (Ofgem 2016c). While this may be an approach that is more likely to 
reach consumers harmed by their energy company, it does not reflect the 
restorative aims of redress under the Energy Justice Framework to restore the 
circumstances of the individual harmed (Graham 2016; McCauley et al. 2013; 
Walker and Day 2012). 
In summary, all three concerns for procedural justice were features of Ofgem’s 
procedures. The institutional framework for redress existed. Transparency 
procedures of policy provided opportunities to hold the regulator to account. 
Further, there were a large range of opportunities to engage with the regulator 
itself, alongside other organisations and institutions concerned with affordable 
energy prices. However, interviewees explained that the opportunity to hold the 
regulator to account and to engage in policy procedures was insufficient. The 
resources to act to do either of these things was limited in many organisations. 
Interviewees particularly noted the challenges for third sector organisations in 
securing the resources needed to participate in the wide-ranging debates regarding 
energy regulation and affordable prices.  
5.5 Interaction of Energy Injustice 2000 – 2016 
 
In this Chapter I have presented my findings from interrogating the thesis corpus 
using the Energy Justice Framework, to evaluate the extent to which regulatory 
energy policy procedures and outcomes in the period 2000-2016 could be described 
as just. The analysis identified as outputs two features of procedures, four features 
related to recognition and three features related to the distributional justice of 
regulatory procedures between 2000 and 2016.  There were three main findings.  
First, the analysis presented in this chapter describes the distribution of the costs 
and benefits of engaging with the energy market. Specifically, that between 2000 
and 2016 benefits of market arrangements were only available to those who 
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switched energy supplier. This meant that those who did not switch energy 
supplier, who were disproportionality likely to be amongst the most vulnerable 
groups in society, bore additional costs (Competition and Markets Authority 2016b). 
Second, my analysis identified concerns regarding recognition justice in regulatory 
policy outputs between 2000 and 2016. Recognition justice involves respecting the 
differentiated needs of communities and individuals (Sovacool and Dworkin 2015b; 
Walker and Day 2012). In terms of household energy use, recognition justice 
considers whether different energy service needs are understood, articulated and 
actioned (Gillard et al. 2017; Jenkins et al. 2017; Simcock et al. 2016c; Sovacool 
2015) . Between 2000 and 2016, I identified a significant and enduring focus on 
understanding the differentiated energy needs of consumers in GB. This 
acknowledgement and understanding of differentiated of energy needs, particularly 
related to heating the home, are also highly visible in the related policy sphere of 
fuel poverty. However, there is limited evidence of these differentiated needs 
translating into action to support all vulnerable groups. Finally, my analysis of 
regulatory policy procedures between 2000 and 2016 identified a range of positive 
foundations for energy justice through the significant commitment to transparency 
of procedures and opportunities to participate in regulatory policymaking. 
However, interviewees from third sector organisations explained highlighted 
limitations when it came to translating opportunities to participate into influencing 
the institutions. In particular, they pointed to an inequality of resources needed in 
order to take up opportunities to engage with procedures and the lack of 
procedures that could challenge the existing energy market system. As a 
consequence, opportunities for procedural and recognition justice were insufficient 
to challenge the distributional injustices of the energy market. 
These findings are presented as relating to the separate features of distribution, 
recognition and procedures. However, the findings of preceding research regarding 
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energy and environmental justice predict that any injustice related to distribution, 
recognition and procedures will interact and reinforce one another (Schlosberg 
2009; Walker and Day 2012). I found this to be the case in energy market regulation 
between 2000 and 2016. 
Figure 5.2 Interaction of Energy Injustice in GB Energy Market Regulation  
Modified from Schlosberg, 2009 
 
  
In Figure 5.2 above, I reproduce the interaction diagram from Schlosberg (2009). 
The asterix * denotes where my analysis identified examples of features leading to 
an interaction of distributional injustices of outcomes, inequalities in recognition 
and unjust access to participatory procedures. I found no evidence of poor 
resourcing restricting access to rights of recognition (box 6). Further, there was no 
evidence of a lack of participation sustaining lack of recognition (box 7) or 
restrictions in access resulting in a lack of recognition (box 5). Instead, 
participatory rights were extended to all in transparent procedures that provided a 
universal opportunity to engage in regulatory procedures. However, there were 
shortcomings in procedural and recognition justice that produced inequalities in 
resourcing between those who participated in the procedures of the energy 
regulator between 2000 and 2016, with poorly resourced participants facing barriers 
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to participation (box 9). Further, interviewees noted that their engagement relied 
on an ability to be able to frame their arguments in a manner that matched the 
perceived concerns of the regulator. This combined with a lack of resources to 
produce the effect of uneven participation (box 4). The interaction of unjust access 
to participatory procedures and inequitable recognition can be seen to result in 
discrimination in access to and the allocation of resources, with energy affordability 
programmes rationed to only some energy needs (box 8) rather than responding to 
the diverse needs evidenced within regulatory policy procedures. Ultimately, the 
range of opportunities to engage in regulatory policymaking did not result in the 
inclusive procedures articulated as requirements for energy justice. While a range 
of different participants had the opportunity to contribute to ways in which the 
policies “knew” people who use energy in their homes, by understanding diverse 
energy needs, procedures alone did not provide equal influence. Instead, only some 
energy needs were responded to in regulatory policymaking. As a consequence, the 
distributional injustices of energy market outcomes were not corrected by 
regulatory policy between 2000 and 2016. 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
Using the Energy Justice Framework (EJF) to analyse the corpus of data gathered 
for this thesis has raised important questions to consider in terms of the influence 
of different ways of knowing consumers. Applying the EJF provides a foundation to 
begin to explore the fairness of regulatory policy-making in line with previous 
research into other parts of the energy system (Jenkins et al. 2014; Sovacool 2015; 
Walker and Day 2012). In particular, considering procedural justice reveals that 
opportunities to participate in regulatory procedures and to scrutinise the regulator 
similarly do not result in regulatory outputs that reflect the views of all of those 
engaging in procedures. Instead, interviewees report an inequality of influence 
between those participating in regulatory policy procedures. However, while the 
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analysis considering energy justice identifies these important features of regulatory 
policy activities between 2000 and 2016, it does not fully elucidate how the 
identified inequalities occurred. As outlined in Chapter 3, I therefore used two 
frameworks from Policy Studies to analyse the procedures followed by the regulator 
to explain how and why inequitable outcomes occurred. First, I analysed how 
procedures operated within regulation by identifying how policies were formulated 
through the use of tools within regulators, as I go on to explain in Chapter 6.  
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Chapter 6 – Tools of Regulatory Policy Formulation in 
Energy Market Regulation 2000 – 2016 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I use the Tools of Policy Formulation (TPF) framework to identify 
how different knowledges play a role in policy formulation. In order to do this, I 
first identify features of policy formulation with regulatory procedures in GB 
between 2000 and 2016. While the identification of policy formulation tasks is 
presented as a preliminary stage in the literature, supporting the development of 
the nascent sub-field of tools of policy formulation, in my case it revealed an 
important pattern of regulatory procedures. Second, I present my analysis of the 
tools of policy formulation and their impact on the role of knowledges in regulation. 
I use TPF to explain in what ways tools influence policy formulation by analysing the 
actors, venues, capacities and effects of different tools. As explained in Chapter 3, 
I applied this framework by coding the texts that made up the corpus using the four 
aspects related to tools: the people (actors), institutions (venues) capacities 
(abilities enabled by tools and the actors who use them) and effects (impact of 
tools) of tools used by regulators to create policies.  
In theory, tools of policy formulation can be used by actors in order to expand their 
capacities for performing the tasks that are associated with policy formulation 
(Adelle et al. 2016; Atkinson et al. 2018; Dunlop and Radaelli 2016; Ferretti 2017; 
Jordan and Turnpenny 2015). However, past empirical studies have identified that 
tools use, in practice, can result in barriers to expanded capacities (Dunlop 2010; 
Howlett and Cuenca 2017; Howlett et al. 2015; Lehtonen 2012). My analysis 
identified where opportunities to benefit from diverse knowledges were brought 
together by tools of policy formulation for use in regulatory outputs. Further, it 
traces the interaction of multiple tools within Ofgem to explain the different roles 
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that knowledges of consumers played in the tasks undertaken by actors to 
formulate policies. In this way, I describe whether policy formulation benefited 
from the capacities expected to be provided by tools. Revealing how tools 
intersected with the venue of Ofgem enables me to describe the extent to which 
tools were, in practice, able to be used to bring new ways of knowing consumers 
into regulatory policy formulation.  
New knowledges might have been expected to be identified as being incorporated 
into procedures via tools of policy formulation in the period analysed. As described 
in Chapter 4, the policy formulation analysed occurred in a context of significant 
public concern regarding affordability and the fairness of energy markets. Further, 
the statutory powers of Ofgem were changed by the Energy Act (2010), with the 
specific aim of incorporating concerns beyond competition into policy formulation 
(The National Archive 2010). In the following sections, I therefore describe the use 
of tools both generally in the period and specifically, where they engaged with 
concerns regarding fairness or affordability. Importantly, the TPF enables not only 
the tracing of ways of knowing through policy formulation tasks through analysis of 
tools but also their impact. The challenges from the public and their elected 
representatives regarding the actions of the regulator did not only require that new 
knowledges were present but also that they had an effect on policy formulation. 
The effects of the tools of policy formulation in Ofgem between 2000 and 2016 are 
presented in section 6.5. This analysis enabled me to directly compare the role of 
knowledges embedded within Ofgem at its inception in 2000 to new ways of 
knowing consumers that occurred by 2016.  
6.2 GB Regulatory Policy Formulation 2000 - 2016 
 
In order to identify the tools being used to formulate policy, I first identified the 
venues, actors and tasks that made up regulatory policy formulation between 2000 
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and 2016. First, I identified the venues of policy formulation, the organisational and 
institutional locations where regulatory policy was made between 2000 and 2016. In 
addition to the policy formulation tasks undertaken in the venue of Ofgem, there 
were two additional venues of policy formulation. First, there is evidence within 
the corpus of an informal venue of policy formulation, the industry body for energy 
supply firms. This was an informal venue in that there were no associated powers 
for this body to formulate regulatory policies. The tasks of policy formulation that 
occurred within the industry body were not published so have not been analysed in 
this thesis or preceding research (Competition and Markets Authority 2015a, 2016b).  
However, there were voluntary codes of conduct endorsed by Ofgem regarding debt 
and disconnection practices, switching energy supplier and sales and marketing 
practices during the period studied (Ofgem 2003a, 2005e, 2008a). The descriptions 
within regulatory policy documents imply that the endorsement by Ofgem is 
connected to voluntary codes that align with the problem as characterised and 
evaluated by Ofgem. However, Ofgem did not undertake policy design where a 
voluntary code was introduced. This could pose a concern to those who, like the 
CMA, did not accept that the incentives existed to ensure that energy supply firms 
conducting policy design in an informal venue would formulate policies that 
benefitted people who use energy in their homes.  The lack of oversight by a formal 
venue of policy formulation was described as a concern by the CMA in its 
investigation. They stated: 
“…we are concerned that: (a) this fragmentation of responsibility increases the 
risk of policy decisions being taken that are inconsistent, conflicting, or based on 
insufficient analysis. It also increases the difficulty both industry parties and other 
stakeholders have in navigating the regulatory framework and (b) the combination 
of roles and responsibilities leads to some parties – notably industry participants – 
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having a role in decision-making but facing incentives that are not always aligned 
with those of consumers” 
(Competition and Markets Authority 2016b, p. 1233) 
Second, a further formal venue of policy formulation is visible in the corpus: The 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). The CMA was a formal policy formulation 
venue as it had statutory powers that set out its role in evaluating the operation of 
markets in GB (Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act, 2013). The energy market 
investigation was conducted in the venue of the CMA as I described in Chapter 4  
Having identified the venues of policy formulation, I went on to determine the 
actors visible in these venues. As described in Chapter 3, I concluded from the 
descriptions of my interviewees that actors involved in policy formulation between 
2000 and 2016 fell into six categories: regulatory governance, democratic 
governance, market participants, representatives, advisory and monopoly providers. 
Individual actors in these categories had contributed to the regulatory policy 
activities described in Chapter 4.  
Interviewees who participated in my research described a perception that there 
were few individuals and organisations who regularly engaged as actors of policy 
formulation who moved between different roles. To explore this description, where 
an interviewee noted a past career or secondary role linked to energy formulation, I 
connected the roles to demonstrate this movement. My findings are presented in 
Figure 6.1 below.  
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Figure 6.1 Roles within policy formulation of interviewees  
 
 
 
Among my interviewees, the narrative of individuals who moved between different 
organisations was true for 12 of the 35 participants. I noted while conducting my 
research that the same organisations beyond regulatory and democratic institutions 
were described in the descriptions of 33 of the 35 interviewees. Further, a subset of 
14 interviewees would regularly refer to specific individuals by their first name, 
clearly articulating a significant level of familiarity within this group of experts. 
While insufficient to generalise across the industry, the experiences of interviewees 
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provide an interesting additional context to considerations of consistency of 
respected expertise over time. 
This is because it implies that the same expertise was accepted as relevant for roles 
across the different organisations and institutions engaged in policy formulation 
(Boswell 2008; Hong and Kim 2017; Howlett 2009; Howlett and Ramesh 1998; 
Schrefler 2013). This could be significant in that this expertise was described by 
interviewees as a barrier for the equal engagement by all. One interviewee 
explained that this extended to the presentation of highly technical regulatory 
activities in documents. Interviewees described this technocratic nature of 
regulatory policy in terms of a significant challenge. One interviewee described this 
as regulatory policy having its own language, stating that: 
“It’s just very, very difficult to translate the consequences of some of the 
[regulatory] proposals back into English. I’d much rather that they were just 
written in English in the first place and stop the ability to exclude people from the 
choices made and how to discussions of how to fix things.”  
Re3 (In line with Reg3, Reg5, DG2, DG3, Rep1, Rep2, Rep4, Rep5, Ma4, Ad7, Ad8)  
Having identified who was involved in the policy formulation procedures – the 
actors - and in what venues, I identified the five interlinked tasks of policy 
formulation. As described in Chapter 3, policy formulation can be identified by 
breaking activities down into five interrelated tasks: problem characterisation, 
problem evaluation, objective setting, option assessment and policy design (De 
Ridder et al. 2007; Dunn 2015; Giest and Howlett 2012; Jordan and Turnpenny 2015; 
Wolman 1981; Wu et al. 2017). I therefore identified which tasks were undertaken 
in formulating regulatory policy in GB. This is an important stage of analysis as 
policy formulation is particularly opaque when compared to other policy-making 
activities (Craft and Howlett 2012; Howlett et al. 2015; Jordan and Turnpenny 
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2015; Thomas 2001). As demonstrated in Table 6.1, between 2000 and 2016 all five 
tasks of policy formulation were undertaken to formulate energy market regulation.   
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Table 6.1 Tasks of Regulatory policy formulation in formal venues 2000 to 
2016 
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1 The Social Action Plan 
(Ofgem 2000b) 
 Y   Y 
2 Review of domestic gas and electricity  
competition and supply price regulation (Ofgem 
2001b) 
 Y Y Y Y 
3 Making Markets Work for Consumers (Ofgem 
2003c) 
 Y  Y Y 
4 Preventing debt and disconnection 
(Ofgem and Energywatch 2003) 
 Y  Y Y 
5 Domestic Market Review (Ofgem 2004b)  Y    
6 Social Action Strategy 
(Ofgem 2005e) 
 Y   Y 
7 Energy Supply Market Probe (Ofgem 2008, 2009b, 
2009c, 2009a) 
 
 Y  Y Y 
8 Notice of modifications of standard licence 
condition 27.11 (Ofgem 2010c) 
 Y  Y Y 
9 Retail Market Review (Ofgem 2010f, 2011h, 
2012k, 2012i, 2012o, 2013k, 2013g) 
 Y  Y Y 
10 Consumer Vulnerability Strategy (Ofgem 2013c) Y Y  Y Y 
11 Decision to make modifications to the gas and 
electricity supply licences to reform the 
switching processes for indebted prepayment 
meter customers – the Debt Assignment Protocol 
(Ofgem 2015f) 
 Y  Y Y 
12 Market investigation reference in respect of the 
supply and acquisition of energy in Great Britain 
(Ofgem 2014a) 
 Y    
13 Prepayment meters installed under warrant: final 
proposals (Ofgem 2016f) 
 Y  Y Y 
14 Energy Market Investigation Remedies 
(Competition and Markets Authority 2016d, 
2016f, 2016e, 2016b) 
 Y  Y Y 
15 The future of retail market regulation  
(Ofgem 2016j) 
 Y  Y Y 
 
While all tasks of policy formulation were undertaken at some point, the majority 
of policy formulation tasks at Ofgem and the CMA between 2000 and 2016 focused 
on problem evaluation, option assessment and policy design (see lines 1, 3-5, 6-10, 
11-14 in Table 6.1). This meant that the majority of the tasks of regulatory 
formulation in this period were focused on determining the extent of a problem, 
the assessment of different options to respond to that problem and the design of 
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policies – the choice of how a policy might be implemented (Eliadis et al. 2005; 
Howlett 2010; Wolman 1981; Wu et al. 2017). On the other hand, problem 
characterization, work to determine the nature of a problem, and setting 
objectives of policy formulation are very rare between 2000 and 2016.  
There are four exceptions to this pattern as I demonstrate in Table 6.1. The first 
exception was the Domestic Market Review Report (line 5) which focused solely on 
problem evaluation without any further tasks of policy formulation. As outlined in 
Chapter 4, this output focused on reporting on measures of engagement and invited 
views on the report’s content (Ofgem 2005b). The second exception was the 
referral from Ofgem of the energy market to the CMA (line 12). In line with the 
statute which sets out this procedure (the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
Act, 2013), Ofgem evaluated the problems in the energy market before 
recommending that the CMA take on the policy formulation tasks that might result 
from their evaluation (Competition and Markets Authority 2016b; Ofgem 2014a; 
Ofgem, Office of Fair Trading and Competition and Markets Authority 2014). The 
third exception was problem characterization in the Vulnerable Consumer Strategy 
of 2013 (line 10 in Table 6.1). In the development of the Vulnerable Consumer 
Strategy (Ofgem 2012h, 2013c), analysts at Ofgem brought new characterisations of 
vulnerability which moved beyond the problem as characterised by earlier 
regulatory policies, as  reflected in the Utilities Act of 2000 (Ofgem 2000b, 2005e). 
The fourth and final exception to this pattern was the policy in 2002 to remove the 
final price controls in GB and introduce full retail market competition (Ofgem 
2001b). In addition to evaluating problems within GB energy markets and assessing 
regulatory options for maintaining or withdrawing price controls, Ofgem set the 
objectives of its retail market regulation: to introduce and then maintain 
competitive retail energy markets for all domestic energy consumers (line 2 in 
Table 7.3). As a result, the policy formulation tasks mainly acted within the 
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problem as characterised by the Utilities Act of 2000 and universally with the 
objective set in 2001: the promotion of competitive retail markets.  
The problem characterisation and objective setting within the Utilities Act of 2000 
was broadly in line with the statutory powers as set out by elected representatives 
for much of the period analysed in this thesis. However, it does not reflect the 
letter or the spirit of the role of energy regulation as set out in the Energy Act of 
2010 or the Energy Act of 2013 (Deller et al. 2018; Mantzari and Ioannidou 2019; 
Thomas 2019). Legislation from 2010 onwards took place against a backdrop of 
considerable concern by elected representatives and Government departments 
regarding the outcomes of energy markets for consumers (Deller et al. 2018; 
Simcock et al. 2016a; Waddams Price 2018). Indeed, the Energy Act of 2010 
specifically set out to ensure that Ofgem included considerations beyond energy 
market competition in its decision making. The explanatory notes for the Energy 
Act of 2010 stated: 
“Competitive solutions may take time to deliver, and the market may create 
barriers for some groups of consumers so that the promotion of competition may 
not be the most effective means of protecting their interests. These provisions 
clarify that Ofgem should consider using alternative types of solution to address 
the consumer detriment instead of, or alongside, measures to promote 
competition.” 
Energy Act 2010 Explanatory Notes C3.78 (The National Archive 2010) 
This change in statutory powers may have led to a role for new knowleges. 
However, the fact that there was a limited role in regulatory policy formulation for 
objective setting and problem characterisation raises the question of whether there 
was any role for knowledges not already embedded within the regulator to conduct 
activities associated with those tasks. This is because problem characterisation 
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includes activities that identify issues that require a response and the selection of 
evidence to describe what the problem is (Baumgartner and Jones 1991; Kingdon 
and Thurber 1984; Thomas 2001). Further, objective specification sets out the aims 
to be met by the policy (Howlett 2010; Wu et al. 2017). These two tasks – problem 
characterization and objective setting – are significant in setting the boundaries for 
policy and their exclusion from regulatory activities between 2000 and 2016 could 
have significantly impacted the roles of knowledge. Specifically, limited problem 
characterisation and objective setting tasks would suggest that there were few 
opportunities for ways of new knowledges to challenge embedded assumptions 
within energy regulation to adapt to the new expectations of the change in 
statutory powers in 2010. Whether this pattern of limited tasks of policy 
formulation resulted in continuity or change can be revealed by analysing the tools 
of policy formulation, as I go on to explain in the subsequent sections.  
 
6.3 Tools of Regulatory Policy Formulation 2000 - 2016 
 
Analysis of tools of policy formulation provided insight into how different 
knowledges were used within energy market regulation. Specifically, I identified 
the actors, venues, capacities and effects of tools within the policy formulation 
tasks described in section 6.2. Where a particular tool was chosen by regulatory 
policy formulation actors and used to implement policies, the use of a tool revealed 
the role of knowledges in conducting those tasks. These tools provided 
opportunities to extend the ability of policy formulators “to marshal the necessary 
resources to make intelligent collective choices about and set strategic directions 
for the allocation of scare resources for public ends” (Painter and Pierre 2005, p. 
2).  
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While a diverse range of actors were identified as engaging in policy formulation 
procedures, described in section 6.2, the only actors visible as using tools were 
analysts in the venues of Ofgem and the CMA. Between 2000 and 2016, regulatory 
policy formulation tools included indicators, impact assessments and six types of 
participatory tools (a workshop, a public engagement event, a roundtable, 
hearings, deliberative focus groups and stakeholder consultations). Analysing the 
corpus identified two overarching tools of policy formulation: participatory tools 
that were used in all regulatory activities and indicators that were used in the 
majority of regulatory activities. The following section describes these two main 
tools used regularly by Ofgem between 2000 and 2016 and describes the implication 
of their use in terms of policy formulation.  
6.3.1 Use of indicators in GB regulatory policy formulation 2000 - 2016 
 
The first tool used in the formulation of energy market regulation between 2000 
and 2016 were indicators. Indicators relating to policy outcomes are a core feature 
of policy formulation in the UK (Hood 2007; Jackson 2011; Lehtonen 2013). 
Indicators have been identified as measures that support actors formulating policy 
on whether to act, to signal a particular action, to focus a complex policy discussion 
and to provide transparency and accountability via monitoring (Briguglio and Pace 
2003; Gudmundsson 2003; Lehtonen et al. 2016; Radaelli 2018; Rosenström and 
Lyytimäki 2006). Indicators as a tool in policy formulation broadly speaking can be 
used both to ‘open up’ or ‘close down’ the range of knowledges considered (Rafols 
et al. 2013; Sébastien, Bauler, and Lehtonen 2014; Stirling 2008). As I demonstrate 
below, indicators were consistently visible as a tool used within Ofgem between 
2000 and 2016 and by the CMA in their energy market investigations between 2014 
and 2016. These indicators monitored measures relating to two issues: first, the 
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participation of consumers in the energy market and second, the treatment of 
vulnerable consumers by energy supply firms.  
The first indicators used in regulatory policy formulation related to energy 
consumer engagement in the market through changing products, tariffs and energy 
supplier. Ofgem monitored these through mandatory data requests to energy supply 
firms and annual surveys (Competition and Markets Authority 2016b; Ofgem 2008b, 
2012i). These themes were explored with a sample of consumers on an ad hoc basis 
in 2001 and in 2008, specifically with a sample of vulnerable consumers (Ofgem 
2001a, 2008g, 2008h). From 2011 to 2015, a regular survey was commissioned 
focusing on the amount of switching between suppliers, consumer knowledge about 
switching, how consumers switched and made evaluations about switching and how 
they searched for deals (Ofgem 2011c, 2012c, 2013e, 2014e, 2015a, 2015j, 2016b). 
The CMA followed a similar approach in their energy market investigation, 
combining data from energy supply firms with a survey of energy consumers that 
asked about their attitudes and their behaviour regarding switching supplier 
(Competition and Markets Authority 2015a, 2016b). 
Although indicators could be used by actors to conduct any of the five policy 
formulation tasks (Howlett and Cuenca 2017; Lehtonen et al. 2016; Sébastien et al. 
2014), the indicator of energy market engagement was regularly used in regulatory 
policy formulation between 2000 and 2016 in the policy formulation task of problem 
evaluation. In successive reviews of the energy market and then the CMA’s energy 
market regulation, this indicator was used to describe the lack of engagement in 
the energy market as a problem that required regulatory intervention (Competition 
and Markets Authority 2015a, 2016b; Ofgem 2008d, 2010f, 2014b). As I explained in 
Chapter 4, both economic regulators were concerned about the low levels of energy 
market engagement of consumers. For example, Ofgem used the indicator of energy 
market engagement to conclude that: 
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“Whilst customers all have a choice of supplier, the majority remain with the 
supplier they had before market opening. This very static picture is, in our view, 
contributing to the market not working well for consumers.” 
(Ofgem 2012i, p. 15) 
On two occasions, this monitoring of energy market participation engaged with the 
concern of fairness in the energy market (Ofgem 2015j, 2016b). These two 
monitoring reports used survey data to gain insight into consumer engagement in 
the market, in line with indicators and consistent since 2000. However, the survey 
also sought insight into the success of a new rule that consumers should be treated 
fairly by their energy supplier. They did this by posing survey questions to 
understand if consumers were satisfied with and trusted their energy supplier. If 
consumers were satisfied and trusted their energy provider, Ofgem could conclude 
that the firm was acting fairly (Ofgem 2015j, 2016b). Ofgem stated that: 
“The RMR aims to create a fairer energy market that consumers are more willing 
to trust and engage in… Ofgem introduced new Standards of Conduct to ensure 
that consumers are treated fairly by suppliers and their representatives in all their 
dealings with them. The aim is that, over time, the level of trust consumers have 
in energy suppliers improves.”   
(Ofgem 2015j, p. 59) 
The questions did not extend into fairness in terms of affordability of energy, 
pricing or the health impacts of cold homes, articulated in terms of fairness that 
characterised the concerns of third sector organisations raised in the press at this 
time (BBC News 2016; Independent 2015). Whether these might have, in time, been 
incorporated into the indicator is unknown, due to the removal of the RMR reforms 
and therefore, the related indicators. However, the second iteration of the 
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indicator maintained the link between a fair market and consumer engagement in 
2016, stating: 
“The RMR aimed to promote consumer engagement in the energy market and 
improve competition between suppliers by making the market simpler, clearer and 
fairer.”  
(Ofgem 2016b p. 4) 
There was, therefore, no link between the concern with fairness in terms of 
affordability of energy and the indicator of competitive market engagement 
between 2000 and 2016. There was, however, a new report recommended by the 
CMA investigation which directed Ofgem to publish, from 2017, a report to replicate 
the analysis of switching behaviour in terms of demographics (Competition and 
Markets Authority 2016b).  
The second indicator used in energy market regulation consisted of measures that 
tracked the treatment of vulnerable consumers by energy supply companies. From 
2000 to 2016, energy suppliers submitted quarterly data on indicators defined by 
Ofgem with regards to their treatment of consumers in vulnerable situations (Ofgem 
2000a, 2005e, 2013c). While this topic might have shone a light on affordability 
pressures or fairness of market outcome, the indicator focused on three key 
themes: treatment of consumers with energy debt; access to a register of 
vulnerable consumers; and delivery of support schemes associated with vulnerable 
customers of energy suppliers (Ofgem 2001c, 2002, 2003f, 2005d, 2009j, 2010g, 
2011d, 2012d, 2013f, 2014f, 2015g, 2016d). Ofgem used this indicator to support its 
regulation against existing rules as it explained in 2009: 
“We do this by monitoring supplier practices, identifying good practice and areas 
for improvement, evaluating the effectiveness of our policies, and ensuring 
compliance with our rules”. 
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(Ofgem 2009j, p. 1)  
This monitoring of energy suppliers’ treatment of vulnerable consumers was used 
repeatedly to review the practices regarding debt collection between 2000 and 
2016 and was used in problem evaluation as part of the Vulnerable Consumer 
Strategy of 2013 (Ofgem 2008a, 2009h, 2013c, 2015e). As in the indicator of 
consumer market engagement, measures of affordability or fairness of market 
outcomes were not included in indicators relating to vulnerable consumer 
outcomes. 
The analysis of these indicators identifies two distinct ways in which people who 
use energy in their homes are known within regulatory policy formulation: as 
vulnerable consumers in debt to their supplier and as individuals engaging in the 
market. While indicators in regulation may have yet to be used to set a specific 
level of success (Radaelli 2018), elected representatives and the public explained 
that energy affordability should be a concern when concluding whether or not that 
consumers benefited from energy markets between 2000 and 2016 (National Energy 
Action and E3G 2018; Ofgem and Energywatch 2003). However, the concern 
regarding affordability was consistently absent from indicators. 
As I described in Chapter 3, analysis of tools shows the impact that tool-use has in 
practice on the capacities of formulation actors in venues. Analysis of the use of 
indicators by formulation actors – analysts working at the regulator – within the 
venue of Ofgem, identified their regular use and expansion. This reveals two 
important insights regarding the capacities that related to the indicator tool as it 
intersected with the specific venue of Ofgem. First, as a tool, indicators can, in 
theory, provide a transparent measurement and monitor policy outcomes and 
provide a shared source of reliable information for policy formulation (Hood 2007; 
Lehtonen 2015; Turnhout 2009). This capacity of the tool itself to monitor outcomes 
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is clearly visible in Ofgem’s use of indicators between 2000 and 2016. Second, the 
analytic capacities of actors within Ofgem were extended by using indicators. 
Specifically, I identified that analysts within Ofgem were able to extend the range 
and regularity of data to calculate indicators and used the indicators to conduct 
problem evaluation.  
An expanded capacity through indicators was the focus of regulatory policy 
formulation as an aim in itself (Competition and Markets Authority 2016b; Ofgem 
2005e, 2009f, 2012i, 2013c). This was in line with the traditional concern of 
economic regulation regarding the information asymmetry between regulated firms 
and regulators (Baldwin et al. 2012; Levi-Faur 2011; Robinson 2002). Specifically, I 
identified that there was an expansion in the content of indicators through more 
extensive demands for data from energy supply firms (Competition and Markets 
Authority 2016b; Ofgem 2005e, 2009f, 2012i, 2013c). However, mapping the use of 
indicators elucidates two limits in the extent to which they extended the capacity 
of regulatory policy formulators. First, the indicators visible in my analysis related 
to the participation of consumers in the energy market and second, to the 
treatment of vulnerable consumer by energy supply firms, were used to conduct a 
subset of policy formulation tasks. As described in section 6.2, regulatory policy 
formulation between 2000 and 2016 focused predominantly on the tasks of problem 
evaluation and option assessment. This meant that indicators were not used to 
expand the characterisation of problems or contribute to the objectives and aims of 
regulation. 
As a consequence, the actors extending their analytic capacity using indicators did 
so on the basis of extending insight into an understanding of market operations 
already embedded in the regulator. While indicators as a tool can be used to either 
‘open up’ or ‘close down’ the range of knowledges considered when actors conduct 
policy formulation tasks (Rafols et al. 2013; Sébastien et al. 2014; Stirling 2008), in 
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my research, neither occurred. Instead, actors of policy formulation maintained 
their focus on measuring energy market outcomes in terms of engagement and 
monitoring energy firm behaviour regarding their vulnerable customers. This 
provided little opportunity for the changes in political or public concern to be 
incorporated into new indicators for Ofgem to monitor between 2000 and 2016. 
Instead, the objectives set in 2000 and 2001 in terms of market outcomes (Ofgem 
2001b) and treatment of vulnerable consumers by energy supply firms (Ofgem 
2000b), continued. This provided no opportunity for wider concerns regarding 
fairness or affordability to be monitored with indicators. I discuss the implications 
of this lack of change in indicators in terms of effects in section 6.4. 
6.3.2 Use of participatory tools in GB regulatory policy formulation 2000 - 
2016 
 
Participatory tools are procedural steps in policy formulation that facilitate a 
dialogue between policy formulating actors within an institution and people outside 
of that institution (Abrams and Primack 1980; Felt et al. 2012; Hisschemöller and 
Cuppen 2015; Hoppe 2018). More specific definitions of participatory tools vary, as 
do the arguments regarding the effectiveness and aims of using participatory tools 
(Beierle 2010; Fischer 2000; Hisschemöller and Hoppe 1995; Smith 2009). However, 
a shared understanding is that tools that enable participation of those outside of an 
institution should, in theory, provide the benefit of a diversity of views to aid 
knowledge production (Pallett and Chilvers 2013; Smith 2009; Woodhouse and 
Nieusma 2001). Participatory tools can be used within any of the tasks of policy 
formulation to open up and evaluate policy problems and evaluate options for 
policy design (Beierle 2010; Cuppen et al. 2010; Fischer 2000; Hisschemöller and 
Cuppen 2015).  
In analysing GB’s energy regulation between 2000 and 2016, I identified 6 
participatory tools. Of these six, four were rare - a public engagement event, a 
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workshop, a roundtable and hearings with energy market stakeholders (Competition 
and Markets Authority 2016a; Ofgem 2001b, 2013c, 2015f). However, two 
participatory tools played a repeated role in regulatory policy formulation: 
deliberative focus groups with members of the public and stakeholder 
consultations. I describe these in turn in the sections below.  
6.3.2.1 “Consumer First” Deliberative Focus Groups 
 
The first prominent participatory formulation tool consisted of deliberative focus 
groups. These were commissioned by actors within the venue of Ofgem, within the 
Consumer First research program. Policy formulation actors within Ofgem engaged 
with this tool in two ways. Firstly, they proposed the topics that were to be 
discussed within the focus groups. This was done on an ad hoc basis. Secondly, 
regulatory actors used insights from these focus groups in policy formulation tasks.  
Deliberative focus groups at Ofgem, called Consumer First Panels, were introduced 
in 2007. Their scope was: 
“…to help improve our understanding of what really matters to consumers and to 
increase direct consumer contributions to Ofgem’s deliberations They are a unique 
resource that we can call on regularly to provide feedback on key energy topics 
and regulatory issues, and act as the ‘voice of the consumer’.” 
(Ofgem 2011b, p. 1)  
Some interviewees who held, or had held, policy formulation roles at Ofgem 
recognised the Consumer First research and broadly welcomed the insights it 
generated. For example, one interviewee explained: 
“I think that they are such are such a useful vehicle for us. To test certain issues 
and to go, well, more ‘deep dive’ with them.”  
Reg2 (in line with Reg4, Reg5, Ad3) 
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Each year, 80 to 100 consumers were recruited through door to door and 
snowballing approaches to form a demographically representative sample. This 
group of participants met three times over the course of a year to deliberate topics 
selected by Ofgem. The events were held over the course of a year with each 
‘wave’ of panellists asked to: 
 “…become ‘expert’ consumers – meaning that they are able to discuss issues from 
a consumer perspective with a rounded view of how the energy industry works and 
knowledge of the business models involved.”   
(Ofgem 2009e, p. 3) 
Between the launch of the Consumer First Programme in 2007 and the end of the 
period analysed by my thesis, there were 13 deliberative focus groups on topics 
linked to supply market regulation. In Table 6.2, I demonstrate that in the 13 focus 
groups, the topics selected by Ofgem largely focused on two interlinked overarching 
topics: energy market engagement and the information requirements for consumers 
to engage with the market.  
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Table 6.2 Consumer First Deliberative Focus Groups Topics  
 Topic Report Name Cited in Regulatory Policy 
1 Information requirements  
Energy market engagement 
Energy Market, Billing and Price 
Metrics (Ofgem 2009e) 
Cited in Energy Supply 
Market Probe Remedies 
(Ofgem 2009f) 
2 Information provision  
Energy market engagement 
Tariffs Structures (Ofgem 
2010b) 
None cited  
3 Energy market engagement 
Fairness  
Supplier Standards of Conduct 
and Prompt Pay Discounts 
(Ofgem 2010a) 
None cited  
4 Energy market engagement 
Information requirements  
 
Energy Market and Tariff 
Structures (Ofgem 2011b) 
Cited in Retail Market 
Review (Ofgem 2013k) 
5 Energy market engagement 
Information requirements  
Consumer engagement with the 
energy market, information 
needs and perceptions of Ofgem 
(Ofgem 2012a) 
None cited 
6 Information requirements  Consumer views on Tariff 
Comparison Rates (TCRs) 
(Ofgem 2012b) 
Cited in Retail Market 
Review (Ofgem 2013k) 
7 Vulnerable Consumer 
Experience 
Priority Services Register 
(Ofgem 2013b) 
Cited in Consumer 
Vulnerability Strategy 
(Ofgem 2013c) 
8 Energy market engagement 
 
Change of Supplier Procedures 
(Ofgem 2013a) 
 
None cited  
9 Vulnerable Consumer 
Experience 
Affordability, Environmental 
and Social Schemes (Ofgem 
2014c) 
 
Cited in Prepayment meters 
installed under warrant: final 
proposals (Ofgem 2016f) 
10 Energy market engagement 
Information requirements 
 
Consumer engagement and trust 
in the energy market - Retail 
Market Review Reforms (Ofgem 
2014d) 
 
None cited 
11 Energy market engagement 
Information requirements 
 
 
Third Party Intermediaries and 
Price Comparison Websites 
(Ofgem 2015d) 
 
None cited 
12 Energy market engagement Exploring Trust and some Retail 
Market Review Remedies 
(Ofgem 2015b) 
 
None cited 
13 Energy market engagement 
Vulnerable Consumer 
Experience 
Switching Suppliers for 
Domestic Customers in Debt 
(Ofgem 2015c) 
None cited 
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The first overarching topic – information requirements for market engagement – saw 
discussions regarding the regularity of information from energy supply firms and the 
formatting of that information (lines 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 10 and 11). The second – energy 
market engagement – saw discussions regarding switching energy suppliers and trust 
in energy supply firms and the extent to which trust impacted market engagement 
(lines 1 – 5, 8 and 10 – 13). Proposals regarding the structure of information 
provided by? consumers from the deliberative focus groups were implemented by 
Ofgem as an outcome of the Energy Supply Market Probe (Ofgem 2009f) and the 
Retail market Review (Ofgem 2013k), following focus group attendees assessing 
options of information displayed (Ofgem 2009e, 2010b, 2012b). 
Four deliberative focus groups were invited to focus topics beyond information 
provision and energy market engagement; these are identified in italics in Table 
6.2. The first, a discussion of fairness, focused on firms who offered a ‘prompt pay’ 
discount. This was related to a possible outcome of the Retail Market Review that 
discussed the removal of the range of discounts and surcharges on the basis that 
they added complexity to comparing offers (Ofgem 2011h). The consideration of 
fairness of this particular discount (in the region of £30) focused on encouraging the 
perceived ‘correct’ behaviour of early payment and whether others who did not pay 
early (even those who paid on time) would be in effect funding this discount. The 
focus group report stated: 
“The concept of a discount for paying promptly was generally seen to be fair. 
However, this fairness was perceived to depend on how the discount was funded. It 
was generally felt that a discount should not be funded by non- prompt-paying 
consumers paying more, but rather that it should come out of the administrative 
savings suppliers may make through receiving payment early.” 
(Ofgem 2010a, p. 5) 
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The recommendation of the panels was that a discount should be derived from 
savings related to supplier processes and not funded by other customers. However, 
no regulatory output enacted this suggestion.  
Three further deliberative focus groups considered a topic beyond information 
provision and energy market engagement in discussions regarding vulnerable 
consumer experiences (Ofgem 2013b, 2014c, 2015c). First, a wave of deliberative 
focus groups were asked to consider people’s energy needs in a discussion regarding 
the Priority Service Register – a registration scheme funded by energy suppliers to 
log characteristics linked to energy vulnerability (Ofgem 2013b). Responding to pen 
portraits of vulnerable energy users, panellists concluded that:  
“Vulnerability was also thought to be a spectrum encompassing people with very 
different needs and support requirements. For example, a person with back 
problems may only need their PPM meter moved in order for them to be able to 
charge it, while someone with a specific learning difficulty may need a lot of 
support when communicating with energy companies... While there were some 
groups of customers who should potentially be automatically be registered for the 
PSR (i.e. those with certain conditions which make them particularly reliant on 
energy), a better approach to helping vulnerable consumers within the energy 
market would be for the companies to take more steps to “know their customers” 
by understanding better their conditions and personal circumstances.” 
(Ofgem 2013b, p. 39) 
This broadening of the concept of vulnerability, along with support for energy 
suppliers to “know their customers”, was cited in Ofgem’s Consumer Vulnerability 
Strategy in its recommendation for energy supply firms to respond to customer 
needs beyond the Utilities Act (2000) definition of vulnerability (Ofgem 2013c). 
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The second wave of focus groups to consider vulnerable consumer experiences 
related to the fairness of PPM charges (Ofgem 2014c). The report from this wave 
states: 
“Nearly all the Panellists think that it is unfair that unit costs for prepayment 
meters are generally higher than for other payment methods. This is particularly 
because they associate prepayment meter use with those on low incomes who can 
least afford the additional costs. Whilst they are unhappy about the difference in 
charges, many Panellists do not feel that it is acceptable for the additional costs of 
prepayment meters to be spread to all customers. They find it difficult to get 
beyond the view that any extra costs should come from suppliers’ profits.” 
(Ofgem 2014c, p. 29) 
The argument that PPM consumers were more likely to be on low incomes and 
unlikely to be able to pay additional high costs related to the PPM system in this 
wave of focus groups, is cited by Ofgem’s policy output regarding PPM warrant costs 
(Ofgem 2016f). While regulatory policy capped warrant costs for PPM consumers, it 
did not set out how this reduction in fees would be funded. This meant that the 
proposal from panellists – that costs associated with PPM should be paid from 
energy supply profits not consumers – was not implemented.  
The final wave of focus groups to consider vulnerable consumer experiences was 
linked to energy market engagement and discussed the ability of people with an 
energy debt to switch energy supplier (Ofgem 2015c). The report of the focus 
groups explains that: 
“Most Panellists end up thinking that in most circumstances, customers with debt 
should not be allowed to switch. They largely think that if a customer incurs debt 
they have a responsibility to pay it off with their existing supplier before they can 
switch. Panellists list a significant exception where they think that customers with 
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debt should be allowed to switch supplier: where the debt is a result of supplier 
error.” 
(Ofgem 2015c, p. 4)  
The recommendation that customers in debt should not be allowed to switch was 
not adopted in any regulatory policy outputs within the period analysed.  
The drawing in of perspectives from beyond the regulator is the central capacity of 
a participatory tool and formulation actors within Ofgem did secure this insight. My 
analysis identified that the participatory tool of policy formulation within the 
Consumer First programme shed light on the steps taken by Ofgem to gain insight 
into the views of the public on energy market regulations. However, it is important 
to note that the topics considered were set by staff within the regulator and 
predominantly focused on energy market engagement and information provision, as 
demonstrated in Table 6.2.  
The use of deliberative focus groups between 2000 and 2016 did not allow for the 
public to challenge the topics discussed. The bounding of topics discussed in the 
deliberative focus groups therefore poses an important barrier to the capacities of 
the tool intersecting with the venue of Ofgem. Further, the topics as a whole 
maintained a focus on two ways of knowing people that were already embedded 
within Ofgem: as vulnerable consumers and as consumers in the market. These may 
not have been the topics that the public viewed as most central to energy market 
regulation. Participatory tools, in theory, may provide the opportunity for diverse 
views from the public to be heard. However, when used in Ofgem they failed to 
provide the opportunity for focus group participants from the public to decide the 
issues that would be under discussion. There is, therefore, little evidence of the 
participatory tool of focus groups effecting regulatory policy formulation, as I go on 
to explain in section 6.4 below.  
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6.3.2.2 Stakeholder Consultations 
 
The most commonly used tool of policy formulation in energy market regulation 
between 2000 and 2016 was the stakeholder consultation. As demonstrated in 
Chapter 5, stakeholder consultations were mandated by guidance from the UK 
Government for all economic regulators (Department of Business, Innovation and 
Skills 2011) and the Utilities Act (2000) specified that Ofgem was to consult on and 
publish key decisions. Stakeholder consultations were conducted in public and 
provided an equal opportunity to engage with actors at Ofgem who were 
completing tasks of regulatory policy formulation. Between 2000 and 2016, there 
were 21 consultations issued by Ofgem regarding the retail market. There were a 
large range of respondents to Ofgem’s consultations in this period: academics, 
members of the public, unions consumer advocates, campaigns, charities, regulated 
firms, other regulators, government officials and elected representatives from local 
councils, devolved administrations and the Houses of Parliament. Although the 
number of respondents increased over time, with the average number of 
respondents doubling between 2000 and 2016, the sole group of actors consistently 
engaged over time were the ex- monopoly supply firms and the statutory consumer 
advocate.  
The repeated engagement with Ofgem by firms is described by interviewees in third 
sector organisations and within firms themselves, as providing an opportunity to 
build relationships with actors using tools of policy formulation within this period 
and from the regulator’s predecessor regulator.  One interviewee explained: 
“That might reflect the fact that we were the former monopoly provider for 
[removed] that there is a long-term relationship there for us. Which isn’t true for 
all of the new players in the market. I’m not saying that we have a huge number of 
people in a company from then [privatization], although I’m surprised how many 
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are still here! So, our relationship tends to be quite positive, we work really hard 
to maintain good relationships right the way across - from Ofgem CEO right down 
to the analysts.” 
 Ma5 (in line with Ma1, Ma2, Ma4, Ma6, Ad2, Ad3, Ad4, Ad6, Re3, Re4, Re7, Re8) 
In addition to a disparity in the number of interactions that energy supply firms had 
with Ofgem over time, interviewees described a significant resource difference 
between energy supply firms and charities and third sector organisations who 
wished to engage with Ofgem but were unable to do so. Ofgem acknowledged this 
resource challenge in 2012, stating: 
“We recognise that many of the organisations that we would like to engage with 
are facing considerable constraints on their time and resources. We therefore 
propose to use a variety of methods of communicating to try to make it easier for 
organisations to engage in our work.” 
(Ofgem 2012h, p. 16) 
Energy supply firms, however, consistently described teams of regulatory specialists 
whose role was to directly engage with actors of policy formulation at Ofgem. While 
the majority described this as a required resource burden, one interviewee was 
more blunt, stating: 
“The first thing to say is that we resource up. There are significant numbers of 
employees whose role full-time is interacting with them [Ofgem].”  
Ma5 
In addition to the differences in resources and the availability of long-term 
relationships, interviewees also described a challenge in articulating their views in 
response to Ofgem, due to the technocratic nature of discussions regarding 
competition. One interviewee from a representative body explained: 
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“We have to frame any concern we have in relation to generally competition or 
efficiency objectives. Because if we could frame them as competition policy issues 
are much more likely to be tackled. Because they would be regarded by them as 
genuine”. 
Re3 (in line with DG2, Ad2, Ad3, Ad4, Ad5, Ad6, Ad7, R1, Re2, Re4, Re5, Re6, Re7, Ma1) 
This experience - described by interviewees from representative bodies, democratic 
governance institutions, advisory groups and an energy supply firm who had 
engaged with stakeholder consultations– suggests that these consultations did not 
necessarily provide the opportunity to engage with actors of policy formulation in 
Ofgem in the open dialogue of diverse views to aid in knowledge production, as 
envisaged by the designers of participatory tools (Beierle 2010; Fischer 2000; 
Hisschemöller and Cuppen 2015; Smith 2009). Under the lens of the TPF approach, 
this can be explained by linking the experience of interviewees regarding the 
regulatory focus on technical market operations to the tasks of policy formulation 
when the stakeholder consultation was used (demonstrated in Table 6.1). 
Although the stakeholder consultation tool provided an opportunity for all to 
engage with the regulator, it was predominantly when the option assessment task 
was being undertaken that this tool was used. The experience of my interviewees 
would therefore suggest that the participatory tool of stakeholder consultation is 
limited by a lack of opportunity to engage in an equal manner when considering the 
role of ex-monopoly firms and other participants. Further, my analysis identified a 
lack of opportunities to engage in objective settings and problem characterisation 
opportunities were rare.  
The implication of this finding for the extension of the capacity within the regulator 
to use stakeholder consultations in tasks of policy making is not straightforward. A 
large and diverse range of stakeholders regularly respond to Ofgem’s consultations. 
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Indeed, one publication specifically notes the challenges faced by Ofgem in 
processing an unexpectedly high number of responses to the Retail Market Review 
consultation (Ofgem 2012k). However, it is not clear whether policy formulation 
capacities at Ofgem were extended with the use of stakeholder consultations alone. 
The intention of participatory tools, in terms of the capacity of actors within 
institutions, is to bring new evidence from individuals and organisations who do not 
have a formal role in policy formulation (Cuppen et al. 2010; Hisschemöller and 
Cuppen 2015; Hisschemöller and Hoppe 1995; Smith 2009). Including diverse 
perspectives in policy formulation is the capacity of participatory tools ,which are 
theoretically available to policy formulators and specifically sought by Ofgem 
(Ofgem 2012h). However, my analysis explains that between 2000 and 2016, 
consultations provided limited opportunities to challenge embedded ways of 
knowing. This finding is in line with research regarding government policy making in 
the UK (Chilvers 2010; Hoppe 2018; Pallett and Chilvers 2013).   
While both ways of knowing consumers – engaging in the market and as vulnerable 
consumers – are visible in stakeholder consultations, where the outcomes can only 
respond to one of the two, the objective setting in 2001 appears to have had a 
more prominent role. The importance of maintaining a competitive market was 
reiterated even where Ofgem noted the negative impact of existing market 
structures on vulnerable consumers (Ofgem 2005e, 2012h). For example, in 
discussing a new licence condition to protect vulnerable consumers in 2009, Ofgem 
explained: 
“We would need to be sure that such a condition is a proportionate measure and 
serves to help, rather than hinder, progress towards an effective competitive 
market.” 
(Ofgem 2009e, p. 3) 
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Instead of incorporating diverse ways of knowing consumers, the stakeholder 
consultation tool maintained a focus on the two ways of knowing consistent 
throughout Ofgem’s policy formulation: consumers engaging in the energy market 
and vulnerable consumers. It is notable that fairness of market outcomes and 
affordability challenges were a regular feature of consultation responses from 
stakeholders between 2000 and 2016 (Ofgem 2009d, 2012n, 2013d, 2016i). 
However, the capacity of the tool to bring together diverse views was not mirrored 
in the regulatory outputs within the regulatory venue of Ofgem. I go on to describe 
the way in which this, in turn, impacted the effects of the use of the stakeholder 
consultation tool in section 6.4. 
6.3.3 Interacting Tools of Regulatory Policy Formulation 
 
In applying the Tools of Policy Formulation (TPF) framework to my corpus, I 
identified two main tools of policy formulation between 2000 and 2016. These were 
indicators and participatory procedures used by analysts at Ofgem and CMA. 
Analysing the implications for how tools intersect in practice within a venue 
required more than descriptions of the individual tools, as within regulatory policy 
formulation the different tools interacted. In line with the procedures for a market 
investigation, the CMA issued reports based on their evidence gathering and provide 
an opportunity to comment on each report, culminating in regulatory policies in the 
form of orders (Competition and Markets Authority 2014, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b, 
2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f). The interaction of tools of policy formulation within 
Ofgem was more varied, as demonstrated in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3 Interacting Tools of Policy Formulation  
 
 Indicator Participatory 
- Focus 
Group  
Additional 
Tool used  
Participatory - 
Stakeholder 
Consultation 
Regulatory 
Output 
 
1 Treatment of 
Vulnerable 
Consumers 
(Ofgem 2000a)  
  Social Action Plan 
(Ofgem 2000a) 
The Social 
Action Plan 
(Ofgem 2000b) 
2 Retail Market 
Engagement 
(Ofgem 2001b) 
 Participation - 
Public 
workshop 
 Review of 
domestic gas 
and electricity  
competition 
and supply 
price 
regulation 
(Ofgem 2001b) 
3    Making Markets Work 
for Consumers 
(Ofgem 2003a, 
2003b, 2003d, 
2003e) 
Making 
Markets Work 
for Consumers 
(Ofgem 2003c) 
4 Treatment of 
Vulnerable 
Consumers 
(Ofgem 2001c, 
2002, 2003f) 
   Preventing 
debt and 
disconnection 
(Ofgem and 
Energywatch 
2003) 
5 Retail Market 
Engagement 
(Ofgem 2005b) 
  Domestic Market 
Review (Ofgem 
2005b) 
Domestic 
Market Review 
(Ofgem 2005a) 
6 Treatment of 
Vulnerable 
Consumers 
(Ofgem 2001c, 
2002, 2003f, 
2005d) 
  Social Action 
Strategy (Ofgem 
2005f) 
Social Action 
Strategy 
(Ofgem 2005e) 
7 Retail Market 
Engagement 
(Ofgem 2006, 
2008d) 
Energy 
Market, 
Billing and 
Price Metrics 
(Ofgem 
2009e) 
Impact 
Assessment 
(Ofgem 
2009b) 
 
Energy Supply 
Market Probe 
(Ofgem 2008c, 
2009d, 2009c) 
Energy Supply 
Market Probe 
(Ofgem 2008, 
2009b, 2009c, 
2009a) 
 
8 Treatment of 
Vulnerable 
Consumers 
(Ofgem 2007a, 
2009j) 
  Review of 
protections for 
vulnerable 
consumers from 
disconnection 
(Ofgem 2008a, 
2009i) 
Notice of 
modifications 
of standard 
licence 
condition 
27.11 (Ofgem 
2010c) 
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Continuation of Table 6.2 
 Indicator Participatory 
- Focus 
Group  
Additional 
Tool used  
Participatory - 
Stakeholder 
Consultation 
Regulatory 
Output 
 
9 Retail Market 
Engagement 
(Ofgem 2010f) 
Consumer 
views on 
Tariff  
Comparison 
Rates (TCRs) 
(Ofgem 
2012b) 
 
Consumer 
engagement 
and trust in 
the energy 
market - 
Retail Market 
Review 
Reforms 
(Ofgem 
2014d) 
Impact 
Assessment 
(Ofgem 2011j, 
2013j) 
Retail Market 
Review 
(Ofgem 2011i, 
2012n, 2012j, 
2012m, 2013i) 
Retail Market 
Review 
(Ofgem 2010f, 
2011h, 2012k, 
2012i, 2012o, 
2013k, 2013g) 
10 Treatment of 
Vulnerable 
Consumers  
(Ofgem 2012d, 
2013f) 
Priority 
Services 
Register  
(Ofgem 
2013b) 
Participation – 
workshops 
Proposal for a new 
Consumer 
Vulnerability 
Strategy (Ofgem 
2012h) 
Consumer 
Vulnerability 
Strategy 
(Ofgem 2013c) 
11 Treatment of 
Vulnerable 
Consumers  
(Ofgem 2013c, 
2014b, 2015a) 
 Participation – 
roundtable 
 Decision to 
make 
modifications 
to the gas and 
electricity 
supply 
licences to 
reform the 
switching 
processes for 
indebted 
prepayment 
meter 
customers – 
the Debt 
Assignment 
Protocol 
(Ofgem 2015f) 
12 Retail Market 
Engagement 
(Ofgem, Office 
of Fair Trading 
and 
Competition 
and Markets 
Authority 2014) 
  Consultation on a 
proposal to make a 
market investigation 
reference in respect 
of the supply and 
acquisition of energy 
in Great Britain 
(Ofgem 2014b) 
Market 
investigation 
reference in 
respect of the 
supply and 
acquisition of 
energy in 
Great Britain 
(Ofgem 2014a) 
 Continued on p194 
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Continuation of Table 6.2  
 Indicator Participatory 
- Focus 
Group  
Additional 
Tool used  
Participatory - 
Stakeholder 
Consultation 
Regulatory 
Output 
 
13 Treatment of 
Vulnerable 
Consumers 
(Ofgem 2015g, 
2015e) 
Affordability, 
Environmental 
and Social 
Schemes 
(Ofgem 
2014c) 
 
Impact 
Assessment 
(Ofgem 
2016h) 
Proposals to improve 
outcomes for 
prepayment 
customers 
(Ofgem 2015i, 
2016g, 2016i) 
Prepayment 
meters 
installed 
under 
warrant: final 
proposals 
(Ofgem 2016f) 
14    The future of retail 
market regulation  
(Ofgem 2016k) 
The future of 
retail market 
regulation  
(Ofgem 2016j) 
 
In Table 6.3, I list the regulatory outputs between 2000 and 2016 where at least one 
tool of policy formulation was used. I connect each final regulatory policy to the 
way in which each regulatory output draws on tools of policy making in columns 
which indicate the use of the tools – indicators, the participatory tool of focus 
groups, the participatory tool of stakeholder consultations and others where 
relevant. Tracing the interaction of tools of policy formulation shows that 
regulatory policy formulation drew on a range of tools in the period studied. 
However, a single tool was rarely used by analysts at Ofgem in preparing a 
regulatory output. Instead, the majority of regulatory outputs included two 
separate tools: indicators and stakeholder consultations. Despite deliberative focus 
groups being used regularly as a participatory tool, they rarely appear within a 
regulatory output – visible only in four. Of the 14 regulatory outputs, only three did 
not include a consultation specific to that output (Ofgem 2001b, 2015f; Ofgem and 
Energywatch 2003). However, all have an alternative participatory tool and are 
connected to previous reforms or policies which did include a stakeholder 
consultation procedure (line 1, line 3, line 5-10 and line 12-14 in Table 6.3). 
The stakeholder consultation was not only used as a tool in regulatory policy 
formulation, but also became the way in which the knowledges embedded in 
multiple tools  – such as indicators and focus groups – were brought together to 
 
 
195 
 
evaluate problems, assess problems and design regulatory policies. Specifically, my 
analysis identified that stakeholder consultations were used to bring together a 
diverse range of knowledges at Ofgem. The majority of regulatory outputs that used 
tools (nine of the fourteen) saw the stakeholder consultation as the tool which 
brought together insights from multiple tools of policy formulation. This pattern is 
repeated in the CMA investigation, regulatory activities related to protecting 
vulnerable consumers and retail market reviews conducted at Ofgem. For example, 
in the Retail Market Review, Ofgem used four tools - impact assessments (Ofgem 
2011j, 2012l), indicators (Ofgem 2010f) and deliberative focus groups (Ofgem 
2012b, 2014d)- to evaluate problems in the energy market and assess options. 
However, it was the stakeholder consultations that brought these insights together 
in order to select options and design the policies that resulted from the regulatory 
activities, in their proposals and subsequent market reforms (Ofgem 2012i). This 
pattern of interacting tools is repeated consistently throughout the period 
examined in this study. The fact that stakeholder consultations were regularly used 
is not surprising given that their use is mandated by Government guidance 
(Department of Business, Innovation and Skills 2011). However, the interaction of 
the stakeholder consultation with other tools of policy formulation was not 
identified by previous research. My findings suggest that the stakeholder 
consultation had an important impact on the role of knowledges in regulatory policy 
formulation, in that between 2000 and 2016 they were frequently the point at 
which knowledges were gathered for evaluation and option assessment. Although 
my analysis identifies two ways of knowing consumers – engaging in the market and 
vulnerable consumers in debt – the pattern of interacting tools show that 
stakeholder consultations focus on the former. In other words, the stakeholder 
consultation played a role in filtering the impacts of ways of knowing that emerged 
from other tools.  
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6.4 Effects of Tools of Policy Formulation 
 
The analysis of the role of policy formulation tools in regulatory activities shows 
multiple tools were used between 2000 and 2016. However, they were not used 
equally in terms of regularity of impacting regulatory outputs. In this section, I 
explain the implications of these findings with regards to the effects of tools use. 
Tools of policy formulation can have two types of effects, procedural and 
substantive (Jordan and Turnpenny 2015; Turnpenny et al. 2009). Each tool of 
regulatory policy formulation I have identified as regularly being used between 2000 
and 2016 – indicators and participatory tools – have the potential for impacting the 
formulation procedures related to procedural effects and the adoption of new 
knowledges and policy outcomes associated with substantive effects (Hisschemöller 
and Cuppen 2015; Hisschemöller and Hoppe 1995; Lehtonen et al. 2016; Sébastien 
et al. 2014; Smith 2009). However, while I identified procedural effects of tools, 
there were few examples of substantive effects of tool use. 
Procedural effects can identify the role of knowledges within procedures of policy 
formulation. Procedural effects – the impact of the use of a tool on the procedures 
of conducting policy formulation tasks – are evident from all three of the indicators 
identified in section 6.3.1. First, indicators provided the basis for beginning the task 
of problem evaluation in twelve of the fourteen regulatory outputs that formed the 
basis of Ofgem’s activities (as demonstrated in Table 6.3). Indicators used at Ofgem 
increased the analytic capacity of policy formulation actors by bringing together 
data from multiple sources, to regularly monitor outcomes of regulatory policy- 
making. Second, deliberative focus groups contributed to the procedures that 
performed the task of option assessment on four occasions. While this is less regular 
use than indicators, interviewees identified them as providing important insights 
and deliberative focus groups were held regularly from their introduction in 2007 
through the period studied. Third, the participatory tool of stakeholder consultation 
 
 
197 
 
had a significant procedural effect. It was used in the majority of procedures of 
regulatory activities between 2000 and 2016 and, when used, brought the findings 
from other participatory tools and indicators together to conduct the tasks of 
problem evaluation and option assessment. For example, in the case of Ofgem’s 
Retail Market Review, the stakeholder consultation tool was also used to apply the 
findings of indicators regarding energy market engagement and focus group findings 
that assessed options in policy design (Ofgem 2011h, 2012b, 2013k).  My analysis 
suggests it was therefore the most significant tool of policy formulation at Ofgem. 
However, it is not clear that the use of stakeholder consultations secures the 
extension in capacities that is embedded within a participatory tool – bringing 
together diverse perspectives to include a range of knowleges in policy formulation. 
Identifying the procedural effects of tools provides insight into the presence of a 
range of knowledges that might be available to policy formulation actors through 
the use of such tools.  
My analysis of how tools and venues intersected in practice show that the use of 
tools which could ensure inclusive procedures. If this were the case, the 
knowledges brought together by tools of policy formulation would have identifiable 
substantive effects. Substantive effects relate to the extent a policy formulation 
tool achieves change in a policy field, linked to a different set of knowledges 
(Turnpenny et al. 2009). From my analysis, it is not clear that the use of policy 
formulation tools had systematic substantive effects between 2000 and 2016. I have 
identified only two regulatory outputs which provided the potential for substantive 
effects from using tools of policy formulation. These were: the change to 
considering consumers as irrational, based on insight from behavioural economics; 
and the change to consider adopting a more universal definition of vulnerable 
consumer (Ofgem 2012i, 2013c). Both of these potential substantive effects saw the 
use of participatory tools – a combination of deliberative focus groups and 
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stakeholder consultations (Ofgem 2013k, 2013c). Each of these new ways of 
understanding consumers had a procedural effect in that they led to adapted 
indicators to measure the outcome of regulatory decisions (Ofgem 2015j, 2015e). 
However, the presence of diverse knowledges through a procedural effect does not 
necessarily result in a substantive effect. 
Moreover, changes in the regulatory policy field of energy supply markets in GB 
have been limited. I therefore conclude that there was a substantive effect in 
terms of knowing consumers in the behavioural sense. However, the resulting 
regulatory policy output was short lived. As discussed in Chapter 4, the CMA Energy 
Market Investigation overturned the Retail Market Review implementation, arguing 
that it had an adverse effect on competition (Competition and Markets Authority 
2016b; Ofgem 2016a). It is less clear whether the change to a universal 
understanding of vulnerability had a substantive effect. As demonstrated in Chapter 
4, no new rules that impacted energy supply markets were introduced as a result of 
the Vulnerable Consumer Strategy which contained a new definition (Ofgem 2013c). 
On the other hand, the new definition was cited as part of the background of the 
regulatory output regarding PPM installations (Ofgem 2016f), though not in the 
implementation of the new rules (Ofgem 2016h). Further, the definition was 
included in the voluntary code introduced by the energy firm’s industry body which 
was endorsed by Ofgem (Energy UK 2016). This new definition did, therefore, result 
in a substantive effect in an informal venue of policy formulation, which had the 
possibility of impacting energy supply firm behaviour. In the period analysed it did 
not, however, have substantive effects within Ofgem or play any role in the CMA 
Energy Market Investigation.   
It is difficult, therefore, to conclude from my analysis that the intended 
consequences of using participatory tools were secured within regulatory policy 
formulation between 2000 and 2016. First, focus groups with members of the public 
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had a limited impact. In 2007, Ofgem stated that they intended members of the 
public to have a role in Ofgem’s deliberations. However, the constrained scope of 
topics and limited use of evidence from focus groups in decision-making meant that 
the impact on the operation of the energy market was limited. Second, stakeholder 
consultation tools which are described as providing an opportunity for all to 
participate in regulatory procedures, were seen to provide a disproportionate 
opportunity for well-resourced energy supply firms to participate. As a result, 
participatory tools of regulatory policy formulation provided Ofgem with an 
opportunity to extend the scale of evidence to assess options within a limited 
selection of outcomes that were in line with their pre-existing aims of retail market 
development. In 2016, Ofgem acknowledged the diverse needs of consumers but 
maintained their vision for positive outcomes for consumers from regulation: 
“In the retail market, we consider that these outcomes are best achieved through 
competition and a more efficient, innovative market, comprised of empowered and 
engaged consumers.” 
(Ofgem 2016j) p. 4  
While diverse knowleges from a range of participants where visible in responses to 
stakeholder consultations, the opportunity for substantive effects from using the 
participatory tool were ultimately unsuccessful in challenging the overarching focus 
of Ofgem. Instead, the objective set in 2001 of enabling the functioning of a 
competitive market was maintained. 
 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
The features of regulatory policy formulation between 2000 and 2016 presented in 
this chapter explain how specific knowledges had a more prominent role than 
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others. Systematically used in tools of policy formulation throughout the period 
were two ways of knowing consumers. First, consumers were known in terms of 
their engagement in the market and therefore, their need for information. The type 
of information required and the way that consumers might engage was the topic for 
eleven waves of focus groups, made up seventeen stakeholder consultations and the 
level of engagement was monitored through indicators. Second, consumers were 
known as vulnerable in terms of their experiencing the outcomes of the behaviour 
of energy suppliers. This was the topic of four waves of focus groups, made up part 
of seven stakeholder consultations and experiences related to debt collection and 
identification of vulnerability was monitored by indicators for the full period 
analysed.  
This study set out to identify whether concerns regarding fairness and affordability 
from the public and their elected representatives were visible in policy formulation 
or had an effect. This might have been expected to result from the use of 
participatory tools – tools of policy formulation designed specifically to bring 
diverse knowledges into procedures (Beierle 2010; Hisschemöller and Cuppen 2015; 
Hoppe 2018; Smith 2009). This expectation of ways of knowing from beyond the 
regulator to play a role in policy formulation is set out by Government for 
stakeholder consultations (Department of Business, Innovation and Skills 2011) and 
was a specific aim of Ofgem in conducting deliberative focus groups (Ofgem 2011b). 
However, I identified few effects of these participatory tools between 2000 and 
2016. Further, my analysis revealed multiple occasions when fairness and 
affordability were topics and where tools were used to formulate policy in 
indicators (Ofgem 2015j, 2016b), deliberative focus groups (Ofgem 2010a, 2014c) 
and stakeholder consultations (Ofgem 2009d, 2009g). However, none of these 
engagements had a substantive effect on regulatory policy formulation.  
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I have provided an explanation for the limited effects in terms of how policy is 
formulated, by identifying the limited range of tasks that are conducted by 
regulators. While there was a significant number of tasks relating to problem 
evaluation, option assessment and policy design, none of these provided the 
opportunity to challenge embedded ways of knowing. Interviewees described the 
result as a technocratic discussion of the operation of markets which only provided 
a limited role for knowing consumers beyond their purchasing decisions. An 
exception to this pattern was the problem characterisation undertaken in the 
Consumer Vulnerability Strategy of 2013 (Ofgem 2013c). While this output itself had 
limited effects, this finding implies that an important influence on the role of 
knowledges in regulatory policy formulation, is the way in which problems are 
understood within Ofgem.  
By identifying the sole objective setting task of policy formulation and single 
problem characterization task, I have shown how few opportunities there were to 
engage in discussions regarding the problems facing people who use energy in their 
homes. Instead, policy formulation tasks were conducted in line with ways of 
knowing consumers that were already embedded in Ofgem, despite the introduction 
of new statutory powers.  
Participatory tools in particular were introduced to ensure policy formulation 
benefitted from multiple perspectives (Beierle 2010; Fischer 2000; Smith 2009). 
However, any substantive effects were limited as Ofgem maintained its objectives 
as set out in 2001: to introduce a functioning retail energy market. This constrained 
the role of knowledges in its regulatory policy outputs, unless they were in line with 
the pre-existing expectations of consumers in market engagement activities. Even 
though indicators highlighted vulnerable consumer experiences and a new definition 
which incorporated a broad range of individuals was included in the regulatory 
policymaking, ultimately they did not result in a change in regulation.  
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Nonetheless, participatory tools played a significant role in the activities of energy 
regulation between 2000 and 2016. Stakeholder consultation exercises also provided 
the opportunity for evidence and perspectives from beyond the regulator. As I 
explained in section 6.3.2, Ofgem and the CMA both secured a large number of 
perspectives from a diverse range of organisations in response to stakeholder 
consultations. The extent to which this capacity was realised within regulatory 
policy formulation in this period, differs between the two participatory tools 
regularly used: deliberative focus groups and stakeholder consultations. 
Deliberative focus groups were seen to meet the aims set out by Ofgem in their 
design – in that they provided Ofgem with the opportunity to understand the 
perspectives of members of the public. However, as demonstrated in Table 6.3, the 
opportunity was limited by the topics that were discussed. 
This analysing of policy formulation tools has also provided insight in terms of the 
relative role that different groups engaging with Ofgem played in regulatory policy 
formulation. Through investigating the venues of policy formulation, I identified the 
informal venue of policy formulation in the industry body for energy supply firms. 
Further, participants in the stakeholder consultation procedures described the 
relative benefits that energy supply firms secured through a greater level of 
resources and long-term relationships. This poses a direct challenge to the aims of 
participatory tools in providing an equal opportunity for all to engage in regulatory 
policymaking. This analysis does not, however, explain why these ways of knowing 
maintained their role during a period which included changes in statutory powers. 
Further, with its focus on policy procedures it does not fully explain why these 
policy procedures resulted in an energy market that was characterised by so many 
as unfair. 
Further, this analysis of policy formulation or tools has not explained why particular 
knowledges played a role. Problem evaluation and option assessment were 
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sufficient for a new way of knowing consumers as “irrational” to have a substantive 
effect in the Retail Market Review (Ofgem 2012i) . However, this was not the case 
for a new definition of the vulnerable consumer. I therefore used the “What is the 
Problem Represented to Be” (Bacchi 2009b) framework to identify problem 
representations and their impact on regulatory policy formulation. The findings are 
presented in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 7 – What is the Problem Represented to Be in 
Energy Market Regulation in GB 2000 - 2016 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
GB energy market regulation between 2000 and 2016 included a series of regulatory 
policies that aimed to deliver benefits to people who use energy in their homes 
through competitive markets (Competition and Markets Authority 2015a, 2016b; 
Ofgem 2008d, 2009f). As described in Chapter 4, these regulatory reforms included 
regulatory policy proposals that described the expectations of the economic 
regulators, Ofgem and the CMA. In Chapter 5, I identified the failure of energy 
market regulation between 2000 and 2016 to deliver equal benefits of competitive 
markets to people who use energy in their homes. Instead, analysis using the Energy 
Justice framework revealed that regulatory policies, even those that specifically set 
out to fairly distribute the benefits of a competitive market, failed to do so for 
some of the most vulnerable groups in society (Competition and Markets Authority 
2016b). As a result, comparatively more affordably priced energy failed to benefit 
all equally. 
In this chapter, I explain a central reason why these regulatory policies failed by 
presenting my analysis of “What the Problem is Represented to Be” (WPR), in line 
with the analytical framework proposed by Bacchi (2012). The framework enabled 
me to identify how people who use energy in their homes were “known” in 
regulatory policy formulation: how they were understood, conceptualised and 
predicted to act. This in turn helps to explain how regulatory policies largely failed 
to benefit energy consumers. Further, it begins to explain the gulf in expectations 
between the public, and their representatives in parliament, and regulatory polices 
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described in Chapter 1. My explanation draws on the insight provided when using 
the WPR framework described initially in Chapter 3. Specifically, understanding 
problem representations can reveal how certain groups of people benefit from a 
particular policy or set of policies (Bacchi 1999, 2012; Schneider and Ingram 1993; 
Schneider et al. 2005). This analysis of the policy proposals of GB energy market 
regulations from Ofgem and the CMA identifies an implicit problem of 
representation which constrained the role of knowledges between 2000 and 2016. 
7.2 What is the Problem Represented to Be in GB Energy Regulation 
2000 – 2016? 
In this section, I describe the categories, characteristics and concepts that were 
active within the 41 regulatory policy outputs between 2000 and 2016, regarding 
energy supply markets for residential energy consumers described in Chapter 4. 
These 41 outputs are the texts that contain the regulatory policies proposed and 
implemented by Ofgem and the CMA in this period. The three features – categories, 
characteristics and concepts – each explain the ways in which groups or individuals 
are understood within policy procedures (Bacchi 2009b). Under the WPR approach, 
categories are labels given to groups or types of individuals; characteristics are the 
features that define a category; and a concept is the constructed idea that emerges 
from categorising and characterising people in a particular manner (Bacchi 1999, 
2012, 2017; Bletsas and Beasley 2012). I traced the use of these categories, 
characteristics and concepts within regulatory policy formulation to reveal the 
problem representations within energy market regulation between 2000 and 2016. 
In this chapter, I address “What the Problem is Represented to Be” by drawing on 
my analysis of regulatory policy outputs, alongside the interviews I conducted with 
participants in regulatory policy formulation. Finally, I describe the attempts to 
challenge the embedded problem representations of regulatory policy between 
2000 and 2016.  
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7.2.1 Categories, characteristics and concepts 
 
Between 2000 and 2016, five categories of people used energy in their homes. 
These are described in Table 7.1 below. In this section, the categories, concepts 
and characteristics that underpin how consumers are known are identified within 
regulatory policy outputs. An overarching pattern of 4 of the categories is the 
characteristic of people as customers of an energy supply firm. These 
characteristics repeatedly result in a concept based around the activities of 
purchasing from a firm.  
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Table 7.1 Categories, characteristics and concepts from energy market 
regulation 2000 – 2016 
 
 Category Characteristic(s) Concept(s) Output(s) 
1. Consumer in 
energy market 
- Potential Purchaser 
- Customer of energy 
firm 
- Active and engaged 
(minority) 
- Inactive, unmotivated, 
uninformed, sticky 
(majority)  
Purchasing 
Consumer 
Full list of 
outputs from 
Table 4.1 
2. Pre-Payment 
(PPM) 
Customers 
 
- Customer of energy 
firm 
- Debtor 
- Low Income 
- Costly (to energy 
supplier) 
- Inactive, unmotivated, 
uninformed, sticky in 
market 
 
PPM Consumer 
 
(Competition 
and Markets 
Authority 
2016e, 2016b; 
Ofgem 2000b, 
2005e, 2008a, 
2008d, 2009h, 
2009g, 2011h, 
2012h, 2013c, 
2015h, 2015e, 
2016f) 
3. Vulnerable 
Consumer  
- Customer of energy 
firm 
- In need of support 
- Debtor 
- Elderly  
- Low Income  
- Rural home 
- Chronic Illness 
- Disability 
- Child under 5 in 
property 
Vulnerable 
Customer I 
(Registered 
Priority) 
 
 
 
(Ofgem 2000a, 
2000b, 2005e, 
2008a, 2009h, 
2012h, 2013c, 
2015e) 
4. Vulnerable 
Consumer (2013 
onwards) 
 
- Customer of energy 
firm 
- Equalities Act 
protected 
characteristics 
- Dynamic vulnerability 
Vulnerable 
Consumer II 
(transient and 
registered) 
(Ofgem 2012h, 
2013c, 2015e) 
 
5. Fuel Poor 
households 
- Government defined 
target group for social 
schemes 
 
The Fuel Poor (Ofgem 2000b, 
2005e, 2012h, 
2013c, 2015e) 
 
The first category of people who use energy in their homes is that of an energy 
consumer. As described in Chapter 1, the construction of the energy market is such 
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that this is the primary manner in which people are understood within economic 
regulation. This is clearly visible within my corpus, with all regulatory outputs using 
this category. The characteristic that is associated with the category of consumer is 
that of an individual who is a customer of an energy supply firm. This individual is a 
decision-maker who is a potential purchaser of energy supply services from 
different energy firms. The category of consumer is linked to characteristics 
regarding market activity – actions taken by the individual decision-maker to 
compare energy supply firms and act to change product or switch energy supplier 
based on that comparison (Competition and Markets Authority 2014, 2016b; Ofgem 
2003c, 2004b, 2008d, 2011h, 2014a). This was articulated repeatedly between 2000 
and 2016 by regulatory outputs, all of which reflect this summary from 2012: 
“Engagement requires consumers to be able and have an incentive to:  
Access relevant market information;  
Assess the offers available to choose what is best, as well as,  
Act on their assessment of the information.” 
(Ofgem 2012k) p17 
 
However, as my evidence across the entire period taken from within Ofgem has 
shown that the majority of consumers did not engage with the market in the way 
that the concept of the consumer assumes (Competition and Markets Authority 
2015a, 2016b; Ofgem 2003b, 2004b, 2008d, 2011h). This finding is reiterated by 
repeated surveys of energy consumers between 2000 and 2016. The Competition 
and Markets Authority notes that its survey: 
“… provides material evidence of domestic customers’ lack of understanding of, 
and engagement in, retail energy markets.” 
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(Competition and Markets Authority 2016b, p. 22) 
The repeated findings that purchasing consumers are not universally actively acting 
on their information assessments, sees the broadening of the concept to 
incorporate individuals who report that they do know that they could engage in the 
market but refrain from doing so (Competition and Markets Authority 2015a, 2016b; 
Ofgem 2003b, 2008b, 2010f, 2016b). This means that the concept of purchasing 
consumer includes individuals who are inactive in the market but are potentially 
active consumers. This is reiterated by interviewees from regulators, energy firms 
and consumer organisations. One interviewee explained: 
“I think we can reasonably define consumers as ordinary members of the public in 
their roles as purchasers and users of goods and services.”  
Ad8 (in line with RG1, RG2, RG3, RG4, RG5, RG6, RG8, Re7, Ma2, Ma5) 
The concept of consumer adopted in the Retail Market Review was broadened by a 
contemporary understanding of consumers as ‘irrational’ from behavioural 
economics (Ofgem 2011k). This underlying characteristic from behavioural 
economics was a significant challenge to the assumption that consumers are 
rational, implicit in the regulatory outputs of Ofgem and its predecessors. Rather 
than an assumption of rationality there was an expectation of irrationality. This 
approach proposes that consumers need to be communicated with in certain ways 
at certain times if they are to benefit from a market. In 2014, Ofgem stated: 
“Consumers in the GB energy retail markets exhibit a number of behavioural biases 
– as they do in other markets. However, complex tariff information and poor 
comparability between suppliers’ tariffs increase the impact of these biases. These 
features of the markets are likely to make consumers disengage more, or make 
poor switching decisions. These tendencies significantly reduce the extent to which 
the current market is delivering the full benefits from competition.” 
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(Ofgem 2011k, p. 16) 
 
The additional characteristic of irrationality did not, however, overturn the 
characteristic of requiring information. Instead, the deficit in information held by 
the consumer was seen as pointing to the need to incorporate capacities for 
engaging with that information: 
“Some consumers deal with their limited capacity for assessing information by only 
engaging in the markets when it is simple to do so”  
(Ofgem 2012k, p. 6) 
The second category of people who used energy in their homes was the Pre- 
Payment Meter (PPM) Customers, people who had a PPM in their home. A PPM is an 
electricity or gas meter that will only supply energy where payment is received by 
the energy supplier in advance. This metering type is associated with homes where 
there is, or has been historically, a time when an individual has been in debt to 
their energy supplier. The PPM technological infrastructure of payment systems 
added an additional cost of supplying energy to homes with this metering type. The 
category of PPM Customer was therefore associated with a central characteristic of 
indebtedness to an energy supply firm. An energy customer who was in debt by over 
£200 to their energy supplier was not able to switch energy supplier until 2012, at 
which point the six largest suppliers agreed voluntarily to increase the amount to 
£500 (Energy UK 2016; Ofgem 2015f). The Competition and Markets Authority noted 
in 2016 that: 
“Prepayment not generally a choice on the part of the customer: all customers on 
prepayment meters must pay by prepayment. Prepayment meters are generally 
installed where a customer has a poor payment history or in specific types of 
accommodation such as holiday homes and student accommodation.” 
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(Competition and Markets Authority 2016b, p. 377) 
The concept that emerged from this characterisation – a PPM Consumer – was 
therefore associated with a lack of engagement in the market that must be 
corrected. Regulatory policy outputs acknowledged that the increased barrier to 
switching and the costs of the payment systems, resulted in affordability 
challenges, resulting in some overlap between the concept of the PPM Consumer of 
consumers, who could also be defined as ‘vulnerable’. For example, the CMA noted 
in 2016: 
“We also note that prepayment customers include, compared to the entire 
population, higher proportions of individuals: with low levels of income; with low 
levels of education; living in social rented housing; and having a disability – 
demographic characteristics that we have found to be associated with low levels of 
engagement in retail energy markets.” 
(Competition and Markets Authority 2016b, p. 529) 
 
The definition of ‘vulnerable’ in energy market regulation between 2000 and 2016 
relates to three further categories linked to problems with accessing affordable 
energy (2 – 5 in Table 7.1). 
The third category of people who used energy in their homes within regulatory 
policy outputs was the Vulnerable Consumer, as set out in the Utilities Act of 2000. 
These consumers were characterised as customers of energy supply firms who were 
in need of more support than an “average” consumer. The statutory definition 
included households where one person was over 65 or under 5, had a chronic 
illness, was disabled, lived in a rural location or was on a low income. This final 
stator characteristic – low income – led to the additional characteristic of being in 
debt to an energy supply firm. This earlier concept of Vulnerable Consumer is one 
 
 
212 
 
that emerges from a set of expectations about supporting a minority of consumers 
who can be straightforwardly identified and whose needs can be registered (Ofgem 
2000b, 2005e). The concept that relates to the Vulnerable Consumer as defined in 
statute is most significant in regulatory outputs between 2000 and 2012 (therefore 
indicated as Vulnerable Consumer I) before being changed in 2013. 
From 2013 onwards a new characterisation of Vulnerable Consumer (Vulnerable 
Consumer II) was introduced by Ofgem (Ofgem 2012h, 2013c) . Though still 
characterised as customers of energy supply firms and including the categories 
described by statute (Utilities Act 2000), this category was expanded to include 
consideration of a further 28 characteristics that might mean a consumer was 
vulnerable.  
In this characterisation, vulnerability is associated with a set of circumstances that 
can affect anyone at some point, rather than a characteristic of an individual. 
However, the risks also extend to the circumstances facing an individual, the extent 
of an individuals’ awareness of their vulnerability and the nature of the purchase of 
energy services. The move beyond the capacities of the individual to their 
circumstances, incorporated a consideration of the context that individuals were 
living in. It moved beyond a narrative of the ability of an individual. Further, it 
incorporated the consideration that an individual might not reasonably be assumed 
to have identified the specific nature of their vulnerability with regards to the 
energy market, in order to ensure their supplier was aware of this. Finally, it made 
a link beyond the energy market with the Office of Fair Trading discussion about 
situational or transactional vulnerability (Office of Fair Trading 2008). In total, 
Ofgem listed 28 factors that should be considered when conceptualising consumer 
vulnerability. However, it noted that these 28 factors were not exhaustive and 
summarised its new definition of Vulnerable Consumer as follows: 
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“While recognise that any consumer can face detriment in a market, our work 
under this Strategy focuses on those consumers in vulnerable situations who are 
most in need of protection or support. For this purpose we have defined 
vulnerability as when a consumer’s personal circumstances and characteristics 
combine with aspects of the market to create situations where he or she is: 
Significantly less able than a typical consumer to protect or represent his or her 
interests in the energy market; and/or Significantly more likely than a typical 
consumer to suffer detriment, or that detriment is likely to be more substantial… 
The characteristics, capacity and circumstances of individuals can change over 
time. Vulnerability can affect anyone at any time and for many different reasons. 
It may be permanent or long-term; but equally it can be transitory” 
(Ofgem 2013c, p. 4) 
The concept that is constructed by these characteristics is a relative one that takes 
into consideration the energy needs of an individual customer of an energy supply 
firm in relation to that person’s circumstances. Ofgem summarised their new 
definition as: 
“When a consumer’s personal circumstances and characteristics combine with 
aspects of the market to create situations where he or she is:  
Significantly less able than a typical consumer to protect or represent his or her 
interests in the energy market;  
and/or Significantly more likely than a typical consumer to suffer detriment, or 
that detriment is likely to be more substantial” 
(Ofgem 2013c, p. 4) 
The fifth and final category present in regulatory policies are fuel poor households, 
although the regulatory outputs I analysed did not engage in any detail with this 
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group. Ofgem’s regulatory outputs simply noted that they had guidance from the 
Secretary of State to consider fuel poor households (Ofgem 2000b, 2005e, 2013c) 
and from 2009, they monitored energy supply firms’ delivery of energy efficiency 
delivered programmes aimed at supporting the fuel poor (Ofgem 2013c, 2015e). 
However, Ofgem did not characterise this group. Instead, this category was defined 
by the UK Government and Ofgem took no role in conceptualising this group 
(Department of Energy and Climate Change 2012).   
7.2.2 What is the Problem Represented to Be? 
 
In the following section, I describe the problem representations in 17 regulatory 
policies contained in the regulatory outputs first described in Chapter 4. There 
were multiple outputs within the same overarching policy. These regulatory policies 
are described in the first column of Table 7.2. Between 2000 and 2016 there were 
three common problem representations: the knowledge of staff in regulators; the 
behaviour of decision-makers in energy supply firms and the behaviour of 
consumers. Each problem representation draws on concepts that were visible in the 
data collected in my thesis and are described in Table 7.1. I connected these 
concepts to problems and regulatory policies to unpack how these were 
interrelated, as I go on to describe below. Importantly, I demonstrate that there 
was an important pattern of problem representations in terms of whether a 
regulatory policy had an impact on the rules that governed the operation of the 
energy market.  
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Table 7.2 Problem representations in energy market regulation 2000 – 2016 
 Regulatory Policy Problem Concept Rules* Reference 
  1 Publish information 
regarding energy 
supply firm conduct 
and outcomes 
Regulator 
knowledge 
Consumer as 
purchaser 
N (Competition and 
Markets Authority 
2016b; Ofgem 
2000b, 2004b, 
2005e, 2009f, 
2012i, 2013c) 
2 Encourage good 
practice through 
publication of 
regulatory reports 
regarding debt 
collection practices 
Regulatory 
knowledge 
Vulnerable 
Consumer I & 
II, Fuel Poor 
N (Ofgem 2000b, 
2005e, 2008a, 
2013c; Ofgem 
and Energywatch 
2003) 
3 Create network of 
experts to support 
regulatory policy 
insight regarding 
vulnerable energy 
consumers 
Regulator 
knowledge 
Vulnerable 
Consumer I & 
II, Fuel Poor 
N (Ofgem 2012h, 
2013c, 2015e) 
4 Retail Market 
Competition is 
required to drive 
lower prices 
Energy firm 
behaviour 
Consumer as 
purchaser, 
PPM 
Consumer 
Y (Ofgem 2001b) 
5 Endorse energy 
supply firm voluntary 
code of practice 
Energy firm 
behaviour 
Consumer as 
purchaser 
N (Ofgem 2003c, 
2015f; Ofgem and 
Energywatch 
2003) 
6 Adapt definition of 
vulnerable 
consumers to 
dynamic 
circumstances as 
well as individual 
characteristics  
Energy firm 
behaviour 
Vulnerable 
Consumer II, 
Fuel Poor 
N (Ofgem 2012h, 
2013c) 
7 Rules-based 
regulation replaced 
by principle-based 
regulation 
Energy firm 
behaviour 
Consumer as 
purchaser 
N (Ofgem 2016j) 
8 Publish principles of 
behaviour for energy 
supply firms  
Energy firm 
behaviour 
Consumer as 
purchaser 
N (Ofgem 2009f) 
9 Introduce rules on 
the principles of 
behaviour for energy 
supply firms 
Energy firm 
behaviour 
Consumer as 
purchaser 
Y (Ofgem 2013g) 
10 Correct differences 
in prices on basis of 
type of meter or 
geographical 
location 
Energy firm 
behaviour 
Consumer as 
purchaser 
Y (Ofgem 2009a, 
2009b) 
11 Remove rules that 
correct differences 
in prices on basis of 
geographical 
location 
Energy firm 
behaviour 
Consumer as 
purchaser 
RR (Ofgem 2010c) 
12 Ensure domestic 
consumer is not 
vulnerable before 
disconnection of 
energy supply 
Energy firm 
behaviour 
Vulnerable 
Consumer I & 
II 
Y (Ofgem 2008a, 
2009h, 2010e) 
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 Continuation of Table 7.2 
 Regulatory Policy Problem Concept Rules* Reference 
13 Cap PPM prices Energy firm 
behaviour 
PPM 
Consumer 
Y (Competition and 
Markets Authority 
2016e) 
14 Cap PPM installation 
charges 
Energy firm 
behaviour 
PPM 
Consumer 
Y (Ofgem 2016f) 
15 Limit number of 
tariffs available to 
consumers 
Consumer 
inactivity 
Consumer as 
purchaser 
Y (Ofgem 2013k) 
16 Remove rules to 
limit number of 
tariffs available to 
consumers 
Consumer 
inactivity 
Consumer as 
purchaser 
RR (Competition and 
Markets Authority 
2015a, 2016b) 
17 Specify timing and 
content of 
information shared 
by energy supply 
firms with 
consumers 
Consumer 
inactivity 
Consumer as 
purchaser 
Y (Competition and 
Markets Authority 
2016b, 2016b, 
2016d, 2016f; 
Ofgem 2003a, 
2009f, 2011g, 
2012e, 2012i, 
2012o, 2013h, 
2013j) 
 
*Rules – where enforceable rules that changed energy market regulation introduced as a result of this regulatory 
output – Yes (Y), No (N) or was a rule removed (RR) 
 
The first problem represented in regulatory outputs between 2000 and 2016 was the 
knowledge of staff in regulators. This problem is in regulatory outputs from the full 
period analysed and is implicit in the solution presented in multiple regulatory 
policies: increasing the data available to and expertise of staff who develop 
regulatory policies (Ofgem 2003c, 2005a, 2008d, 2011h). A lack of data is explained 
to be problematic where staff at the regulator sought to evaluate energy firm 
activities and their outcomes (1 and 2 in Table 7.2). The solution to this problem 
was more extensive use of the regulators’ information gathering and publication 
powers (Ofgem 2000b, 2004b, 2005c, 2009i, 2012n, 2013c; Ofgem and energywatch 
2003). While this did not result in new rules in the energy market per se, it aimed 
to ensure that the regulator could enforce existing rules. For example, Ofgem 
explained in 2010: 
“We work with suppliers to find out what they are doing that has resulted in these 
trends, to help identify good practice and identify areas for improvement. We also 
use this data to ensure that suppliers comply with our rules, to challenge poor 
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performance, and to inform policy. We will take enforcement action if necessary, 
as described in our Enforcement Guidelines.” 
(Ofgem 2010g, p. 7)  
 
Following the Competition and Markets Authority investigation, the monitoring and 
publication conducted by Ofgem was extended to consider not only energy supplier 
activities but also their outcomes. Further, publication was to extend to include the 
distribution costs in the energy market.  
“We recommend to Ofgem that it publishes annually a state of the market report 
which would provide analysis regarding issues such as the evolution of energy 
prices and bills over time; the profitability of key players in the markets; the 
social costs of policies and distributional impacts arising from them; and the 
impact of initiatives relating to decarbonisation and security of supply. We are also 
recommending the creation of a team within Ofgem to take this work forward.” 
(Competition and Markets Authority 2016b, p. 76) 
This resulted in the creation of the new “Office for the Chief Economist” 
department to deliver the economic analysis of the energy market in line with the 
CMA’s recommendation to ensure that the impact of regulation on the energy 
market were fully understood by staff within the regulator (Competition and 
Markets Authority 2016b). 
In 2012, the problem of regulatory staff’s lack of knowledge is described in a very 
different way to a lack of data (line 3 in Table 7.2). Instead, Ofgem referred to a 
lack of expertise regarding the lived experiences of energy vulnerability (Ofgem 
2012h): 
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“We propose to establish a Consumer Vulnerability Network to develop our 
connection with grassroots organisations that work with consumers in vulnerable 
positions. The network will assist us in developing future policy in this area and in 
understanding more fully the issues that face consumers when interacting with the 
energy market.” 
(Ofgem 2012h, p. 5) 
The solution proposed for this problem was to set up a network of charitable 
organisations that could share insights regarding the impact of energy regulation. 
Whether this network would have impacted regulatory outputs and changed the 
knowledge regulatory staff is not known, as the proposed network was not created.  
The second representation problem in regulatory outputs between 2000 and 2016 is 
the behaviour of decision-makers in energy supply firms (4 to 12 in Table 7.2). 
References to attempts to steer the behaviour of decision-makers in energy supply 
firms dominate the regulatory outputs. This aligns with concerns from the public 
and their elected representatives regarding energy supply firms (Becker et al. 2019; 
Demski et al. 2017; House of Commons Select Committee on Energy and Climate 
Change 2013). However, regulatory outputs that focus on the problem 
representation of decision makers in energy supply firms, do not universally result 
in new regulatory rules, i.e. supply licence conditions. Instead, as described in 
Chapter 4, the regulator did the following: it published principles that it 
encouraged energy suppliers to adopt in decision-making in the Energy Supply 
Market Probe (Ofgem 2009f); it endorsed voluntary codes (Ofgem 2003c, 2015f; 
Ofgem and Energywatch 2003); it encouraged firms to consider energy vulnerability 
as dynamic in their interactions with customers (Ofgem 2013c); and finally, in 2016, 
it argued for a style of regulation that set out principles instead of rules (Ofgem 
2016j). As illustrated in Table 7.2 (line 4 – 7), this included 4 of the 11 of the 
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regulatory policies that adopted the problem representation in terms of the 
behaviour of decision makers in energy firms. 
There were, however, five regulatory outputs that did introduce enforceable rules 
as a solution to the problem of decision makers in energy supply firms. First, the 
Energy Supply Market Probe introduced new rules to stop energy supply firms 
charging higher prices to consumers who lived in geographical areas that had been 
the location of their ex monopoly (line 10 in Table 7.2). However, as described in 
Chapter 4, this rule was removed (line 11 in Table 7.2) following evidence that this 
led to decision- makers in energy supply firms charging higher prices to consumers 
outside of their ex monopoly area, rather than lowering the prices for those in their 
ex monopoly area (Hviid and Price 2012; Ofgem 2010c).  
There is also an example where a regulatory decision not to introduce a rule was 
later overturned (lines 8 and 9 in Table 7.2). This was the introduction of principles 
for the behaviour of energy supply firms, which were introduced into the supply 
licence by the Retail Market Review in 2011 (Ofgem 2013g).  
Finally, the regulator acted to introduce a rule that energy supply firms should not 
disconnect the home of a consumer without confirming the circumstances of those 
living in the property (Ofgem 2010c). This rule incorporated the problem 
representation of the decision makers within the energy supply firms by proposing a 
solution to the problem of disconnection from energy supply of vulnerable 
consumers (Ofgem 2008a). However, details of what steps should be taken to 
confirm the circumstances of people living in a property were not specified in this 
rule; they were instead described by a voluntary code endorsed by Ofgem (Energy 
UK 2016; Ofgem 2008a). 
Two regulatory policies clearly did result in new rules on the basis of the problem 
represented as the behaviour of decision makers in energy supply firm: the removal 
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of price regulations to introduce full market competition (Ofgem 2001b) and rules 
to protect PPM consumers (Competition and Markets Authority 2016e; Ofgem 
2016f). As described in Chapter 4, a theoretical assumption of the introduction of 
competitive markets was that consumers switching energy suppliers would lead to 
incentives for firms to behave well (line 12 in Table 7.2). Without that pressure, 
energy supply firms would abuse their market power. Ofgem explained: 
“The abuse of market power may be one of the factors that stops effective 
competition developing. Hence it is important that any such abuse is prevented. If 
there is effective competition, over time, competition can be expected to lead to 
innovation, since successful innovation will be properly rewarded, and improved 
economic efficiency.”  
(Ofgem 2001b, p. 12) 
This problem representation that sees competition as central to controlling the 
behaviour of decision- makers in energy supply firms, is also highly visible in the 
second area where rules were introduced: the treatment of PPM consumers (line 13 
and 14 in Table 7.2). In 2016, Ofgem and the CMA independently reviewed aspects 
of the energy market for PPM consumers. The CMA argued that: 
 “Our view is that a combination of features concerning energy supply specifically 
to the prepayment segments gives rise to an AEC [Adverse Effect on Competition] 
through reducing suppliers’ ability and/or incentives to compete to acquire 
prepayment meter customers and to innovate by offering tariff structures that 
meet customers’ demand (the Prepayment AEC). These features are certain 
technical constraints limiting the number of tariffs that suppliers can offer to 
customers on dumb prepayment meters and softened incentives for all suppliers, 
and in particular new entrants, to compete to acquire all prepayment customers, 
whether on smart or dumb prepayment meters arising from actual and perceived 
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higher costs to engage with, and acquire, such customers and a lower prospect of 
successfully completing the switch of indebted customers.” 
(Competition and Markets Authority 2016b, p. 40) 
The problem was predominantly represented by the CMA as energy supply firm 
decision-makers failing to compete to attract PPM consumers due to PPM 
infrastructure, resulting in PPM consumers not benefitting from competition. A 
temporary price cap was therefore introduced while the infrastructure was 
replaced (Competition and Markets Authority 2016e). Implicit to this argument was 
that when the infrastructure allowed competition, the price cap would not be 
needed, as the behaviour of decision-makers in energy supply firms would be 
constrained in the same way as the rest of the energy market – by consumers 
engaging in the market (Competition and Markets Authority 2016b). Ofgem’s 
regulatory review of the PPM market noted the CMA’s ongoing investigation and 
focused on the charges associated with the installation of a PPM. They concluded 
that the behaviour of decision-makers in energy supply firms was harmful in that 
they charged unjustifiable fees to install a PPM, using a warrant. Ofgem explained 
the finding that: 
“The overwhelming majority [of energy suppliers] (16 out of 18) charge for 
warrant-related costs such as court costs, warrant application cost, dog handlers, 
and locksmiths. These costs range from £75.00-£566.00, which can be considerably 
more than the original debt owed by the customer.” 
(Ofgem 2016f, p. 33) 
Ofgem therefore concluded that the solution to this problem was a new rule that 
capped fees for the forced installation of a PPM at £150. By the end of the period 
analysed in my thesis, this new rule meant that of 17 regulatory policies only 3 
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resulted in rules that changed energy market regulation, where the problem was 
represented to be the behaviour of decision-makers in energy supply firms.  
The 11 regulatory policies (4 to 13 in Table 7.2) that were based on a problem 
representation related to decision-makers in energy supply firms, saw a mix of 
responses from Ofgem between 2000 and 2016. Solutions to the problem of 
incentives for good behaviour included some rules but a range of reporting and 
voluntary codes of conduct. Notably, by 2016 only three of the rules introduced by 
the regulator based on this problem representation, still impacted energy firms; 
moreover, the regulator had begun the procedure of moving to a system of 
regulation that actively avoided setting rules that firms had to keep (Ofgem 2016j).   
This contrasts with regulatory policies based on a problem representation of 
consumer inactivity (12 to 16 in Table 7.2), all 4 of which resulted in changes to the 
rules that governed the energy supply market. Indeed, the majority of regulatory 
outputs between 2000 and 2016 were dominated by the introduction of rules that 
stipulated  the information that had to be provided to consumers when entering a 
contract (Ofgem 2003b, 2009f, 2011g), the information that had to be provided 
regarding energy usage over time (Ofgem 2009f, 2013k) and communications that 
encouraged energy consumers to switch supplier (Competition and Markets 
Authority 2016b, 2016f, 2016d; Ofgem 2009f, 2011a, 2013j).  
This problem representation sees the concept of the consumer who needs accurate 
and timely information, taking a central role in the types of solutions considered by 
Ofgem. For example, in the Energy Supply Market Probe, Ofgem states the 
following:  
“Consumers should be able to compare products easily;  
 
• consumers should be confident that when dealing with suppliers, they will be 
treated fairly and provided with full, clear and accurate information at all 
stages in the supplier-consumer relationship (before, during and after sales);  
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• consumers should be confident that suppliers will take their circumstances into 
account and provide information on the most appropriate products for them; 
and 
 
 
• consumers should not face unreasonable barriers to switching between products 
or suppliers.” 
(Ofgem 2009f, p. 10) 
A significant policy relating to consumer behaviour was the focus of the Retail 
Markets Reforms, described in Chapter 4, regarding limiting the number of energy 
tariffs available to consumers. Arguing that the energy market was perceived as too 
complicated, Ofgem stated that: 
“A large number of tariffs, many of which have complex structures and discount 
arrangements, makes the prospect of engaging in the market unattractive for many 
consumers, and means it is often difficult for consumers who do engage to choose 
the best deal for their circumstances…. this limit the ability of consumers to find a 
good deal and in turn limit the competitive pressure on energy suppliers to offer 
good customer service at efficient cost and to innovate and improve over time.” 
(Ofgem 2012i, p. 15) 
This resulted in Ofgem introducing a solution in the form of rules that restricted the 
number of tariffs available to consumers (Ofgem 2013k).  
Interviewees explained that providing information to foster engagement with the 
market was the predominant focus of the regulator, with one noting: 
“So if you look at sort Ofgem’s main communications on retail markets, through all 
the ups and downs, and to the current day it is always ‘You can be an energy 
shopper’.”  
Ad3 (in line with Reg1, DG2, DG3, Rep1, Rep2, Rep4, Rep5, Ad4, Ad5, Ad6, Ad7, Ad8, Ma4, 
Ma5) 
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Interviewees acknowledged the focus on the style, content and timing of 
information regarding the energy market in regulatory outputs. In line with staff 
from energy regulators and individuals who had worked at Ofgem in previous roles, 
one interviewee stated:  
“I’m an economist, my team is made up of policy experts and economists and we 
do whether we like it or not we do tend to think of things in a very rationalistic 
way. So, [when] we think about a problem, you know, we think about solutions 
from a very informational deficit model approach.” 
RG3 (In line with RG4, RG5, RG7, Ad7, Ad8) 
The problem representation that places information-needing purchasers is central 
to the majority of the regulatory policies on Table 7.2. Of these 17, only 9 resulted 
in regulatory changes that would be guaranteed by enforceable rules. Crucially, the 
majority of these regulatory policy outputs were based on a problem representation 
of consumer inactivity in the energy market, even though the majority of problem 
representations (4 to 14 in Table 7.2) related to energy supplier behaviour rather 
than consumer inactivity. Throughout the period, Ofgem maintained its view 
articulated in 2009 that: 
“We remain convinced that consumers benefit most from a vibrant, competitive 
market: markets work best when consumers make active choices based on good 
quality information”. 
(Ofgem 2009a, p. 4) 
Unpacking the implicit problem representations, including the underlying concepts, 
using the WPR framework reveals the regulator’s assumption that energy supplier 
behaviour should be controlled by active consumers who choose to purchase energy 
from energy supply firms who behave well.   
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While all three problem representations – consumer inactivity, energy firm 
behaviour and regulatory knowledge - are discussed by regulators, the problem 
representation in policies that resulted in enforceable rules involves blaming 
consumer behaviour. The role of the regulator is acknowledged and discussed but 
ultimately only poses a policy problem because of the behaviour of energy 
consumers. The role of energy suppliers is discussed as challenging but ultimately 
viewed as an outcome of the behaviour of consumers. Specifically, the behaviour of 
consumers failed to meet the expectations of the theoretical proposals of a 
competitive marketplace. Consumers also failed to punish firms who behaved poorly 
against published indicators of performance by leaving their energy supplier. This 
means that firms who provided a poor service or failed to comply with regulations 
were not sufficiently motivated to change. As a result, people could be exploited by 
suppliers, forcing the intervention of the regulator. In other words, GB consumers 
failed to play their assigned role, that of engaging with the competitive market to 
secure their own positive outcomes and drive positive behaviours in the energy 
firms.  
This aligns with findings from GB energy system research, beyond market 
regulation, that people who use energy in their homes are categorised as consumers 
and characterised by deficits (Devine-Wright 2012; Lennon et al. 2019; Shove and 
Walker 2014). In this study, regulatory policy formulation appears to have adopted 
the characterisation of consumers identified by Devine-Wright as “lacking interest, 
care, action, time, knowledge or understanding” (Devine-Wright 2005a, p.21). In 
my analysis, the deficits that characterised the majority of people were with regard 
to a deficit of interest, care, action, time knowledge or understanding to engage in 
the energy market. 
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7.2.3 Silences of energy market regulation in GB 2000 - 2016 
 
The problem representation that focuses on the inactivity of consumers failing to 
engage in the energy market excludes acknowledgement of, or engagement with, 
topics related to affordable energy that were the focus of public debate over the 
same period. Interviewees in this study described three areas as outside of the 
scope of regulatory policy outputs, despite being central to concerns regarding 
affordable energy: structural inequality in society; the role of fear in considering 
engaging with energy suppliers; and death as a consequence of a cold home.  
The first issue on which regulatory outputs are largely silent is the structural 
inequality in society which results in different ability to purchase energy. Low 
income consumers are particularly identified in concerns regarding vulnerable 
consumers (Ofgem 2000b, 2005e, 2013c, 2015e). There is a limited 
acknowledgement of the role of financial exclusion (Ofgem and Energywatch 2003) 
and digital exclusion (Ofgem 2009i) and their probable impact on vulnerable 
consumers (Ofgem 2012h, 2013c).   
Interviewees from the regulator, third sector and energy supply firms, agreed with 
the characterisation of economic regulation in the energy market as distinct from 
concerns regarding inequality in society. Inequality was framed as a problem too 
large and complex for a regulator to consider, even where affordability challenges 
were relevant. As one interviewee explained, the focus of economic regulation was 
on purchasing consumers independent from concerns about the financial context of 
the decisions of that consumer: 
“That actually automatically defines the consuming activity is something rather 
different from the activity of being a citizen. And I think it is a very useful 
distinction to make because there are plenty of circumstances where there are 
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citizen issues which are not directly part of the consumer perspective – like wider 
issues of social justice and inequality”.  
Ad8 (in line with RG1, RG2, RG3, RG4, RG5, RG6, RG8, Re4, Re5, Re7, Ad4, Ma1, Ma2, Ma5) 
The factors that might contribute to the lack of income available to people to meet 
their needs for energy services are excluded from consideration. The role of energy 
regulatory policy in engaging with this broader context of inequality is simply stated 
as an issue that should not impact the decisions of economic regulation – only 
Government policy. For example, in their Social Action strategy of 2005, Ofgem 
state: 
“The broader issues of poverty and social exclusion are essentially for Government. 
Ofgem’s central role, to protect consumers by promoting competitive energy 
markets, remains key in helping in helping to keep energy prices as low as 
possible”.  
(Ofgem 2005a, p. 1)  
The second issue, which is a silence in the formulation of regulatory policy, is the 
influence of fear. It is a particularly surprising gap, considering the extensive 
consideration of Ofgem of the variety of reasons that individuals do not purchase 
the lowest price product available. Consumers are described in some cases as 
‘uncertain’ or ‘concerned’ (Ofgem 2005a, 2009f, 2012i).  However, the 
characterization of people as fearful does not enter the discourse. The role of fear 
in decisions about energy is described within discussions of the lived experience of 
people who use energy in their home, described in evidence submitted to the 
regulator in policy formulation procedures. This includes fear of landlords regarding 
making changes to suppliers at a rented property, fear of a period without an 
energy supply, fear of debt or fear of a lack of budgetary control, shape the 
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experience and decisions related to energy (Ofgem 2005f, 2009d, 2009i, 2013d, 
2016g, 2016i). One interviewee from a third sector organisation explained:  
“You can’t just bounce [someone] onto a direct debit when you know the idea of 
the someone just taking money out of your bank account without you explicitly 
granting [permission] is absolutely terrifying to you”. 
Ad9 (In line with Ad3, Ad6) 
The third and final silence in regulatory outputs explained by interviewees is any 
discussion of death. While there was a growing engagement from 2009 with the 
narrative of energy as an essential service (Ofgem 2009h), the death of those 
without affordable energy was not part of regulatory policy output between 2000 
and 2016. According to interviewees, there were two points at which the death of 
those unable to afford to heat and light their homes could have been considered.  
The first possible point at which engagement from the regulator could have 
acknowledged death as a consequence of a lack of energy in the home, was in 
response to the Office of National Statistics publication of Cold Weather Deaths 
statistics. Coverage from the press and reports from third sector organisations do 
link energy prices and the behaviour of energy supply firms to Cold Weather Deaths 
statistics (Akbar 2003; Independent 2015; National Energy Action 2019; National 
Energy Action and E3G 2018). Regulatory outputs between 2000 and 2016, however, 
did not.  
The second was in response to the “Bates case” where an elderly couple died in a 
home that had been disconnected due to an energy debt. The result of the case was 
a significant reduction in the numbers of homes disconnected from their gas supply 
and a voluntary code of conduct administered by the industry trade body (Energy 
UK 2016; House of Commons Select Committee on Trade and Industry 2005; Ofgem 
2005e). While the public response was significant, the regulator did not conclude 
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that any new regulation of energy suppliers was required (Ofgem 2005e) . Further, 
no compliance case was brought against the supplier, who successfully argued that 
the problem lay with the provisions from social services rather than their 
procedures (House of Commons Select Committee on Trade and Industry 2005). One 
interviewee explained that, 
“Well, after the Bates family were found frozen to death in their lounge after 
they’d been disconnected by British Gas there was a short sharp Parliamentary 
enquiry where they [British Gas], in a most unconcerned way, just explained that 
they were just doing their job”. 
Re1 (In line with Ma3, Ad3)  
The role of an economic regulator as set out in statute focuses on the regulation of 
the energy market. It was argued by both interviewees and articulated in regulatory 
outputs, that market interactions must be the focus of energy regulation. It might 
therefore be viewed as unsurprising that inequality, fear and death are topics on 
which the regulator was largely silent between 2000 and 2016. However, the final 
example of the Bates case being examined in Parliament explains an alternative 
place where these issues were discussed with staff from the regulator. In 
considering “What is the Problem Represented to Be”, I will now move to examine 
where problem representations were challenged, defended and disseminated. As 
described in Chapter 2, parliaments and Government departments play an 
important role in the governance structures of accountable, legitimate regulatory 
agencies. These structures rely on two sources of challenge to the regulator if 
elected officials are concerned about the actions of the independent regulatory: 
accountability to parliament via select committee hearings and legal statutes as 
defined by Government (Baldwin et al. 2012; Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004; Levi-Faur 
2011). However, my findings imply that the operation of this accountability 
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mechanism may be more complex than the theoretical account, as described in the 
section below. 
7.3 Opportunities for defence or challenge of problem 
representations 
 
Throughout the period between 2000 and 2016, elected representatives had the 
ability to hold Ofgem to account through scrutiny at committee enquiry hearings in 
multiple locations. This included hearings in the devolved nations in enquiries 
related to fuel poverty (Scottish Fuel Poverty Strategic Working Group 2016; Welsh 
Environment and Sustainability Committee 2015). However, the energy policy and 
regulation remained a predominantly reserved power for the UK Government (Mould 
and Baker 2017; Muinzer 2016). This meant that Select Committees in the Houses of 
Parliament provided an important venue for regulatory scrutiny and therefore the 
opportunity to challenge Ofgem’s problem representations.  In Chapter 4, I 
identified 11 Select Committees in the UK Parliament that discussed affordability of 
energy. Five Select Committees specifically investigated elements of the retail 
energy markets regarding pricing and regulation (House of Commons Select 
Committee on  Business and Enterprise 2008; House of Commons Select Committee 
on Energy and Climate Change 2011, 2012, 2013; House of Lords Select Committee 
on Regulators 2007). However, I found no evidence of any Select Committee 
investigation succeeding in influencing regulatory policy outputs. This might have 
reflected the formal role of Select Committees in holding regulators to account 
(Baldwin et al. 2012) and providing an opportunity to challenge the problem 
representation (Thompson 2016). However, I found no evidence that Select 
Committees provided a challenge to the problem representation that blamed 
consumer inactivity for market outcomes. The majority of interviewees articulated 
doubt that Select Committees had an impact on regulatory policy – the only 
exceptions being those elected representatives from committees. Indeed, the 
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theoretical proposal that accountability of Ofgem could be supported or deliverable 
via scrutiny by Select Committee was seen as highly unlikely by interviewees in this 
study, with several interviewees actually laughing at the thought that this could be 
the case. Instead, my interviewees described three features of Select Committees 
that scrutinised energy market regulation in this period: the orchestrated nature of 
hearings; that Select Committees provided an opportunity to reiterate the 
importance of competitive energy markets; and that Committees did not have an 
impact on regulatory policy formulation. 
The first feature of Select Committee hearings was that, according to interviewees, 
they were highly orchestrated confrontations. Three interviewees described the 
orchestrated nature of Select Committees in terms of being invited to submit 
evidence and provide oral evidence. One interviewee described their close working 
relationship with the House of Commons staff who coordinate appearances – the 
Committee clerks. One interviewee described invitations to appear as a positive 
opportunity related to an ongoing relationship: 
“So, we have ongoing relationships with clerks of committees. We will probably be 
in almost weekly contact that committee [through an enquiry], feeding 
information, and advice. And meetings outside of the committee itself about the 
agenda. So is it quite a natural procedures I think, in in terms of being invited to 
give evidence. And as, an organisation, we would expect to [be invited]”. 
Ad2 
However, two interviewees from two separate energy supply firms did not see 
invitations from the clerks as positive. One described an occasion on which their 
firms did not want to appear but were threatened with negative publicity if they 
did not do so:   
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“The clerks rang me about the Wednesday before the following Tuesday and said 
can [CEO] give evidence so we said no, they’re busy. And they said well that’s not 
good enough reason that they’re busy. And then he rang me back at seven that 
Friday evening and it was the clerk saying he’s spoken to [the Committee chair] 
and he wants you to give evidence and if you don’t he’s going to make it public. 
When I asked why us, he said because you were working with the regulator on this – 
but all of us [Big 6 energy suppliers] were!” 
Ma2 
Another interviewee expressed their view that Select Committee evidence sessions 
were orchestrated by clerks and set up as a confrontation between those giving 
evidence: 
“We were asked to go, we chose not to. There is a little bit of a feeling that if you 
go, your role, your kind of expected role is to give a counterargument i.e. the big 
companies and small companies can never agree. And I don’t think that’s 
necessarily always true but it does put you in a difficult position. There’s just the 
sort of wariness you can end up getting into a slagging match”. 
Ma6 
The second feature of Select committees identified in my analysis is the lack of 
impact of Select Committee report recommendations on regulatory policy outputs. 
Despite interviewing individuals from organisations and institutions who were 
regularly engaging with Select Committees on the topic of energy markets and 
affordability, I did not identify a single Select Committee that impacted a 
regulatory output. Instead, Select Committee committees supported the regulatory 
outputs of Ofgem. For example, in 2012, the Energy and Climate Committee 
included in one report the comment that: 
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“The snail-like pace of Ofgem’s progress on RMR may have been frustrating, but at 
least its updated proposals are evidence-based. These issues are far too complex 
for off-the-cuff policy-making”. 
(House of Commons Select Committee on Energy and Climate Change 2012, p. 20) 
 One interviewee explained that they did not expect a Select Committee to impact 
regulatory outputs or the actions of the regulator in energy markets: 
“If you look back over the years, what kind of scrutiny did the committee really 
provide? Very little I would suggest. I wouldn’t say they have made much of a 
difference. I think MPs on that committee have struggled to understand where 
they can put specific pressure, particularly on the regulator [Ofgem] but also on 
the government around holding them to account for specific actions in a way that 
you see with the Treasury’s Select Committee. The Treasury Select Committee is 
very, very effective in holding the FCA [Financial Conduct Authority] to account. 
And indeed government ministers to account”. 
Ad2 (In line with Re1, Re3, Re4, Re8, Ad3, Ad4, Ad6, Ad7, Ma2, Ma3, Ma5, Ma6) 
A third feature of these committees between 2000 and 2016, as described by some 
interviewees, was that instead of changing or challenging regulatory outputs, they 
reiterated rather than challenged the commitment to competitive energy markets. 
The Select Committee system was seen as an opportunity for the regulator to 
defend its approach and its model of competitive markets with each appearance 
before MPs, described by one interviewee as: 
“…very much around promotion of competition” 
Ad3 (In line with Re1, Re2, Re3, Re4, Re8, Ad5, Ad6, Ad7, Ma2, Ma5, Ma6) 
The notion of the consumer engaging in the energy market as the focus of policy 
formulation was rarely challenged in committees between 2000 and 2016. Instead, 
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scrutiny of the regulator remained focused on its role as an agency to deliver 
competition. 
The focus on regulatory burdens on firms occurred in committees and was 
reinforced between 2010 and 2016, with a broad focus on all regulators seeking to 
remove regulation wherever possible. This included rules that the introduction of a 
new regulation should be accompanied with the removal of another, and that firms 
should not face unnecessary burdens. As one interviewee explained: 
“They [Ofgem and Government] just started from a default ideological default 
position that they should not interfere in the market”. 
Ad8 (in line with Re1, Re2, Re4, Re5, Re7, Ad3, Ad4, Ad5, Ad7, Ma3, Ma6) 
The source of the concern regarding the ‘burden’ of regulation was not specifically 
related to the sectoral focus of energy regulation. This was reiterated by the Select 
Committee on UK Regulators who stated that: 
“We recommend that, as legislative opportunities arise, economic regulators be 
statutorily required to facilitate the competitiveness of UK firms by: i) promoting 
competition; and ii) removing regulatory burdens from firms wherever possible”. 
(House of Lords Select Committee on Regulators 2007, p. 89)  
 
The overarching narrative that economic growth was driven by privately owned 
businesses who should be enabled rather than restrained, played a role in 
consideration of regulation in all sectors. The Government maintained: 
 
“…the Government’s commitment to, stable and predictable regulatory 
frameworks to facilitate efficient investment and sustainable growth; Independent 
regulation has been a vital part of the UK’s framework for economic regulation 
since the 1980s and remains central to the Governments approach.” 
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(Department of Business, Innovation and Skills 2011, p. 3) 
The need to maintain consistency with the overarching framework of regulation in 
the UK was noted by the majority of interviewees from the regulator, spontaneously 
explained as part of the description of the scope of Ofgem as an economic 
regulator. 
“So, we follow the better regulation principles in terms of, well in terms of how 
we go about everything that we do”. 
Re3 (In line with Re4, Re5, Re6, Ma1, Ma2, Ma3, Ma5, Ma6) 
Better Regulation is an agenda characterised by the restriction and removal of rules 
that limit the decision making of firms (Hong and You 2018; Levi-Faur 2011; 
Weatherill 2007). It is cited by Ofgem in terms of the remedies proposed by the 
Energy Supply Market Probe. In 2005, the CEO of Ofgem described his intention for 
Better Regulation as: 
“In 2005, when Parliament first required us to have regard to the principles of best 
regulatory practice, I spoke about what better regulation means at Ofgem. I had 
two key messages: that better regulation is synonymous with competition, self-
regulation and the consumer interest: and that at heart it is about mindset not 
systems. I wanted Ofgem to be an organisation that truly embraced the better 
regulation agenda, not one that saw it merely as a piece of bureaucracy to be 
tolerated. The Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 places a further 
duty on us in respect of our regulatory functions. This duty requires us to keep 
those functions under review and to secure that when we exercise those functions 
we do not impose or maintain burdens which we consider unnecessary.” 
(Ofgem 2012g, p. 3) 
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Select Committees between 2000 and 2016, then, not only provided an opportunity 
for the regulator to defend energy market structures but reinforced this argument 
by linking energy regulation to a narrative in which regulators were encouraged to 
do as little as possible to burden firms with rules (Department of Business, 
Innovation and Skills 2011; Weatherill 2007).  
This analysis therefore identifies that far from challenging the regulator to consider 
the topics it views as irrelevant to economic regulation and irrelevant – inequality, 
fear and death - the role of Select Committees in energy market regulation 
between 2000 and 2016 was to reinforce the view of economic regulation focused 
on enabling efficient markets. Further, Select Committees reiterated the 
importance of a low regulatory burden for firms. This is in line with Ofgem’s 
regulatory rulemaking between 2000 and 2016 described in Table 7.2, during which 
it rarely introduced rules on the basis of a problem representation regarding the 
behaviour of firm, instead focusing the majority of regulatory rules on providing 
information to consumers. This reveals that Select Committees were a forum in 
which the problem representation that blames consumers was disseminated and 
defended rather than challenged. Further, interviewees reported that Select 
Committees between 2000 and 2016 did not impact energy market regulation in 
that period. 
7.4 Chapter Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have explained my findings from applying the “What is the 
Problem Represented to Be?” framework to energy market regulation between 2000 
and 2016. I identified that people who use energy in their homes were visible in 
regulatory outputs with reference to 5 concepts, but that the concept 
overwhelmingly present in this period was that of the purchasing consumer. This is 
unsurprising given the context of research, namely, the UK energy system and the 
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role of domestic householders as purchasers and the findings of previous research 
(Devine-Wright 2012; Scrase and Ockwell 2009; Shove and Walker 2014). What is 
revealed for the first time by this thesis is the extent to which regulatory output 
that resulted in the rules that changed the operation of the energy market, 
responded to the characterisation of consumers – how the consumers are known – 
while failing to respond to issues that adopted an alternative problem 
representation. Using the WPR approach to trace the solutions provided to respond 
to problems, I have shown that there are few examples where regulatory outputs 
introduced new rules based on the behaviour of energy supply firms being an 
implicit or explicit problem. Instead, the majority of changes in energy market 
regulation between 2000 and 2016 were in response to the problem of consumers 
failing to engage in the market and switch supplier. The problem representation of 
inactive consumers within the procedures of energy market regulation results in 
silences – issues that are rarely considered and when present, firmly rejected as 
irrelevant. These include the impact of inequality in society on the ability to 
purchase energy and fear and death as a consequence of a lack of energy services in 
the home. The inclusion of these silences within the WPR framework provides a 
central insight into the gap between public expectations and regulatory policy- 
making described in Chapter 1. Much of the narrative of concern articulated in the 
press at the time (Independent 2015; National Energy Action 2019; National Energy 
Action and E3G 2018) related to the affordability of energy, to inequality and death 
as a consequence of a lack of energy services in the home. Yet as my findings show, 
these were not accepted as relevant in regulatory policy formulation between 2000 
and 2016. 
Although the majority of changes to energy market regulation between 2000 and 
2016 was based on a problem representation of consumer inactivity, this 
representation was challenged on two occasions within the regulator: first, in the 
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Retail Market Review (Ofgem 2010f, 2013j) and then in the Vulnerability Strategy 
(Ofgem 2012h, 2013c). Each of these occasions saw the introduction of a new 
concept of people who use energy in their homes and called for a significant and 
enduring change to the operation of the energy market. However, neither 
successfully challenged the problem representation of consumer inactivity being 
due to lack of information.  
In Chapter 2, I explained that regulators were theoretically accountable to 
parliament. It might, therefore, have been expected that parliamentarians would 
have challenged the silences at Ofgem regarding harm related to unaffordable 
energy and would have held Ofgem accountable for restricting the majority of new 
rules to ones that were based on blaming consumers for the failures of the energy 
market. However, evidence provided by my analysis of problem representation 
provides a more complex scenario, one where committees provided an opportunity 
for the reinforcement of the problem representations within economic regulation. 
The findings of ‘What is the Problem Represented to Be’ proposes that a 
straightforward account of accountability of regulators to select committees may 
be over simplistic.  
The result of this problem representation being predominantly adopted between 
2000 and 2016 and being defended and disseminated across multiple institutions 
and organisations, is based on concepts of consumers that are technocratic and 
economic, focused on market interactions. Within this problem representation, 
consumers are expected to be active participants. Where they fail to engage in the 
manner predicted, regulatory policy focuses on changing their behaviour to match 
regulatory expectations, with only those who do behave in this manner securing 
benefits from the energy market.  
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The analysis presented in this chapter makes an important contribution to 
answering the research question: “What role did knowledges of ‘consumers’ play in 
the formulation of GB energy market regulation between 2000 and 2016?”. It shows 
that the concept of ‘consumer’ shaped regulatory outputs; in turn, its impact on 
the energy market was to limit people who use energy in their homes to that of 
purchasing consumers who were in need of information. However, the WPR 
approach alone does not explain how this problem representation played a role in 
the formulation of the energy market. Having established a clear view of the way 
consumers were known in regulatory outputs and new insight into the accountability 
mechanism of parliamentary scrutiny by Select Committees, I therefore analysed 
how the tasks that made up the procedures leading up to regulatory outputs – policy 
formulation – functioned between 2000 and 2016. This analysis is discussed in the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter 8 – Discussion  
 
8.1 Overview of Findings  
 
In this chapter, I discuss the implications of the combined insights from all of the 
analysis presented in this thesis for understanding the role that knowledges of 
“consumers” played in the formulation of GB energy market regulation between 
2000 and 2016. Firstly, Chapter 4 described the regulatory policy events and their 
context between 2000 and 2016. This provided the insight that there was a great 
deal of regulatory policy activity between 2000 and 2016, particularly from 2009. 
The time period 2009 to 2016 saw important new ways of knowing of ‘consumers’ 
visible in the policy documents considered: behavioural consumers who might be 
considered irrational (Ofgem 2012i) and a new definition of consumers in vulnerable 
circumstances (Ofgem 2013c). Further, the needs of consumers to be able to secure 
affordable energy gained prominence politically, with significant changes to the 
statutory duties of the regulator (Deller et al. 2018).  
In Chapter 5, using the Energy Justice Framework (EJF) (Jenkins et al. 2016; 
McCauley et al. 2013) my findings identified the large number of opportunities 
provided by energy regulation procedures to include diverse knowledges that could 
deliver energy justice. This included diverse groups of representatives providing 
detailed and nuanced evidence regarding the differentiated energy needs, within 
procedures that were open to all. The procedures of energy market regulation 
between 2000 and 2016 at Ofgem therefore included key features of recognition 
and procedural justice. However, the regulatory outputs rarely reflected this 
diversity of and nuanced knowledges within the regulatory procedures. Instead, the 
majority of regulatory outputs maintained a single way of knowing people who use 
energy in their homes, as energy consumers who needed information. Chapter 5 
 
 
241 
 
explained that the outcome of these regulatory policies was distributionally unjust, 
with those who had higher needs for affordable energy least likely to secure 
benefits from the market structure. Importantly, the analysis in Chapter 5 did not, 
however, reveal how or why the interacting features of distributional, procedural 
and recognition injustice occurred. What it did reveal was that different ways of 
understanding consumers were related to inequalities of outcomes. Specifically, my 
analysis identified that the lived experience of energy consumers as represented in 
policy procedures by third sector organisations, was not the same as the insights 
regarding customers that the energy firms provided.  
I therefore went on to apply two frameworks from policy studies: Tools of Policy 
Formulation (TPF) (Jordan and Turnpenny 2015) and “What is the Problem 
Represented to Be?” (WPR) (Bacchi 2009b) frameworks The findings in Chapter 6, 
generated through applying the “Tools of Policy Formulation” framework, explain 
how a technocratic, economic way of knowing maintained an influence in the 
regulatory outputs. Chapter 7 showed the benefit of a focus on policy formulation 
to investigate energy market regulation between 2000 and 2016. While considering 
procedures and policy-making in the broader sense provides insight into the input 
and output of regulatory policy making, the focus on specific formulation tasks 
undertaken at Ofgem using specific tools explains how actions taken by staff were 
repeatedly in line with the expectations of economic regulation and focused on 
market logics. Each framework from policy studies reinforced findings that resulted 
from my analysis and identified the effects of particular knowledges within policy 
procedures and in terms of regulatory outcomes, as I go on to describe below. 
Policy formulation actors at Ofgem evaluated problems and assessed options in 
terms of problems characterized by the expectations of market interactions. 
Although the tools that were used within the regulator provided a large number of 
opportunities to input into policy formulation tasks, the role different knowledges 
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played was limited. Further, tools used within regulators provided opportunities to 
extend the ways in which consumers were ‘known’ by the actors of regulatory 
policy formulation. However, not all of these tools were equally influential in terms 
of regulatory outputs. Instead, the stakeholder consultation tool brought together 
the indicators, research reports that resulted from the deliberative focus groups 
and the views of consultees to evaluate problems and assess options. The influence 
of the stakeholder consultation tool could have been a significant contributor 
towards regulatory legitimacy at Ofgem. This is because it was a procedure open to 
all and the inputs were almost universally transparent. However, according to my 
interviewees, access to stakeholder consultations were not equal across the 
different organisations. Instead, a technocratic discussion of market operations set 
a higher barrier for many participants and resulted in inequalities, perceived by 
interviewees as an inequality between energy supply firms and any other 
organisations engaging with Ofgem. Interviewees from energy supply firms broadly 
accepted this characterisation and pointed out that a further inequality existed 
between smaller energy supply firms and ex- monopoly suppliers, who were 
perceived as having engaged regularly with the regulator over a significant period 
of time. This resulted in a perception that ex-monopoly energy supply firms were 
seen as credible, reliable evidence providers, whose knowledge of energy 
consumers as purchasers of their products was seen as most influential in 
formulating regulatory policy outputs.  
The finding of Chapter 7 suggests that the provision of opportunities to engage with 
regulatory policy making was insufficient to influence the way that ‘consumers’ 
were known within Ofgem between 2000 and 2016. In Chapter 7, the “What is the 
Problem Represented to Be” (Bacchi 2009a) framework helps to explain why 
opportunities alone did not change the characterisation of consumers to a 
sufficiently significant extent to result in influencing regulatory outputs. Rather 
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than adapting or developing regulatory outputs to respond to an increasingly 
nuanced and diverse range of ways of knowing people who use energy in their 
homes, and these being made visible within regulatory policy procedures, 
consumers continued to be characterised as information-requiring purchasers. This 
finding proposes that rather than the diverse range of knowledges present in 
regulatory policy procedures playing an equal role, a single powerful technocratic, 
economic discourse based on market logics which knows consumers as information-
poor purchasers, was maintained over the period 2000 to 2016. This had influential 
effects on the characteristics of regulatory procedures and regulatory policy 
outputs.  
Reviewing all of my findings under each framework together raises two notable 
characteristics of energy market regulation between 2000 and 2016: inequality 
generated by regulatory processes that maintained a focus on retail market 
development and inequitable access to regulatory procedures that benefitted the 
access of ex-monopoly energy supply firms. I elaborate on each of these in in the 
sections below. 
8.1.1 Effects of regulatory procedures 
 
The first overarching set of findings of my thesis relate to the effects of an 
economic discourse of retail market development on the functioning of regulatory 
procedures. My findings have demonstrated that regulatory activities between 2000 
and 2016 systematically prioritised retail market development. This had two 
overarching effects on regulatory policy in energy during this period. First, policy 
formulation maintained a focus on retail market development throughout the 
period. This saw policy formulation tasks focused on the evaluation, assessment and 
design of policies focused on market operations. Second, the transparency of 
processes open to all did not result in a broadening of ways of knowing that 
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incorporated diverse perspectives. Each of these effects constrained ways of 
knowing in procedures of energy regulation.  
The first effect of regulatory procedures within the market discourse was a 
hesitancy to introduce rules that would impact the operation of the energy market. 
This was due to policy procedures that maintained a focus on market development. 
This affected the breadth of tasks of policy formulation undertaken between 2000 
and 2016. Evaluation, assessment and design occurred within the market discourse 
and failed to incorporate a nuanced understanding of differentiated energy needs. 
There were two exceptions to this pattern. The first exception was the objective 
set in the 2001 decision to implement full retail market competition in GB. Policy 
formulation at Ofgem therefore maintained its objectives as set out in 2001 that: 
“Ofgem believes that, consistent with the new principal objective under the 
Utilities Act 2000, consumers’ interests, in terms of price, quality and variety of 
service on offer, will, wherever appropriate, be most effectively protected 
through effective competition between suppliers.” 
(Ofgem 2001b p. 5) 
 
While this adopted a problem representation of energy firm behaviour and 
introduced rules that impacted the operation of the energy market, it did not 
engage with an acknowledgement of diverse energy needs associated with 
recognition justice. Instead, as outlined in Chapter 4, it focused on a market design 
whereby consumers were expected to engage in the market.  
The second exception were two regulatory outputs regarding vulnerable energy 
consumers. Aligning this with an understanding of individual tasks of policy 
formulation reveals an important characteristic of this regulatory procedure: it 
involved problem characterisation. Problem characterisation provided the 
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opportunity for actors within the regulator to open up the understanding of causes 
and impacts of the experiences related to vulnerability of consumers in the energy 
market (Ofgem 2012f, 2013c) and resulted in a novel manner of understanding 
consumers in vulnerable circumstances. However, in terms of incorporating new 
ways of knowing consumers in the regulatory output governing the energy market, 
the WPR framework illustrates the limited effect of this problem characterisation. 
Specifically, it did not result in a rule that would have affected the operation of the 
energy market.  
Even where there was an acceptance that energy supply firms needed to change 
their behaviour, there was a hesitancy to introduce rules that might impact 
competitive markets and limit innovation. Indeed, on two occasions, rules were 
removed on the basis that they had an adverse effect on competition (Ofgem 
2010c, 2016a). While options to introduce rules were regularly considered by the 
regulator, the introduction of rules to constrain the behaviour of firms rarely went 
beyond instructions to provide information. This approach is characterised by the 
following quote from Ofgem in 2009 (with similar wording regularly coming up 
throughout the corpus) that, when introducing a new rule through a supply licence 
condition: 
“We would need to be sure that such a condition is a proportionate measure and 
serves to help, rather than hinder, progress towards an effective competitive 
market.” 
(Ofgem 2009e, p. 3) 
The focus on innovation is also visible in the broader economic context during this 
period, for example, the emphasis on shareholder value maximisation. My WPR 
analysis identified that between 2000 and 2016, this included a narrative of the 
need to enable firms to make decisions and act in the way that they saw as most 
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efficient. Under the banner of “cutting red tape”, Government ministers 
encouraged regulatory institutions to remove rather than increase the “burden” of 
regulation on firms. Although the period of 2000 to 2016 saw significant individual 
Government policies calling for specific regulatory interventions in the energy 
market (Energy Act 2010, 2011, 2013), these did not result in the energy market 
being exempt from policies that sought to remove regulatory barriers from firms. 
This context makes it less surprising that Ofgem did not consistently implement 
rules. 
The consequences of this approach are visible in terms of distributive justice 
outcomes. In Chapter 5, I identified a series of opportunities for Ofgem to reform 
the market so as to secure positive outcomes for all consumers, particularly 
consumers in vulnerable circumstances. However, the nuanced understanding of 
energy needs present when assessing options within procedures, rarely translated 
into a regulatory output that had a consistent effect on the operation of the energy 
market. This is because, instead of implementing rules that might have had a 
positive distributive outcome, Ofgem maintained a focus on provision of information 
to support engagement in the market and failed to introduce regulatory policies to 
deliver distributive justice.  
The second effect of the market discourse I identified was the failure of making 
procedures that were inclusive to all and the consequences of this. The 
inclusiveness of processes did not result in a broader range of ways of knowing that 
incorporated diverse perspectives. Instead, my analysis reveals that regulated firms 
operated within the market discourse of economic regulation and therefore, their 
views were institutionally embedded in a manner that other views were not. This 
undermined procedures that had been implemented with the intention of bringing 
diverse views into decision-making processes. For example, deliberative focus group 
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reports noted challenges in engaging with members of the public with regards to 
support for vulnerable consumers, with one report stating: 
“They [focus group participants] find it difficult to get beyond the view that any 
extra costs should come from suppliers’ profits”. 
(Ofgem 2014c) p. 29 
 
This illustrates the limited ability of focus group participants to challenge the scope 
as set out by Ofgem within the focus groups by articulating the expectation that 
participants “get beyond” their opinion that support for vulnerable consumers 
should be funded by profit making firms rather than consumers.  
Participatory tools of policy formulation were incorporated as a central part of the 
procedures of regulatory activities. However, the restricted focus on retail market 
engagement meant that views that did not relate to the interaction of competing 
firms and their customers were rarely incorporated. This meant that although there 
was a range of opportunities to engage with the regulator, they were not equitably 
available to all. It was therefore unsurprising that discussions related to fair 
outcomes within procedures were systematically excluded from regulatory policy 
outputs. Opportunities to engage with regulatory procedures were, however, 
reported by interviewees to be accessible to energy supply firms. This had 
implications for the role of energy firms in regulatory policy formulation, as I go on 
to explain in the section below.  
8.1.2 Inequality of access to regulatory policy procedures 
 
Energy firms were seen by interviewees as having more resources than others 
participating in the procedures of policy formulation. For example, they had 
specific teams of regulatory specialists to engage with Ofgem. While energy firm 
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interviewees mainly described a need to prioritise the focus of the team in line with 
different regulatory policies (with one exception), third sector organisations 
described their situation as either being able to engage or not. This observation 
reported by interviewees may not be surprising. However, my findings identified 
three characteristics of regulatory policy-making procedures between 2000 and 
2016 that increased the inequitable access of energy supply firms to regulatory 
policy formulation: their market expertise, their access to an additional policy 
formulation venue and the complexity of procedure of affordable energy policy-
making.  
First, energy firms had acknowledged and valued expertise in the operation of the 
energy market and the experiences of consumers within that market. Insight from 
the energy supply firms was required by the regulator and formed the basis of the 
majority of operational considerations in the energy market between 2000 and 
2016. In Chapter 5, the interaction of inequalities and injustices for recognition in 
participatory procedures was described through the Energy Justice framework 
(Schlosberg 2009; Walker and Day 2012). These findings revealed that injustices of 
recognition and procedures resulted in inequitable respect for experts. Where 
expertise was associated with knowledge about customer activity, this placed 
respected experts largely within regulated firms. Some energy supply firms 
described this insight provision as a resource burden on their operations. However, 
my TPF analysis identified that the role of regular engagement with regards to 
insight into the market from energy supply firms, provided far more opportunities 
to them than to other organisations engaged in regulatory policy formulation. 
This respect for expertise enabled the second characteristic of regulatory policy-
making procedures that benefited energy supply firms: the informal venue of the 
industry body. Between 2000 and 2016, Ofgem concluded that their policy would be 
to support voluntary codes of conduct within the industry, rather than introduce 
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rules. As outlined in Chapter 4, this included voluntary codes regarding the high-
profile issues relating to energy supply firms, namely, doorstep selling and the 
disconnection of vulnerable consumers. These voluntary codes were drawn up by 
the trade association for energy supply firms. These voluntary codes may have had 
an impact in the way in which energy supply firms operated. However, these were 
not universally adopted by energy supply firms and therefore did not impact the 
operation of the energy market to secure benefits for all consumers. Further, it is 
notable that rules were introduced to replace voluntary codes and were highlighted 
as a concern of the CMA Energy Market Investigation (Competition and Markets 
Authority 2016b). Further, due to the fact that the development of these voluntary 
codes were conducted without the transparency of public policy-making and 
without processes open to all, it failed to meet the standards set by procedural 
justice.  
The third and final characteristic I identified as benefiting energy supply firms was 
the complexity of the interacting spaces of affordable energy policy. The focus of 
the research question posed in this thesis is the energy regulator, Ofgem. My thesis 
was scoped in this way in response to the academic research that preceded this 
literature and the statutory arrangements of GB. This is reflected in the results of 
my procedures tracing, presented in Chapter 4. However, engaging with 
interviewees – particularly those interviewees working at the detailed level of 
policy formulation – revealed a far more complex policy system.  
The narratives of my interviewees, reinforced by commentary in documents, 
describe a complex system that extended far beyond Government, Parliament and 
the energy regulator. The system as described by interviewees incorporated 
discussions related to energy prices and therefore, energy affordability, that were 
perceived to be significantly influenced by Ofgem and the way that it used its 
powers. This included the distribution of the Warm Home Discount benefits and the 
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interactions with devolved administrations described in Chapter 5 and alternative 
venues of policy formulation as described in Chapter 6. The narrative of 
interviewees when mapped in this way reveals a further barrier to engagement in 
policy procedures that relate to affordable energy: their extensive scope and range. 
Knowledge of the opportunities available and resources to participate in these 
opportunities, provided a further benefit to the comparatively well-resourced 
energy supply firms. In regulatory policy formulation, the implication for capture is 
that regulated firms had more opportunities to influence the regulator than other 
participants. 
In Figure 8.1 I mapped this set of interactions between actors and venues that 
influenced regulatory policy formulation regarding affordable energy (Miles et al. 
2014). 
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Figure 8.1 System of Affordable Energy Policy Formulation 2000 – 2016 
Published changes in the name of an organization changed between 2000 and 2016 are listed 
in Table A8. 
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The narrative of interviewees resulted in my identification of the six spaces in the 
policy system indicated by six boxes. Each of the six spaces refer to clusters of 
organisations and actors described by the interviewees as participating in topics 
associated with energy market regulation – energy markets, energy affordability 
and fuel poverty. Where a subgroup existed, it is indicated by a box with a light 
grey line. The groups that interacted are indicated by the grey lines. The thick 
black lines refer to findings from my analysis overlaid onto the system that resulted 
from descriptions given to me by the interviewees.  
In Box 1 are institutions of regulatory governance. Only the energy regulator, 
Ofgem, has specific powers regarding energy markets (Utilities Act 2000; Energy Act 
2004, 2008, 2010 and 2013). Also required, via Government guidance, was that it 
consider the impact of fuel poverty in its decisions (Ofgem 2000b, 2005e, 2013c). 
Ofgem also had sole responsibility for monitoring compliance of some social 
schemes related to fuel poverty (Ofgem 2013c, 2015e). In addition to energy 
regulation, interviewees pointed to the connection between regulatory policy and 
health concerns, housing and the environment. Further, an investigation into 
competition in the energy market by the Competition and Markets Authority 
provided opportunities for engaging in discussions regarding the costs associated 
with energy pricing. Finally, regulatory governance included the detailed industry 
codes and agreements that had decision making powers regarding the distribution 
of costs between areas of the energy system. 
Regulatory Governance was, unsurprisingly, the focus of much of the interviewees’ 
narrative about regulatory policy formulation. Less predictable was the role of 
other types of regulatory governance that were perceived by interviewees as having 
an impact on the affordability of energy. The health and housing concerns 
connected to fuel poverty resulted in interviewees from third sector organisations 
engaging with procedures regarding the provision of energy-related services by 
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healthcare professionals and via housing regulation. In addition to the narratives of 
interviewees, these regulatory spaces were also visible in documentation regarding 
affordable energy in Scottish and Welsh fuel poverty policy documents (Scottish 
Fuel Poverty Strategic Working Group 2016; Welsh Government 2015). Further, the 
technical operation of the energy system, industry codes and agreements, were 
described as playing a further role in energy affordability and energy pricing, in 
that their role involved allocating costs to different parts of the energy system. 
These procedures were described by interviewees in third sector organisations as 
particularly difficult to engage with due to the technical nature of discussions and 
the reliance on energy supply firms to provide the technical expertise to facilitate 
discussions.  
Box 2 lists the institutions of democratic governance. Elected representatives of 
parliaments scrutinise legislation via committees and debates in the UK and in 
devolved parliaments and assemblies. Democratic Governance therefore includes 
multiple parliaments and committees. This included multiple policy formulation 
procedures with related but differing priorities. As discussed in Chapter 7, 
committees might have had a role in challenging the problem representation 
embedded within Ofgem and deliver an increased focus on public concerns 
regarding affordability and fairness. However, interviewees highlighted that this did 
not occur. Within devolved administrations, regulation was not within the powers 
required to impact energy prices. Select Committees within the UK Parliament did 
include a consideration of fairness and affordability but these failed to challenge 
the problem representation within energy market regulation.  
In Box 3 are the representative groups who engaged with energy policy 
development. Each organisation within this space related their role in policy making 
as a formal position representing a particular group. For example, this included the 
consumer representative, the industry body that represented energy supply firms 
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and the UK Regulators as representatives of economic regulators in the UK. 
Interviewees referred to commercial consumer groups who provided advice or 
services on engaging in the market, charities representing particular demographic 
groups and the statutory consumer advocate as well-known representatives in 
policy making procedures in energy and beyond. Interviewees also consistently 
described the role of the industry body that represented some energy supply firms. 
Energy UK and its predecessor organisations who represented the energy supply 
firms who made up its membership. Energy UK Codes of Practice were noted by 
interviewees as the source of standards and rules on topics where the regulator, 
Ofgem, did not change the prescriptive rules in the energy supply licences (Ofgem 
2003c). As discussed in Chapter 7, this resulted in policy formulation activities 
occurring within the industry body that represented the energy supply firms. These 
organisations represented specific groups that might relate to any of the areas and 
issues identified across the policy space. Representatives were described by 
interviewees as having had a far less formal role in providing expertise to policy 
development procedures, compared to the organisations and institutions in Box 1 
and Box 2 
In Box 4 is the advisory group who provided expertise but had no formal role in 
contributing to energy policy development. They provided ad hoc input to 
procedures of energy policy formulation and included academics, consultancies and 
think tanks. Those in the advisory group can be seen engaging with policy 
formulation in documentary evidence such as consultation responses and 
parliamentary committee reports.  Interviewees noted that the perception of 
organisations associated with the advisory group varied significantly and the 
reliability and credibility of their contribution was connected to these perceptions. 
For example, my connections to the Centre for Competition Policy and UK Energy 
Research Centre were noted by the majority of interviewees, who showed 
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familiarity with the evidence provided by both research centres to debates 
regarding energy markets and energy affordability, respectively. 
In Box 5 are the monopoly providers. These organisations were associated with the 
transportation of energy around the system. Interviewees explained their role in 
regulatory policy formulation regarding affordable energy in terms of identifying 
and supporting vulnerable consumers. Transportation of gas was linked in regulatory 
policymaking to fuel poverty through? a specific scheme to extend the gas grid to 
new areas (and therefore deliver a heating fuel associated with lower prices). In 
addition, the period 2000 to 2016 has been associated with an increase in 
engagement from local district network operators (DNOs). This is due to the 
developing needs that were associated with identifying households in fuel poverty. 
Network operators had responsibilities to identify individuals with particular 
energy-related needs through the ‘Priority Service Register’ and the use of this 
data, alongside measures of low income, became the focus of development for 
further targeting. However, monopoly providers of energy transportation played no 
role in retail market regulation between 2000 and 2016. 
In Box 6 are the market participants, predominantly energy supply firms who played 
two roles in policy procedures. Interviewees from third sector organisations 
described their perception that enduring relationships and regular contact between 
ex-monopoly energy supply firms and energy policy formulators within the 
regulator, created an additional barrier for any organisation that was not a large 
energy supplier. The view was that larger energy supply firms had lower barriers to 
engaging with the regulator and, to some extent Government, a view also held by 
smaller energy supply firms. The firms were perceived by interviewees as the only 
actors sufficiently resourced to navigate the complex interactions of affordable 
energy policies.  
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Mapping the location of organisations and institutions where tools were used to 
produce regulatory policy outputs, also provided important insight into the 
different levels of influence that policy actors had. Those with influence on 
regulatory policy outputs are those who had opportunities to engage with the 
organisations in the boxes with a black dashed line in Figure 8.1. The policy actor 
using tools of policy formulation between 2000 and 2016 had an important influence 
in setting out the options to be evaluated and assessed. Revealing the more limited 
range of opportunities to impact regulatory policy outputs helps to identify policy 
actors that engaged with? the most influential tools, within the most influential 
venues.  
Venues where these tasks took place were not universally accessible to all. While 
the energy regulator and Government departments provided guidance that 
recommended transparent policy formulation procedures that were visible to all, 
this was not the case for all of the opportunities for policy formulation. In addition 
to Ofgem, these included the Department of Business, Enterprise and Industrial 
Strategy, the Competition and Markets Authority and the trade association for 
energy firms Energy UK (identified by the dark grey boxes in Figure 8.1). 
Highlighting the venues within which regulatory policy formulation was conducted 
between 2000 and 2016, sheds light on the influence of different ways of knowing 
energy consumers that impacted regulatory outputs, with the understanding that 
specific tasks occurred with the input of specific policy actors due to the use of 
tools.  
My analysis in Chapter 7 using the WPR framework, identified that not all actors and 
venues of policy formulation engaged in policy formulation on an equal basis. The 
dark grey boxes comprise institutions and organisations that had defended and 
disseminated the problem representation of consumer inactivity in a competitive 
energy market. These institutions and organisations maintained a status quo in 
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which businesses, including energy supply firms, were conceptualised as sources of 
beneficial economic growth and energy consumers were characterised as failing to 
engage in the energy market. These were the Competition and Markets Authority, 
Ofgem and the Government departments with responsibility for energy regulation 
and its associated Select Committee. If a successful reproblematisation of 
affordable energy in the home in GB were to take place, it is likely that these four 
institutions would need to adopt a different characterisation of consumers. The 
findings of this thesis suggest that even if Ofgem adopts a different problem 
representation which incorporates diverse knowledges, regulatory outcomes are 
unlikely to similarly change while the technocratic, economic discourses are 
maintained in venues that impact energy market regulation.  
This system of six types of policy formulating expertise provides a rich and nuanced 
range of perspectives that could have been drawn upon in the formulation of 
regulatory policy formulation. Each of the six spaces has been identified as 
providing its own important contribution to the context in which policy was 
formulated. The diversity of perspectives across this system provided an 
opportunity for a range of perspectives on affordable energy that could have 
supported inclusive policy formulation prioritised by energy justice scholarship and 
models of regulatory legitimacy. However, the analysis in this thesis suggests that 
the opportunities in this system did not result in inclusive regulatory policy 
formulation procedures between 2000 and 2016.  
Mapping the Regulatory Policy System in Figure 8.1 reveals how, within the 
connected policy arena of fuel poverty amelioration, an inequality in participation, 
reinforced by inequitable recognition between experts in energy policy procedures 
connected to energy market regulation extended into debates regarding policies 
regarding energy service affordability. This regulatory governance extended beyond 
the energy market into health and housing and democratic governance to devolved 
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administrations. This complex system of interacting organisations and venues was 
described by interviewees as requiring significant resources to identify 
opportunities to engage and then to do so. Further, interviewees noted that only 
ex-monopoly energy supply firms had the resources to take up such opportunities 
from across the system.  
 
8.1.3 Summary of Findings 
 
Between 2000 and 2016, ‘consumer’ knowledges played a role in energy market 
regulation predominantly when characterised as information-poor purchasers. This 
is due to a technocratic, economic discourse embedded within energy regulation 
and in procedures that were used by regulators. There were challenges made to the 
characterisation of ‘consumers’ as information-poor purchasers. These included an 
increasingly nuanced and detailed engagement with characteristics that could 
result in vulnerability and increased energy needs. There were a large number of 
opportunities to present evidence to knowledges of ‘consumers’ beyond a 
characterisation as energy purchasers. However, the technocratic, economic 
discourse maintained its influence. Instead of diverse knowledges of ‘consumers’ 
influencing regulatory policies, only the concept of ‘consumer as information-poor 
purchaser’ played a consistent role in energy market regulation between 2000 and 
2016.  
Synthesizing the findings of each chapter in this section shows in seeking to 
understand the role knowledges of consumers played in energy market regulation 
between 2000 and 2016, each analytic framework revealed important features of 
regulatory procedures. First, the EJF analysis revealed the inequitable participation 
between different organisations engaged in policy procedures and missed 
opportunities to correct distributional injustices. Second, TPF provided the insight 
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that in the operation of policy formulation, there were inequalities in respected 
expertise. Understanding the activities of energy market regulation as a series of 
policy formulation tasks undertaken by actors in venues using certain tools, 
provided insight into how inequitable policy procedures operated. These procedures 
embedded the way of knowing consumers that were present when energy markets 
were introduced in the 1980’s, despite contemporary ways of knowing people who 
use energy in their homes and new legal powers for Ofgem. Third, WPR identified 
the connection between energy market regulation and rules that predominantly 
relied on a problem representation that blamed consumers for failing to act in the 
manner expected of information-poor purchasers. Finally, the combination of the 
insights from each chapter reinforce one another in generating the two overarching 
insights: the effects of a focus on retail market development and the inequitable 
access to regulatory procedures by ex-monopoly energy supply firms.  
My findings suggest that there were three significant omissions from regulatory 
procedures that are necessary for those concerned with either energy justice or 
regulatory legitimacy. First, there was little transparency regarding the limited 
nature of the tasks being undertaken within the regulator and these rarely included 
the problem characterisation that might have incorporated broader concerns 
regarding fairness or affordability of energy. Second, there was a systematic 
rejection of the need for rules that would affect the activities of all firms, beyond 
information provision. Third, there was an inequality of respect between experts 
who were able to engage in technocratic discussions regarding market operations 
and those who were not. In the subsequent sections, I discuss the way that these 
findings contribute to the academic literature. 
8.2 Novel contribution to research 
In this section, I describe my three contributions to academic research. First, I 
describe the implications of my findings for research relating to energy justice. This 
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includes a new case study of policy development within energy institutions as well 
as a rare focus on regulatory procedures. Further, I propose an adaptation to the 
understanding of interacting forms of injustice that incorporates an understanding 
of institutional expectations with regards to expertise. Second, I explain how 
important insights into injustice can be revealed by adopting two analytic 
frameworks from policy studies (Bacchi 2009b; Jordan and Turnpenny 2015). 
Finally, I describe the implications of my findings for regulatory legitimacy in GB, 
including a proposed development of the classic understanding of regulatory 
capture and incorporating a deeper understanding of expertise into Regulatory 
Studies.  
 
8.2.1 Energy Injustice in GB energy market regulation, 2000 to 2016 
 
The empirical analysis in this thesis identified a problem representation in policy 
formulation regarding affordable energy that focuses on energy market 
participation. This has important implications for the just-ness of policy outcomes 
in that the existing discourse poses a barrier for the equitable recognition of and 
participation by, diverse policy formulators. In the sections above, I explained that 
there are significantly limitations in previous research in terms of understanding the 
scale and extent of the effects of market discourse within regulatory procedures. 
This is evident in my documentary evidence and explained by interviewees. 
Revealing energy injustice included directly engaging with the way that the most 
influential way of knowing consumers – as information-poor purchasers - could be 
empirically identified as functioning in policy procedures.  Understanding the 
extent to which energy injustice functions, therefore, needs to begin by 
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acknowledging the complex interactions of institutions and organisations in 
formulating policies for affordable energy in the home.  
My analysis contributes to identifying two shortcomings of previous studies 
regarding energy justice in GB that excluded regulation and the adopted the narrow 
policy frame of ‘fuel poverty’. My empirical findings from the WPR and TPF 
frameworks describe why this shortcoming is so significant to the interaction of 
injustice. Existing assumptions embedded within the technocratic economic 
discourse focus on market interactions and consumers with information deficits. It 
is the implicit assumptions associated with the market discourse that are powerful 
within policy formulation procedures. 
The enduring role of the technocratic economic discourse resulted in a specific 
group of experts being respected over others. What is revealed by the analysis of 
regulatory policy formulation is that this group is distinct not only due to their 
expertise being relevant within the market discourse of the regulator but also that 
they have had the opportunity to build a relationship over time and that they 
provide data that is required by the regulator to monitor the energy market. 
Previous research has not identified the effects of the market discourse in limiting 
the extent to which energy justice can occur. This is because the application of the 
framework as conceptualised in previous research did not move sufficiently beyond 
the role of opportunities to participate in energy policy development. The research 
in this thesis, on the other hand, incorporated the WPR and TPF frameworks to 
reveal the impact of institutionally embedded implicit assumptions that have been 
unidentified in applications of the Energy Justice framework in isolation.  
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Figure 8.2 Energy Injustice Interaction 
This figure explains the interaction between distributional, procedural and 
recognition injustice revealed by the findings of this thesis, adapting Schlosberg 
(2009), as described in Table 8.1 below.  
 
The extent to which this restriction in participation affects injustice can be seen by 
revisiting the interaction of injustice as described by Schlosberg (2009) in cases of 
Environmental Injustice and discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. My analysis using 
the EJF in Chapter 5 explained that a similar interaction could be observed with 
poorly resourced participants who faced barriers, leading to inequitable 
participation (box 9 and box 4 in Figure 8.2). This reinforced the inequitable 
distribution of resources (box 8). Exposing the problem representations embedded 
within these processes and revealing how policy procedures of energy market 
regulation functioned, extends the understanding of injustice further. The way in 
which the findings of this thesis provide evidence for a similar interaction of 
injustice are described in Table 8.1 below.  
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Explanations of energy injustice and their interaction share several characteristics 
with environmental injustice as originally proposed by Schlosberg (2009), with four 
differences. Differences between the interactions of environmental injustice and 
proposed adaptation based on my empirical findings, are explained in italics in 
Figure 8.2 and described in Table 8.1. 
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Table 8.1 Why is there injustice in energy market regulation? 
Why is there injustice? 
 
Environmental 
Injustice  
Schlosberg 
(2009) 
Energy Injustice 
(Blakelock) 
Empirical 
Findings 
(Blakelock) 
Why is there unjust 
access to participatory 
procedures? 
Because lack of 
participation 
sustains lack of 
recognition. 
Because lack of 
participation 
sustains lack of 
recognition. 
Finding 1. 
Participation in 
regulatory 
policy 
formulation 
has few 
consistent 
participant 
organisations 
beyond energy 
firms and the 
statutory 
consumer 
advocate. 
 
 Because those 
who are not 
recognised do 
not have equal 
participatory 
rights. 
Because those who 
are not recognised 
do not have equal 
participatory rights. 
Finding 2. 
Those who do 
not have 
credible 
economic 
expertise do 
not have the 
opportunity to 
become 
respected 
participants 
due to the 
maintenance 
of the 
embedded 
frame.  
 
Why are there 
inequalities of 
recognition? 
Because those 
who are poorly 
resourced face 
barriers to 
participation. 
Because those who 
are poorly resourced 
face barriers to 
participation. 
Finding 3. 
Barrier to 
participation in 
terms of not 
being a 
respected 
participant in 
economic 
frame and few 
resources to 
overcome the 
barriers of 
engaging in 
regulatory 
policy 
formulation. 
 
Table continued on 
page 265 
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Table continued from 
page 264 
 
Why are there 
inequalities of 
recognition? 
 
 
Because those 
who are not 
recognised are 
discriminated 
against in 
allocation of 
and access to 
resources. 
 
 
Because those who 
are not recognised 
are discriminated 
against in allocation 
of and access to 
resources via 
existing and future 
programmes. 
 
 
 
Finding 4. 
Development 
of programmes 
distributing 
resources over 
time places 
expertise of 
programme 
delivery firmly 
within the 
energy market. 
Development 
of programmes 
is iterative and 
relies on this 
expertise. 
 
Why is there 
distributional 
injustice? 
Because those 
who are poorly 
resourced have 
restricted 
access to rights 
of recognition. 
 
Because those who 
are poorly resourced 
are restricted in the 
extent that rights of 
recognition can be 
exercised. 
 
Finding 5. 
Access to 
resources 
constrains 
ability of 
representatives 
to exercise 
rights of 
recognition in 
policy 
formulation. 
 
 Because there 
is uneven 
participation in 
decision 
making 
procedures. 
 
Because there is 
uneven participation 
in policy 
formulation 
procedures. 
Findings 6. 
Participation 
that impacts 
policy outputs 
is 
predominantly 
related to 
participation 
by energy firms 
in specific 
tasks of policy 
formulation. 
 
 
 
The table above describes the way in which the empirical findings of my thesis 
provide the foundation for a modified framework of interacting energy justice. The 
findings provide empirical evidence for the reasoning from environmental justice 
for procedural injustice and one important factor underpinning recognition injustice 
(Schlosberg, 2009). Findings 1 and 2 in Table 8.1 describe the way that the 
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dominance of a technocratic economic discourse limits equal participatory rights. 
This lack of equality in participation is then sustained by the exclusion of some and 
the inclusion of others over time. My findings also align with Schlosberg (2009) in 
that recognition injustice is caused by barriers to participation due to lack of 
resources for those who are not recognised.  
My findings also explain an important element of distributional injustice within 
policy procedures, in addition to its outcomes. There is extensive research 
regarding the distributional injustices related to the outcomes of existing energy 
policies in GB. However, the distributional injustice of the significant inequalities 
that exist in terms of the resources those engaging in formulating policies have 
access to, is not explored (Sovacool et al. 2016; Sovacool and Dworkin 2015a). The 
empirical findings of my thesis suggest that the inequalities in the resources 
available that facilitate engagement with policy formulation, have an important 
implication for the meaningful participation required for just procedures. While 
inadequate access to information and unequal respect are described in procedural 
and recognition justice considerations respectively, the impact of unequal access to 
resources to engage in the first place was absent before my adaptation.  
While the environmental injustice model of interacting injustices are mirrored in 
some findings of this thesis (Findings 1 – 3 in Table 8.1 above), I did not find that 
the full range of causes of environmental injustice could be applied to energy 
injustice in GB without modifications. I therefore I propose three modifications to 
incorporate my findings regarding affordable energy policy formulation in GB. 
The first recommended modification, identified in Table 8.1 with italicised text, 
builds on the findings that only acknowledged experts have the power to allocate 
resources within programmes intended to support distributive justice (Finding 4 in 
Table 8.1 above). Specifically, social schemes associated with fuel poverty relied on 
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expertise in developing and delivering energy efficiency and energy bill discounts 
from energy firms. Energy firms, over time, became the experts in delivering 
programmes that were evaluated by the regulator. This embedded the expert role 
some energy supply firms played. Policy formulators who did not deliver these 
social schemes associated with fuel poverty were not perceived as having this 
expertise and lacked the resources to overcome the barrier that unequal respect in 
these procedures played. This constrained the ability of representatives to 
challenge the regulator and other institutions engaged with regulatory policy 
formulation procedures. The mapping of institutions and organisations connected to 
regulatory policy formulation, presented in section 8.2 above, explains a large 
number of interacting actors and venues. This means that any attempt to challenge 
the status quo may need to be across a large range of different institutions. Even 
where a particular way of knowing is adapted or challenged in one institution, this 
may not be sufficient to effect change. In Chapter 6, analysis of the problem 
representation identified that a transformation in the understanding of consumers 
in vulnerable situations was not adopted universally within Ofgem and was largely 
ignored by other institutions such as the CMA. This constrained recognition justice 
not only in the allocation of and access to resources under existing frameworks of 
affordable energy and fuel poverty policy but embeds and replicates inequalities in 
existing programmes and the development of new ones in the future. This therefore 
requires a modification that takes into account that recognition injustice occurs 
when those who are not recognised are discriminated against in allocation of and 
access to resources via existing and future programmes. 
The second modification proposed to reflect the findings from my analysis (Finding 
3 in Table 8.1) is to incorporate the notion that equal rights of access to policy 
procedures does not necessarily imply equality in exercising those rights. 
Distributional and recognition injustice is sustained because those who are poorly 
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resourced are constrained in the extent to which they can exercise their equal 
rights to access policy procedures. Furthermore, even where a particular way of 
knowing is adapted or challenged in one institution, this may not be sufficient to 
effect change. Furthermore, interviewees, when describing their experiences of 
participation, did not describe equality of respect between difference participants. 
My analysis identified that ex monopoly energy firms were engaged most regularly 
over the period from 2000 to 2016. Interviewees described inequalities in 
engagement with Ofgem and other institutions. Recognition justice was therefore 
directly exacerbated by higher barriers for those whose expertise did not match 
that of the expectations of accepted experts. My empirical analysis of regulatory 
procedures and outputs identifies a consistent pattern of dominance of expertise 
associated with market operations and outcomes.  
Not only were these firms those with the most resources available to commit to the 
procedures of regulatory policy making, their expert status meant that the barriers 
to engage were lower than for firms and other organisations seeking to engage with 
procedures of policy formulation, as they were the acknowledged experts in the 
energy market. The implication of this expert status for recognition injustice is 
inequality of respect for participants in regulatory policy formulation. The ‘experts’ 
did not include a diverse range of organisations that described themselves as 
representatives for people who use energy in their homes. The experience of these 
representatives, as described in interviews and reinforced by documentary analysis, 
suggests that recognition injustice is likely to be sustained while the only 
organisations accepted as credible, reliable experts are those who adopt the 
embedded technocratic economic discourse. The recognition injustice of inequality 
of respect between experts in regulatory policy procedures impacts procedural 
justice. One of the requirements of procedural justice is meaningful participation. 
My analysis of regulatory policy formulation identified significant shortcomings in 
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the extent of meaningful participation, where participants were not recognised as 
experts within the technocratic, economic discourse.  
The third and final adaptation to Schlosberg’s framework indicated by the findings 
of this thesis is the move from decision making procedures to policy formulation 
procedures. This important distinction means incorporating the way in which 
outcomes are shaped by policy outputs which are significantly restricted by the 
embedded implicit assumptions of those with influence over how and why a 
problem is represented and characterised in a particular manner. Incorporating a 
policy formulation focus provides a vital context for the injustices reflected in each 
of the causes of injustice.  It reveals that procedures that result in regulatory policy 
outputs are characterised by an inequality of participation that inequitably 
prioritises participation by energy firms. 
The inequalities in participation between large energy firms and other policy 
formulators was due to three factors. First, my procedures tracing between 2000 
and 2016 show that the energy firms who were ex- monopoly are among the very 
few groups of stakeholders that were engaged with the regulator over the full 
period and had an opportunity to engage and build relationships over time. Second, 
energy firms had more resources to use when engaging in regulatory policy 
formulation. Commonly, these resources relate to specialist teams of regulatory 
experts whose entire professional focus is engagement with regulatory policy 
makers. Third, the policy actors who formulated energy market regulation 
respected the expertise from energy firms. This is not the case for others engaging 
in policy procedures. The result is that those whose expertise was not already 
recognised faced a more significant barrier to engagement with procedures. Not 
only was the extent of meaningful participation limited in individual procedures of 
policy formulation, over time the repeated reinforcement of the market discourse 
excluded some representatives of people who use energy in their homes.  
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Participatory injustice was therefore sustained by exclusion of diverse participants 
through the sustained dominance of the technocratic economic discourse. The 
opportunity to engage with regulatory policy formulation was open to all. However, 
there was not an equality of respect for all participants. This contributed to the 
maintenance of the status quo. Importantly, the maintenance of the status quo 
continued even when there was an attempt at adopting a new characterisation of 
consumers. The engagement of a specific policy to move to a dynamic concept of 
vulnerability, with an explicit commitment to engage with diverse range of 
participants, did not impact regulatory policy formulation between 2000 and 2016. 
8.2.2 Analysing regulatory policy formulation   
 
In this thesis, three frameworks for analysis from three different fields were applied 
to a corpus of documentary evidence and interview transcripts. This approach had 
significant benefits in delivering insights into opaque procedures and in explaining 
the role of implicit assumptions in regulatory policy outcomes, as discussed in 
section 8.1 of this chapter. The specific benefits of combining these frameworks, 
along with the challenges, are described below.   
The most significant challenge of combining the three frameworks was synthesizing 
the differences in theoretical backgrounds that informed the development and 
application of each framework. As described in Chapter 3, both energy justice and 
tools of policy formulation frameworks specifically aim to include research agendas 
with broad epistemological claims that have the potential to be practically 
applicable.  
The “What is the Problem Represented to Be” framework is focused neither on 
providing tight boundaries for research projects nor practical application. Instead, 
analysing problem representations requires directly engaging with a series of 
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complex influences at multiple levels and over time (Bacchi and Bonham 2014). 
Individual researchers seeking to combine frameworks as described in this thesis 
will also have to face this tension. From the perspective of conducting this 
research, I align with many other researchers using a critical policy framework – I 
acknowledge and accept that the probability of challenging an existing inequitable 
discourse is low but I maintain the intention of clearly evidencing the effects of 
such discourses in society.  
A further challenge to note for any future research is the focus of this research on 
GB energy regulation. From this thesis, it is not clear if the application of this 
approach would be similarly accessible in other sectors or countries. The majority 
of the procedures of the application and use of tools of policy formulation in GB 
energy regulation over this period are available due to the legal demands on Ofgem 
as part of the institutional design that seeks accountability for its decision making. 
Further, this research design included a significant commitment to direct 
engagement with those using and engaging with tools of policy formulation. It is not 
clear that this approach could therefore be replicated in all of the areas in which 
energy justice research seeks to reveal injustice.  
Despite these challenges, combining all three frameworks provided important 
benefits in revealing opaque procedures and explaining the role of implicit 
assumptions in regulatory policy outcomes. The previous energy justice framework 
as described in Walker and Day (2012) could not explain why inclusive procedures 
were not impactful on outputs. In particular, why the characterisations of energy 
within the corpus - energy as an essential service or energy as a universal right – 
were consistently absent from the majority of policy formulation outputs i.e. 
regulatory policy. This was due to the absence of engagement with the 
institutionally embedded implicit assumptions of the regulator, in addition to 
Governments.  
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As described in Chapter 2, the energy justice framework as applied in UK fuel 
poverty policy by Walker and Day (2012) was able to identify sources of injustice 
and provide insight into how challenges in meaningful participation impacted due to 
two factors. Firstly, understanding procedural justice requires insight beyond the 
presence or lack of opportunities; the impact of institutionally embedded implicit 
assumptions in shaping how those opportunities relate to the functioning of 
procedures, also needs to be understood. Secondly, revealing recognition injustices 
does not provide sufficient detail regarding the source of inequalities of recognition 
within a particular institution.  
This poses a challenge to the intention behind the recommended practice of 
engaging proactively with decision makers. While the framework provides the 
opportunity to identify injustice, it cannot provide actionable insight regarding 
overcoming it. To be able to build on the injustice revealed by applying the energy 
justice framework, why and how injustice occurs also needs to be understood. 
As described in detail in Chapter 3, the field of Policy Studies can provide the 
frameworks to fill the gaps left by applying the Energy Justice framework in 
isolation. The Tools of Policy Formulation framework (Jordan and Turnpenny, 2015) 
did identify how institutions function in a manner that results in injustice. Further, 
the “What is the Problem Represented to Be” framework (Bacchi 2009a) can 
identify why the policy outputs of an institution may not be just. An important 
benefit of combining frameworks is that while the features and outcomes of 
knowledges can be identified, there is still important insight from considering the 
detail of how functioning of institutions can enforce an existing, embedded 
discourse. Considering the role of problem representations together with the “Tools 
of Policy Formulation” framework opens up consideration of the choices individuals 
have to use outputs of tools or not to do so and the implications of these choices. 
The most contemporary of the three frameworks applied in this thesis, “Tools of 
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Policy Formulation”, traces knowledges embedded within regulators, through the 
application of tools of policy formulation by policy formulators. This provided the 
insight of how the technocratic, economic knowledges were maintained, even when 
tools were used to engage with diverse perspectives.  
Applying the “Tools of Policy Formulation” framework to empirical data identifies 
the manner in which these tools are then used to maintain the market discourse 
and exclude alternatives. Crucially, identifying the way that the procedures used by 
the regulators excluded some ways of engaging with and understanding the 
problems to be tackled by regulatory policy, explains how procedures specifically 
designed to provide the inclusion sought by procedural justice can fail. Revealing 
the effects of tools of policy formulation identifies how specific opportunities 
function to invite alternative perspectives to engage in a manner that could have 
resulted in procedural justice within Ofgem.   
 Without combining the problem representation analysis with the energy justice 
framework, revealing injustice would not have provided an explanation of why 
attempts to implement changes within the regulator faced such significant 
challenges. As described in Chapter 3, the “What is the Problem Represented to Be” 
framework is particularly valuable in combination with the Energy Justice 
framework, due to its clear procedures with regards to engaging with the complex 
historical and societal context, while rigorously evaluating the problematisations 
brought to the analysis by the researcher.  
The effects of the economic frame are explained by analysing the way in which the 
regulator functions, using the frameworks from Policy Studies. The procedures were 
delivered in line with the values of the market that are embedded in specific 
assumptions and logics. Problem representation analysis (Bacchi, 2012) identified 
two effects of the market discourse that impact the way in which procedures 
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function in energy regulation within GB. First, people who use energy are 
associated with a limited concept of people using energy as consumers. The 
concept of consumer can be seen to incorporate a characterisation of consumers in 
terms of deficits. Second, the values related to economic growth within elected 
bodies embed the role of firms through regulatory procedures that portray 
regulation as a risk to profitable businesses. This narrative encouraged the 
retraction of regulation, the “cutting of red tape”, as part of the definition of the 
concept of an effective regulator. The concept of economic regulation was seen to 
incorporate a characterisation of regulatory institutions as a barrier to economic 
growth.  
In Chapter 6, “What is the Problem Represented to Be?” (Bacchi 2009a), the 
analysis identified that this inequality was related to the implicit assumptions 
within economic regulation in GB. The way of understanding regulation and what 
regulation should be was organised in a way that systematically provided 
opportunities to the valued expertise of market participants, those who had 
adopted the market discourse of economic regulation. Those implicit assumptions 
were focused on the importance of economic growth through the maximisation of 
shareholder value and underpinned by a minimum of economic regulation.  
This thesis found that the procedures of regulatory policy formulation provided a 
framework that enabled firms to build long term, mutually respecting relationships 
with the regulator that were not available to others who engaged in regulatory 
policy formulation procedures. Extending research regarding energy justice by 
applying a problem representation analysis has enabled me to give a detailed 
description of how specific characterisations about people and their engagement 
with energy markets originate, are perpetuated and are challenged. It unpacked in 
detail competing ideas about how people who use energy in their home could or 
should be understood within energy regulation in GB. 
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Without identifying and explaining the role of these concepts and characterisations 
within Ofgem, an understanding of procedural and recognition justice is limited. By 
explicitly revealing the concepts and characteristics of information poor consumers 
that are embedded within the regulators’ decision-making, I have provided vital 
insight into why the participation of some policy actors might be limited and why 
detailed insights into diverse energy needs within the regulator do not necessarily 
influence regulatory policy outputs. Without engaging with the role of concepts and 
characterisations enacted through discourse, it is not possible to fully understand 
the way in which Ofgem understood and operationalised its institutional remit. By 
tracing the effects of a technocratic, economic frame, the problem representation 
approach clearly explains the task ahead of those seeking to challenge the existing 
frame and to deliver energy justice. 
Both of these frameworks from Policy Studies incorporated a strong focus on the 
empirical development and delivery of policies, that is, what actually happened, 
without ignoring what did not. They are frameworks that take silences seriously. By 
incorporating specific concerns regarding those who are not represented, the 
knowledges that are not included as credible, by the tools which are not chosen, 
these frameworks provide an important lens with which to examine powerful ideas. 
One of the key insights of discourse studies in all disciplines is that the more 
embedded the idea, the less it is questioned or challenged. The status quo simply 
is. By taking silences seriously, these frameworks provide an excellent foundation 
for empirical evidence of the influence and outcomes of the uncritical adoption of 
such ideas. 
Without tracing the impact of a discourse with its exclusionary effects, injustice 
could be revealed by the energy justice framework and explained by problem 
representation analysis. However, only an examination of the actual applications of 
policy formulation tools within a regulator, reveals the detail of how diverse 
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perspectives are accepted or rejected on the basis of the technocratic economic 
discourse.  
This combination of frameworks enabled me to focus on the implications for the 
embedded implicit assumptions of the regulators to explain how and why it 
functioned in an exclusionary and therefore unjust manner between 2000 and 2016.  
8.2.3 Regulatory legitimacy in GB energy markets 
 
The empirical findings from this thesis demonstrate that with regards to energy 
justice, regulatory policy formulation in GB between 2000 and 2016 failed to meet 
the standards set. As energy justice includes participation in procedures, this poses 
two challenges: first, the traditional definition of ‘capture’ of a regulator and 
second, whether regulatory policy making in this period failed to meet the 
standards described in classical regulatory theory of regulatory legitimacy.  
8.2.3.1 Regulatory Capture 
 
First, my findings challenge the sufficiency of the traditional notion of regulatory 
capture. As described in Chapter 2, regulatory capture is conceptualised as the 
regulator being insufficiently informed or powerful to set an appropriate level of 
return, particularly in monopoly markets (Robinson 2002). The findings from this 
thesis suggest that the existing scope of capture needs to be reconsidered to 
incorporate an understanding of how inequitable recognition of sources of credible, 
reliable expertise can empower firms even when regulatory institutions specifically 
set out to operate inclusive procedures. This thesis found that the procedures of 
regulatory policy formulation provided a framework that enabled firms to build long 
term, mutually respecting relationships with the regulator that were not available 
to others who engaged in regulatory policy formulation procedures. This means that 
firms not only had more resources in the first place to engage with regulatory 
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procedures, they were able to expend fewer of those resources to take up 
opportunities to do so. 
This aligns with the concept of ‘epistemic capture’ – a pattern of interaction that 
enables the influence of energy firms to be more significant in regulatory policy 
formulation, over and above the influence of other policy actors. As described in 
Chapter 2, Sunstein (2014) describes the concept of ‘epistemic capture’ as the 
capture of a particular way of understanding the appropriate scope of regulatory 
policy. Specifically, capture by acceptable, normalised ways of understanding could 
be as a result of regular exposure to the arguments of regulated firms and the 
absence of engagement with alternative views. Sunstein (2014) concludes that 
epistemic capture did not occur at Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
between 2009 and 2012. However, the concept of epistemic capture could offer an 
important insight into the implications of how consumers are known in energy 
market regulation, in relation to the findings under each individual framework and 
their combined insights. 
First, in Chapter 5, the interaction of inequalities and injustices for recognition in 
participatory procedures was described in line with the Energy Justice framework 
(Schlosberg 2009; Walker and Day 2012). These findings revealed that injustices of 
recognition and procedures resulted in the inequitable respect of experts. Where 
expertise was associated with knowledge of customer activity, this placed 
respected experts largely within regulated firms. The implication for capture is that 
in regulatory policy formulation, regulated firms have more opportunities to 
influence the regulator than other participants.   
Using the TPF (Jordan and Turnpenny 2015) framework, Chapter 6 revealed how 
this set of institutional implicit assumptions was embedded and reproduced. 
Findings from this thesis, like Sunstein, suggest that it is not clear that simple 
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exposure over time to many people with a particular point of view in itself leads to 
a particular way of understanding being embedded in a regulatory institution. 
Instead, the findings presented in this chapter suggest that epistemic capture at 
Ofgem between 2000 and 2016 was the capture of the regulator by the embedded 
implicit assumptions of technocratic economic regulation from the liberalization 
policies of economic policy from the 1980’s. This enabled and embedded the 
technocratic economic concept of people as users and consumers of energy being 
defined by deficits in motivation and understanding. As described in Chapter 6, this 
benefitted energy supply companies as it shifted the focus away from the behaviour 
of firms and onto the behaviour of people using energy in their homes. The 
identification of knowledges and their influence, specifically within economic 
regulators, illustrates the need for a significantly expanded concept of regulatory 
capture than the traditional Regulatory Studies focus on the risks of asymmetry 
between regulatory firms and regulators. Instead, a concept of capture is needed 
that adopts the influence of values and associated knowledges. 
In Chapter 7, the WPR (Bacchi 2009a) analysis identified that this inequality was 
related to the embedded implicit assumptions within economic regulation in GB. 
The way of understanding regulation and what regulation should be was organised 
in such a way that it systematically provided opportunities to the valued expertise 
of market participants who had adopted the market logics of economic regulation. 
Those logics were focused on the importance of economic growth, through the 
maximisation of shareholder value and underpinned by a minimum of economic 
regulation. Interviewees explained that despite political and press interest in more 
intervention by the regulator in energy markets, people working at Ofgem 
formulating energy regulation saw their role as that of creating the optimal 
competitive market, not responding to concerns regarding the affordability of 
energy in the home. This insight adds an additional implication for concerns 
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regarding capture: that regulated firms operate within the market logics of 
economic regulation and that therefore, their views are institutionally embedded in 
a manner that other views are not. 
The inequalities of influence between different actors of policy formulation in 
procedures that use participatory tools poses a significant challenge to expectations 
of the accessible regulatory policy formulation. This is because these participatory 
tools specifically aim to provide equal opportunities to diverse organisations with a 
range of perspectives that are proposed to enable regulatory legitimacy.  
8.2.3.2 Regulatory Legitimacy 
 
The inequitable participation identified by my analysis poses a second challenge to 
regulatory legitimacy as outlined in classical regulatory theory. As described in 
Chapter 2, classical regulatory theory states that a regulator needs to meet five 
criteria to be able to exercise its powers legitimately: support from legislative 
authority; procedures of accountability; relevant expertise; efficiency within the 
organisation; and procedures that are fair, accessible and open (Baldwin et al. 
2010b, 2012; Ogus 2004; Robinson 2007). 
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Table 8.2 Regulatory Legitimacy Findings  
 
Legitimacy Claim 
(Baldwin et al. 
2012) 
Problem for Legitimacy 
Claim 
(Baldwin et al. 2012) 
Empirical Findings 
(Blakelock) 
 
Legislative mandate 
– authorization from 
elected legislature 
Parliament’s intention may 
be vague; Objectives for 
regulation many be in 
tension; Discretion of how to 
deliver objectives is with 
regulator not legislators. 
  
Delivery of objectives 
reflects the embedded 
implicit assumptions of 
the regulator, Ofgem, 
and focuses on consumer 
engagement in 
competitive markets 
despite a large range of 
objectives from its 
legislative mandate. 
Efficiency – 
legislative mandate 
is being 
implemented 
efficiently or 
efficient results are 
produced 
Problems similar to 
legislative mandate claims 
above; measuring efficiency 
is difficult*; Question of 
whether trade-offs between 
accountability and efficiency 
are acceptable may be 
ignored. 
Limited engagement by 
Ofgem with 
distributional questions 
in policy formulation 
tasks. As noted above, 
legislative mandate 
covers a range of 
different areas.  
Accountability – 
regulator is 
accountable to and 
controlled by 
democratically 
elected 
representatives 
Question of whether trade-
offs between accountability 
and efficiency are 
acceptable*; Body holding 
regulator to account may not 
be properly representative*. 
Accountability 
mechanism of 
parliamentary Select 
Committees significantly 
limited in terms of 
challenging the choice 
of regulatory policies 
enacted.  
Due process - 
procedures are 
sufficiently fair, 
accessible and open 
to expose the 
regulator to 
democratic 
influence 
 
Question of who should be 
allowed to participate; 
Question of whether there is 
an acceptable trade-off 
between openness and 
accessibility and efficiency; 
Question of whether the 
mode of participation is 
appropriate. 
Transparent and open 
procedures providing 
opportunities to all 
provide evidence in 
policy formulation tasks. 
However, limitations of 
whether these 
procedures are 
sufficiently fair due to 
the significant 
inequalities of resources 
between organisations. 
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Table 8.2 continued 
Legitimacy Claim 
(Baldwin et al. 
2012) 
Problem for Legitimacy 
Claim 
(Baldwin et al. 2012) 
Empirical Findings 
(Blakelock) 
 
Expertise – 
Specialized 
knowledge, skills 
and expertise have 
been applied in 
judgements made 
 
Public is poorly positioned to 
evaluate expertise with 
difficulty to explain 
reasoning to lay persons. 
 
Distrust of experts*. 
 
Public desire for openness 
and accountability*. 
 
Any conflicts between 
expertise undermines public 
confidence*. 
 
Public scepticism of 
neutrality of regulatory 
decisions where certain 
parties gain advantages. This 
may relate to public 
perception of experts as 
self-interested or captured*. 
 
Specialized knowledge, 
skills and expertise are a 
significant perceived 
barrier of some third 
sector organisations in 
engaging with the 
regulator. 
 
Further, it is not clear 
that the institutional 
assumptions related to 
the technocratic, 
economic embedded 
implicit assumptions 
recognise expertise 
equally.  
 
*no empirical findings relating to this problem for legitimacy in this thesis 
 
 
As described in Table 8.2 above, the first criterion of regulatory legitimacy is a 
legislative mandate from a democratically elected legislature. As described in 
Chapter 4, the powers of the energy regulator, Ofgem, were based on the Utilities 
Act of 2000 which itself was based on the Gas Act of 1979 and the Electricity Act of 
1989. However, the legislative mandate of Ofgem did not remain identical over the 
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period researched. Instead, there were modifications through the Energy Acts of 
2004, 2008, 2010 and 2013. Previous research identified that these regular changes 
meant that there was inconsistency in the expectations of the energy regulator 
(Deller et al. 2018). In my empirical work, I identify challenges to the legislative 
mandate criterion that mirror the problem that the discretion of how to deliver 
objectives lies with the regulator rather than legislatures. In this case, far from 
Parliament’s intentions being vague, concerns regarding the regulators’ 
performance in delivering against their legislative mandate was specifically 
articulated in the House of Commons. Further, new legislation was introduced 
which expressly aimed at steering the regulator. However, despite pressure from 
Governments and Parliament, regulatory policy formulation maintained continuity 
in terms of existing embedded implicit assumptions of the economic efficiency of 
competitive markets.  
The second criterion of regulatory legitimacy is efficiency. There can be two 
different considerations of efficiency: the efficient delivery of the legislative 
mandate and efficient outcomes. As discussed above, my empirical findings identify 
shortcomings in the delivery of Ofgem against its legislative mandate in terms of 
how democratically elected representatives sought to direct its activities between 
2000 and 2016. In terms of efficiency outcomes, classical regulatory theory explains 
that a focus on efficient outcomes may in itself be problematic for regulatory 
legitimacy, as efficiency concerns do not always incorporate distributional 
outcomes of efficient procedures or efficient resource allocation (Baldwin et al. 
2012; Robinson 2007). The findings from Chapter 5 regarding the distributional 
outcomes, explain that the Competition and Markets Authority found that some of 
the most vulnerable groups in society were least likely to access the most 
affordable energy through the energy market. This was not articulated specifically 
as a problem for regulatory legitimacy between 2000 and 2016. However, as 
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discussed in Chapter 4, the outcome of unaffordable energy for vulnerable groups 
was articulated as a failure of existing energy market design and as pointing to the 
need for new statutory powers for the regulator (Energy Act 2010 and 2013).  
The third criteria is accountability of the regulator to democratically elected 
representatives. The accountability mechanism that existed for the regulator, 
Ofgem, was accountability to Parliament. As described in Chapter 4, this included 
ad hoc investigations by the House of Commons and House of Lords Committees into 
topics that were impacted by Ofgem’s work and regular scrutiny by the House of 
Commons committee, linked to the Government department responsible for energy.  
interviewees who participated in my research described significant limitations in 
the theoretical link between appearance before a Committee in Parliament and 
accountability. Analysis using the “What is the Problem Represented to Be?” 
(Bacchi) in Chapter 5 explains how between 2000 and 2016 parliamentary 
accountability procedures failed to challenge the market discourse. My findings 
challenge the theoretical expectations of a key foundation of regulatory legitimacy: 
rather than providing an opportunity for the representation of the problem to be 
challenged, the parliamentary accountability procedures of select committee 
scrutiny provided an opportunity for the defence and dissemination of Ofgem’s 
existing problematization. Committees provided an additional opportunity for 
people perceived as experts to reiterate their views and embed and reinforce 
existing implicit assumptions.  
The fourth criteria of regulatory legitimacy relates to due process. Due processes 
are procedures that are sufficiently fair, accessible and open, so as to ensure that 
regulators respond to democratic influences. One problem that these criteria could 
pose to regulatory legitimacy is in terms of who should be allowed to participate. In 
the majority of regulatory policy formulation procedures between 2000 and 2016, 
my findings suggest that procedures were open to all. Regulatory policy formulation 
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usually includes the transparent publication of intentions and the opportunity to 
provide insight and evidence when assessing options for regulatory policies. 
However, the Tools of Policy Formulation analysis presented in Chapter 7 identified 
that there were informal venues of regulatory policy formulation that were not 
open to all. Firstly, the trade association Energy UK co-ordinated the creation of 
codes of practice with its members (energy suppliers) to develop co-regulation on 
the topics of face to face energy sales, disconnection of domestic energy supply and 
the presentation of bills. Second, parliamentary committee hearings did not provide 
the equal ability for all to provide their input into scrutinising the regulator. This 
limits the extent to which the procedures can be argued to have been sufficiently 
fair, as regulatory policy formulation procedures were not systematically open to 
all.  
In discussing due process as a criteria for regulatory legitimacy, Baldwin et al. 
(2012) note that considerations of these rarely specify who participates or in what 
manner participants engage with a regulator. In GB regulatory policy formulation, 
the rules of participation are set out in guidance from the UK Government and 
specify a public consultation procedures. However, this thesis has explained that 
the consultation procedures between 2000 and 2016 were not equally accessible 
and open to different groups. The findings of this thesis would suggest that a crucial 
problem for legitimacy relates to the third problem of regulatory legitimacy 
identified by Baldwin et al. (2012) related to due process: whether the mode of 
participation is appropriate. Due process includes the requirement that procedures 
are sufficiently fair. While there is not yet a strict definition of ‘sufficiently fair’ 
due process in Regulatory Studies, the inequality of access to and influence on, 
regulatory policy formulation identified by my analysis suggests that energy supply 
firms had an unfair advantage when engaging in the tasks of regulatory policy 
formulation.  
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The fifth and final criteria of regulatory legitimacy is that specialized knowledge, 
skills and expertise should be used in judgements made by the regulator. In 
problems of legitimacy described by Baldwin et al (2012), the difficult is that 
presenting justifications to the public could be a challenge due to the lack of 
expertise that lay people have. While public opinion was not measured as part of 
this research, academic research that did so within the period 2000 to 2016, shows 
that there was public concern regarding the trustworthiness of energy supply 
companies in the energy market (Becker et al. 2019; Demski et al. 2017; Pidgeon 
2012). The fact that energy supply companies have been shown as facing lower 
barriers when engaging with the regulator than other policy actors, may therefore 
be a challenge to regulatory legitimacy.  
The concept of expert judgement that is discussed in classical regulation theory is 
based on the framework of economic regulation which argues that expertise in a 
specific market needs to operate separately from non-experts – whether the non-
experts be in government or lay members of the public. This expertise is valuable in 
that it enables engagement with the complex interaction of factors required to 
develop and deliver a competitive market without regulatory failure (Baldwin et al. 
2010a; Littlechild 2002; Ogus 2004). It is only after implementation (ex – post) that 
judgements need to be justified to non-experts outside of the regulatory system, in 
procedures that relate to accountability.  
The findings of my research suggest that this framework that separates regulatory 
expertise was not operating in Ofgem between 2000 and 2016. Instead, procedures 
of engagement with a range of organisations with diverse expertise were invited to 
participate in regulatory policy formulation. First, as described in Chapter 4, from 
2009, regulatory policy formulation related to consumers in vulnerable 
circumstances by specifically articulating the need for experts in the lived 
experience of vulnerable consumers within regulatory policy formulation. Second, 
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from 2007, lay members of the public were directly engaged with commenting on 
regulatory policies as they were formulated through deliberative workshops. Public 
distrust of regulatory expertise in the scenarios considered as potentially 
problematic by Baldwin et al. (2012) did not, therefore, arise. 
It is instead the interaction of expertise and due process that my analysis identifies 
as most problematic for regulatory legitimacy. Distinct from the conceptualization 
of expertise and the problems envisaged by Baldwin et al. (2012), my findings 
explain a distinct challenge to legitimacy posed by concerns regarding fairness. 
Rather than the acceptability of judgements related to expertise within the 
regulator, my findings suggest that it is the narrow definition of expertise used in 
the characterisation and representation of problems within Ofgem between 2000 
and 2016 that resulted in challenged regulatory legitimacy.  
Ultimately, legitimacy of regulatory policy between 2000 and 2016 was most 
significantly undermined by significant failures in three of the criteria of regulatory 
legitimacy: due procedures, efficient execution of the legislative mandate and 
accountability. Failures in the accountability procedures and the execution of 
powers under the legislative mandate insufficiently challenged the discourse of 
competitive market implementation despite its evident harms ex post. Further, 
efforts to introduce regulatory policy that would address market failures that were 
harming people who need energy did not meet the criteria of due process and this 
also undermined regulatory legitimacy. The analysis presented in this thesis 
suggests that the existing theory of regulatory legitimacy requires adaptation in 
order to reflect the interaction of due process with other criteria, particularly 
expertise. 
Figure 8.3 proposes an interaction that captures the important ways in which 
energy injustice might occur. While this prototype is only based on the findings in 
 
 
287 
 
this thesis and the context of previous literature, it does propose how empirical 
research might go about responding to considering the impact of “sufficiently fair” 
due process, with a virtuous circle of regulatory legitimacy based on equal respect 
for the expertise of all those who engage in regulatory policy formulation. 
Regulatory legitimacy respects due process by providing sufficiently fair access to, 
and scrutiny of, regulatory policies. On the basis of my findings, I argue that 
regulatory legitimacy should rely on three criteria of equally respected experts and 
open, equally accessible procedures in Figure 8.3 below.  
 
Figure 8.3 Fair Due Process for Regulatory Legitimacy 
 
 
These three criteria are supported by at least three procedures that enable 
participation in regulatory policy formulation and scrutiny of regulatory policy and 
their outcomes via accountability procedures. For fair due process, equally 
respected experts must be able to play a dual role. First, they must be able to be 
participants in tasks of regulatory policy formulation in equally accessible 
procedures. Secondly, they must be able to use open procedures to scrutinise 
regulatory policies via accountability procedures. Crucially, my findings show that 
the cycle must be completed with a procedure that enables concerns to be raised 
regarding the outcomes of existing policies. Outcomes that raise concerns could 
then be corrected with new regulatory policies which would be formulated using 
equally accessible procedures.  
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8.3 Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the findings of this thesis when combining insights from 
all of the preceding chapters. I have suggested that the findings from “What is the 
Problem Represented to Be” and the “Tools of Policy Formulation” frameworks 
provide important insights with regards to explaining how and why inequalities arise 
in terms of opportunities to participate in regulatory policy formulation. Rather 
than equal participants providing insights from diverse perspectives, energy supply 
firms and their representative trade body have a unique ability to formulate policy 
both as a venue of policy formulation and as respected experts in energy markets, 
within a technocratic, economic frame of regulation. As described in section 8.2.2, 
frameworks from policy studies can play an important role in revealing important 
features of energy policy development(Bacchi 2009b; Jordan and Turnpenny 2015). 
For energy justice scholarship, these findings highlight the importance of engaging 
directly with the institutional embedded implicit assumptions that operate within a 
given policy area. Specifically, adopting a perspective of policy formulation with 
the intention to reveal implicit problem characterisation and representations, 
ensures that energy justice scholarship can reveal important details of why and how 
procedural and recognition injustice operate. My findings were focused on the 
period 2000 to 2016 in Great Britain where strict rules of transparent and open 
policy procedures were met. Evidence in the corpus revealed a large number of 
opportunities, with interviewees from the regulator describing significant efforts to 
secure insights from a diverse range of organisations and directly from members of 
the public. My proposed adaptations to the energy justice interaction framework in 
Figure 8.2 explained why these efforts were insufficient: ultimately, the high 
number of opportunities to engage were not sufficient to balance the existing 
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embedded implicit assumptions of the regulator that were maintained throughout 
the period. 
My findings pose an important challenge to those concerned about regulatory 
legitimacy. In evaluating the relevance of expertise within policy procedures, 
concerns regarding the role of different organisations in regulatory policymaking 
should not be at the expense of paying attention to the inequalities of respect that 
influence the perceptions of regulators. Failing to take account of inequalities in 
respect given to different actors leads to the important influence of regulated firms 
in their interactions with the regulator being overlooked. In section 8.2.3 I 
explained that Sunstein’s concept of ‘epistemic capture’ could be central in 
understanding the role of the perceived respect of the evidence provided by firms 
due to the expertise of firms in the economic, technocratic way of knowing 
consumers (Sunstein, 2014). This inequality poses an important challenge to 
considerations of both energy justice and regulatory legitimacy. 
Together, my findings provide a lens through which I show that policy engagement 
opportunities within procedures alone are woefully inadequate at enabling the 
equitable participation required by both energy justice and regulatory legitimacy. 
This is a result of three overarching features of regulatory procedures: a focus on 
formulating policies without considering the problem that policies aim to solve; a 
hesitancy to introduce rules beyond information provision; and an inequality of 
respect for diverse experts. I explore the implications of these findings for future 
academic research, and regulatory policy in practice, in my final concluding 
chapter.  
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Chapter 9 – Conclusion 
 
9.1 Inequitable Regulatory Procedures 
 
In this thesis I set out to answer the question “What role did knowledges of 
‘consumers’ play in the formulation of GB energy market regulation between 2000 
and 2016?” I found that the knowledges that influenced the formulation of GB 
energy policy and regulation between 2000 and 2016 consistently maintained a 
technocratic, economic concept of decision optimizing purchasers. This particular 
concept of ‘consumers’ as decision optimizing purchasers was challenged within 
multiple procedures during the period studied. However, the role of a consumer 
engaging in the energy market is firmly entrenched in the wider set of expectations 
relating to the operation of an energy market. The possible benefits of the 
competitive retail energy market as a framework have been prioritised in Great 
Britain to such an extent that the outcomes of market arrangements – lack of 
affordable energy to some of the most vulnerable people in society – were not 
accepted as sufficiently relevant to the formulation of regulatory policy to reject 
market arrangements. 
The analysis undertaken using the Energy Justice framework - presented in Chapter 
5 - identified that regulatory policy in GB between 2000 and 2016 was problematic 
in terms of distributional, recognition and procedural inequalities. First, policies 
formulated within the regulator can be seen to have had distributional outcomes. 
Specifically, the market design choices of Ofgem resulted in the cheapest energy 
tariffs being accessed the least by some of the most vulnerable people in society 
(Competition and Markets Authority 2016b, 2019). On a smaller scale, the regulator 
had a distributional impact in the allocation of part of the Warm Home Discount 
scheme. Second, policies formulated within the regulator inequitably recognised 
different types of expertise regarding knowledge and understanding about people 
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who use energy in their homes. Thirdly, policy procedures within the regulator 
exacerbated inequalities in resource and limit participation by third sector 
organisations with specialist knowledge about the impact of unaffordable energy 
services.  
Chapter 6 showed that expertise that focused on market outcomes failed to respond 
to concerns about unaffordable energy and yet this focus was systematically 
embedded and reproduced in regulatory policy formulation between 2000 and 2016. 
Analysis using the Tools of Policy Formulation framework (Jordan and Turnpenny 
2015) identified three important features of regulatory policy formulation in the 
period studied. Firstly, it identified that regulatory policy formulation tasks were 
undertaken outside of the regulator. While some of these tasks were acknowledged 
policy formulation sharing across Government and the regulators, some were 
conducted within the unelected trade body for energy suppliers, Energy UK. 
Second, participatory tools were specifically selected by the regulator between 
2007 and 2014 with the articulated aim of incorporating diverse views on regulatory 
policy formulation. This attempt was clearly described by interviewees from within 
the regulator as important work that sought to broaden knowledges of consumers. 
However, these attempts failed to translate into regulatory policies that impacted 
the operation of the energy market. The reason for this is identified by the third 
feature, revealed by identifying the tasks of policy formulation and how they 
interacted with the participatory tools. Participatory tools – consultations and 
deliberative focus groups – were predominantly used to assess options that had 
already been selected by the regulator in line with its traditional problem 
representation.  
The reasons why the role of expert knowledges associated with consumers in the 
market played such a significant role in Ofgem between 2000 and 2016 were 
identified by using the “What is the Problem Represented to be” (Bacchi 2012) 
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analytic framework. As described in Chapter 7, ‘consumers’ were presented as the 
problem in the energy market as they failed to engage with energy suppliers to 
identify and secure a good deal. This representation of the problem was challenged 
in some regulatory policy formulation. While an accountability procedure 
technically existed via Select Committees to critique this problem representation, 
interviewees explain that the procedures in securing scrutiny that resulted in any 
challenge to the existing assumptions of the regulator were inadequate. Thus, any 
challenge to the embedded knowledges of economic regulation and predicted 
benefits of competitive retail energy markets were rejected.  
9.2 Recommendations 
 
9.2.1 Future Research  
 
Research from three multi-disciplinary fields provided a fruitful foundation for this 
analysis of regulatory policies in the energy markets of Great Britain between 2000 
and 2016. In this thesis, I have identified two important features of GB policy- 
making that can also provide a foundation for future research. First, I have 
explained the complex interactions of organisations and institutions in formulating 
the policies that can impact the affordability of energy in people’s homes in Great 
Britain. Second, I have identified the effects of market development discourse in 
energy regulation on regulatory legitimacy. I outline the implications of these for 
future research in turn in the subsections below. 
9.2.1.1 Complexity of policy formulation system 
 
My findings will support future research that specifically focuses on energy within 
Great Britain. The mapping of the energy policy system in Chapter 8 can provide a 
starting point for identifying the range of organisations involved in energy policy 
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development, not just regarding energy in the United Kingdom but other nations 
moving towards the regulated, competitive market British Model, mandated by the 
EU’s Third Energy Package. While the specific organisations and institutions may 
change, under the market model, the spaces (or Boxes in Figure 8.2 in Chapter 8) 
will be broadly consistent. 
My findings suggest that this will be particularly relevant if mapping is undertaken 
with regards to participation in energy policy development. There are implications 
for two of the foundation literatures for my thesis: Energy Studies and Energy 
Justice. As I described in Chapter 2, the field of Energy Studies provides case 
studies of energy policy-making in Great Britain that consider how policy makers’ 
knowledges of people who use energy in their home, has impacted those policies 
(Cotton and Devine-Wright 2012; Shove and Walker 2014). This research from the 
energy system beyond the markets argues that the way that people are 
conceptualised within policy-making procedures shapes the way that citizens are 
able to participate in energy policy decision-making and, ultimately, the design and 
implementation of those policies (Devine-Wright 2005b; Guy and Shove 2014; 
Pallett and Chilvers 2013). Energy Justice research describes how the design and 
implementation of energy policies has important ethical consequences and that in 
the processes followed by decision makers, it is vital to understand the extent to 
which policies can be described as ‘just’, particularly in the contemporary era of 
energy system transformation. My mapping suggests that a concern with 
participation in energy policy should incorporate a similar activity to understand 
the complexities of interacting policy spaces. This would enable the identification 
of participation opportunities on the one hand but also the barriers to participation 
on the other. The link between the complex interactions of different opportunities 
to engage in affordable energy policymaking is central, as it enables the insight that 
an ever-increasing number of opportunities might, in itself, be a barrier for 
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equitable participation. This insight could then be combined with my proposed 
adapted framework for understanding the interaction of inequitable processes 
(Figure 8.2.). Both the initial mapping and the identification of its implications for 
injustice in terms of procedure and recognition, would benefit future research that 
considers the implications for participation in institutional contexts.   
9.2.1.2 Regulatory Legitimacy  
 
Regulatory studies provide insight into the intended consequences of institutional 
frameworks and probable opportunities and challenges that arise from particular 
types of institutional design (Baldwin et al. 2012; Koop and Lodge 2017). 
Specifically, they highlight how economic regulators, independent from 
democratically elected governments, could be held accountable and make claims to 
regulatory legitimacy. My findings regarding inequitable access and its connection 
to an economic discourse that focuses on market development has implications for 
future research regarding participation in regulatory processes and concepts of 
legitimacy.  
First, my findings regarding the inequitable recognition within, and resources to 
engage with, Ofgem between 2000 and 2016 make an important contribution to the 
emerging research agenda within Regulatory Studies described in Chapter 2. This 
academic research has begun to explore  how citizens might engage with economic 
regulators (Haber and Heims 2016; Heims and Lodge 2018). However, the focus has 
hitherto been on the provision of opportunities to engage in existing procedures. 
The influence of embedded values within regulatory agencies identified by my 
analysis also provides a further challenge to Regulatory Studies in its identification 
of the way in which problem representations impact participation in regulatory 
procedures. My analysis explains the shortcomings of research that limits its focus 
to opportunities to engage. It demonstrates that provision of opportunities may be 
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the foundation for participation but can have limited influence on outcomes. 
Provision of insight from participatory procedures does not guarantee its use by 
those working within a regulator. In order to engage with the breadth of ways in 
which knowledges play a role in economic regulators, Regulatory Studies scholars 
must begin to consider problem representations. Without this understanding, the 
operations of institutions that claim to provide accountability and legitimacy will be 
limited. This significantly limits any understanding of the operation of institutional 
frameworks that claim to provide accountability and to ensure the legitimacy of 
regulatory decision-making.  
Second, my findings trace the impact of problem representations within energy 
regulation and how they create barriers to incorporating public concerns regarding 
affordability of energy and fair outcomes. My findings highlight the importance of 
silences of economic regulation. In addition to the theoretical consideration of 
regulatory legitimacy, participation in regulatory procedures by future research also 
needs to understand the venues of regulatory policy formulation and the boundaries 
of the procedures, i.e. what is unsayable in regulatory venues. In Chapter 4, I 
described the formal role of Governments in formulating an important GB sphere of 
affordable energy policy: fuel poverty policy. Technically, the legal responsibility 
between the Governments of Great Britain and the regulator were clearly defined 
and separated – democratically elected Governments formulate fuel poverty policy. 
Responsibilities that formally sat with Governments included defining who should be 
assisted by fuel poverty policy and experiences of fuel poverty policy 
implementation that were used to develop each iteration of fuel poverty schemes. 
The regulator, Ofgem, had a limited formal role: to monitor the delivery of the 
schemes as defined by elected Governments and to consider fuel poverty in their 
own, separate, policymaking.  
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However, in Chapter 5 I explained that Ofgem had a previously unidentified role in 
fuel poverty policy. Specifically, it provided a venue for the targeting of part of the 
Warm Home Discount and therefore had distributional outcomes.  Policy 
formulation regarding fuel poverty policy schemes that were hosted by Ofgem was a 
between 2000 and 2016, continue to date. Future research considering these fuel 
poverty schemes should therefore consider the probable implications for the 
regulatory embedded implicit assumptions present in energy market regulators and 
enduring policy formulation; particular attention needs to be paid to the ‘silences’ 
within regulatory policy formulation.  
Interviewees who explained the concern regarding the capacity of regulatory policy 
formulation to incorporate inequality, fear or death as a result of unaffordable 
energy. Indeed, they described the way in which regulatory policy formulation 
refused to engage with these issues when considering evidence. This meant that 
any individual choosing to engage with policy formulators beyond the credible 
realm of technocratic economic expertise, took the risk of being excluded. When 
prompted to expand on this silence, interviewees described elements of lived 
experience of energy services use that were not discussed in policy formulation yet 
made up a significant part of public concerns. Future research regarding 
participation in regulatory policy formulation needs to be able to identify these 
‘silences’ within regulation.  
While death as a result of unaffordable energy and inequality in society were 
excluded from regulatory policy formulation, references was made to them in 
broader energy policy (National Energy Action 2019). However, one significant 
silence was the emotion of fear as a response to energy firms. The reasoning behind 
this silence may be partially understood by examining certain studies in the Energy 
Studies literature. According to these studies, in energy infrastructure policy-
making, credibility is linked with rationality and a lack of emotion, with procedures 
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explicitly designed to retain a focus on the technical and emotional responses 
excluded or actively belittled (Lange 2002; Pedwell 2014; Wetherell 2012). 
Empirical studies that have engaged with the role of emotions in infrastructure 
policy decision making show that consultative procedures can be destabilised by 
attempts to retain a focus on technical and engineering knowledges (Cass and 
Walker 2009). A focus on such technical knowledges characterises concerns linked 
to emotions as irrelevant articles in need to actively manage emotions out of 
procedures and procedures of decision making (Cass and Walker 2009; Koenig-Lewis 
et al. 2014; Pedwell 2014; Wetherell 2012). However, the role of emotions in terms 
of affordable energy has been explained in contemporary fuel poverty research 
(Deller et al. 2018; Longhurst and Hargreaves 2019) and therefore emotion is 
therefore particularly important silence when considering regulation and 
unaffordable energy prices in future research. 
9.2.2 Policy Recommendations 
 
This thesis has analysed a single regulator of a single market in GB in a defined 
period. However, this was a period of significant change in expectations in terms of 
the scope of regulatory policy in a market that delivers an essential-for-life service. 
When looking at the practical implications for policy, I have therefore focused on 
the contemporary work of the regulator, Ofgem, the ongoing policy debates in GB 
regarding regulation and considered the implications for a further essential-for-life 
regulated sector – water. 
One of the opening concerns of this thesis was the gulf in expectations of regulation 
between the public and their elected representatives and Ofgem. While there was a 
narrative that the regulator should actively engage with concerns regarding 
affordability and the unfair outcomes of the energy market, Ofgem maintained a 
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focus on implementing competitive markets. Indeed, there was an active argument 
that ‘fairness’ should not be the focus of an economic regulator - though few 
reiterated the claim by the father of the energy market in GB, Stephen Littlechild, 
that the word “fair” should be banned under the roof of the regulator’s offices 
(Littlechild 2019) . 
After the end of the period considered in this thesis, Ofgem saw a further change to 
its statutory powers as a result of legislation: that it should implement a temporary 
price cap. This transformation of regulatory policy to an interventionist one engages 
directly with the narrative of fair prices: the consultation for a future energy retail 
market stated “We will therefore continue to work with industry to explore 
protections where necessary to ensure that all customers are able to secure a fair 
deal” (Ofgem and the Department of Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy 2019). 
Further, Ofgem’s recent Consumer Vulnerability Strategy saw fairness literally 
placed at the centre (Ofgem 2019a). 
Figure 9.1 The five themes of Ofgem’s CVS2025 (A Consumer Vulnerability 
Strategy for 2020 - 2025)  
(Ofgem 2019a, p.15) 
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However, it is not clear that the engagement with the narrative of fair outcomes 
will result in any change in the role of diverse knowledges within the economic 
regulator, Ofgem, or the logic that underpins their regulatory policy formulation 
procedures. Notably, the flagship policy areas of the Future Energy Retail Market 
and the Consumer Vulnerability Strategy both note the end of price cap legislation 
in 2023 and the benefits of competitive markets. Affordable energy is still 
predominantly articulated as an outcome of market engagement in regulatory 
policies. For example, the future retail market consultation states that “Well 
regulated, efficient markets are the best driver of results for consumers” and goes 
on to conclude that “In the long-term, the market design must ensure that all 
consumers are able to reap the benefits of competition and get a fair deal for their 
energy” p. 11 (Ofgem and the Department of Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy 
2019). It is not therefore necessarily the case that the temporary policy of price 
regulation or the engagement with the terminology of fairness, will drive outcomes 
that benefit consumers any more than in the period 2000 to 2016. The continuity of 
a technocratic, economic discourse over the period analysed, despite some 
individual policies in the period analysed, suggests that price regulation may not be 
sufficient to challenge the enduring commitment of the logic that competitive 
markets will deliver optimal outcomes and should therefore be pursued 
independent of the fatal implications of a lack of access to affordable energy that 
have been its consequences in the past.  
The embedded nature of the focus on competition has, for example, been 
maintained in the adoption of a new tool within Ofgem after 2016. In a report 
called “Pioneering policy making” Ofgem explained that regulatory activities have 
adopted a further tool of formulation that enables interaction with the public – user 
experience (UX) designers embedded in regulatory policy teams (Ofgem 2019c). 
Following a pilot in 2019, regulatory analysts work in teams that include individuals 
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who test assumptions and proposals with consumers. However, it is notable that the 
publications so far show that this approach has not expanded the ability of the 
public to decide on the topics under discussion. Instead, the focus on switching 
energy supplier has been maintained (Ofgem 2019c).  
The implications of the logic of competitive markets for essential-for-life services is 
no longer limited to energy. In 2014, the Coalition Government passed legislation to 
begin a period of market reform in water, stating that “The government is taking 
action to open up markets to new entrants, driving greater competition and 
providing consumers with more choice” and that the government will work with 
water companies to begin the transition to retail competition before the end of this 
Parliament” (House of Commons Library 2016b). A water market is only currently in 
place for non-domestic consumers in England, with no existing announcement to 
use the legislative framework to introduce retail competition for a domestic water 
market at the time of writing. However, the government has used an identical logic 
of efficient market outcomes in its legislative reforms as was visible in the energy 
market (House of Commons Library 2016c).  
This logic is also visible in the current investigation into the scope of economic 
regulation undertaken by the National Infrastructure Commission, scoped to “assess 
what changes might be necessary to the existing regulatory framework to facilitate 
future investment needs, promote greater competition and increase innovation, and 
meet the needs of both current and future consumers” (National Infrastructure 
Committee 2019a, p. 2). There is, however, an opportunity for a discussion to be 
had, regarding the needs of “existing and future consumers” to include affordable 
access to essential-for-life services in the National Infrastructure Commission. While 
the Government launch of the commission focused on competition and innovation, 
the NIC itself notes that the review “should take account of distributional issues, 
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consumer disengagement and the scale and quality of consumer protections across 
the regulated sectors” (National Infrastructure Committee 2019b, p. 4). 
To avoid repeating the shortcomings of regulatory policy formulation identified in 
this thesis between 2000 and 2016, I recommend extended accountability 
procedures and novel training for policy formulators to provide new opportunities 
that ensure that alternative views have an influence on regulatory policy 
formulation. I describe seven policy recommendations in Table 9.1 These are 
relevant within energy regulation, future considerations regarding the water market 
and actions taken following the National Infrastructure Committee report.  
Table 9.1 Policy Recommendations 
 
 Finding Recommendation  
 
1 Regulatory policy has a 
distributional impact 
Include distributional implications of 
regulatory policies in annual report 
rather than rely on rare market 
investigations by Competition and 
Markets Authority 
 
2 Accessible procedures to 
engage with all tasks of 
policy formulation were 
not enabled between 2000 
and 2016 
 
Transparent publication of all 
opportunities to participate in tasks 
of policy formulation using plain 
English 
 
3 Access to opportunities to 
participate is mediated by 
resources and perceived 
‘insider’ status 
Resources to be made available for 
small organisations to engage directly 
with regulatory policy formulators to 
meet the number of opportunities 
energy supply firms secure to engage 
with procedures 
 
4 Informal venues of policy 
formulation were used 
between 2000 and 2016 
 
The energy supply firm trade body is 
not an accessible or accountable 
body and Ofgem should cease 
delegating policy formulation tasks to 
it immediately 
 
5 Understanding of 
implications for 
inequalities within 
institutions is needed 
 
Training for regulatory policy 
formulators to include unconscious 
bias training similar to that 
undertaken in recruitment training 
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The first recommendation relates to one of the important trends of regulatory 
policy formulation between 2000 and 2016 at Ofgem: the introduction of new 
powers regarding fuel poverty amelioration schemes and new evidence from the 
CMA Investigation about the distributional impact of the energy market 
(Competition and Markets Authority 2016b, 2019; Ofgem 2015e). This is because the 
distributional impact of regulatory decision-making has been exposed as significant 
and enduring. This understanding means that policy makers cannot rely on an 
investigation by the CMA to track the distributional impact of regulatory 
policymaking on people who use energy in their homes. Instead, the impact of 
energy regulation on people in their homes should be a central pillar of transparent 
regulatory reporting to provide the foundation for procedures of accountability of 
Ofgem. 
The second recommendation results from the finding that Ofgem followed guidance 
to deliver transparency in the development of regulatory policies but failed to 
provide accessible policy formulation. Interviewees painted a complex range of 
interacting institutions and organisations that impacted policies and therefore 
influenced the affordability of energy in GB. An annual report should therefore be 
published explaining the range of opportunities to engage and the formal and 
informal role of the organisations in policy development tasks. Further, this report 
should be in plain English to ensure visibility of where decisions impacting the 
allocation of costs in the energy system will be made. It should include a list of all 
of the opportunities available to engage with regulatory policy formulation, 
including clarity on the type of formulation task (line 2 in Table 9.1). Small 
organisations with limited funds could then decide whether to assist in option 
assessment under an existing problem representation or campaign on any need to 
incorporate other problem characterisations into procedures or reviews.  
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A third recommendation that would also provide more equitable access to 
regulatory policy formulation is to focus on resource inequality of participants (line 
3 in Table 9.2.2). This includes traditional abilities to finance a team of regulatory 
experts but also the access to the status of ‘expert’. Ensuring equitable resource 
availability would be a significant challenge so funding for small organisations to 
engage directly with regulatory policy may be required in order to provide insight 
from other actors besides energy firms. An alternative to making access to 
regulatory procedures more equitable would be to cap the resources available to 
large energy firms to participate, thereby closing the resource gap between 
different stakeholders engaged in procedures of regulatory policy formulation.  
The fourth recommendation that could also ensure more equitable procedures of 
policy formulation is reviewing the use of the industry body as an informal venue of 
policy formulation. There is no democratic mandate for any policy formulation tasks 
to be undertaken by the industry body representing supply firms. The procedures 
are not transparent or accountable. Ofgem should therefore cease the practice of 
informal delegation of policy formulation to the industry body.  
Each of the proceeding recommendations (line 1 to 3 in Table 9.1) provide broader 
opportunities for the engagement of new, diverse perspectives for regulatory policy 
formulation. However, it is important to note that a core contribution of this thesis 
is that opportunities alone are insufficient to deliver equal participation in energy 
policymaking. Enabling equality in society and support the respected expertise of 
all is unlikely to begin within the energy regulator of GB. However, a small first 
step towards inclusive policy-making procedures would be to ensure that energy 
regulators themselves are trained to consider diverse views. This should begin with 
the urgent training of all staff with unconscious bias training, to provide individuals 
with the tools to challenge biases they observe in their own work and the work of 
their peers.  
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9.3 Chapter Conclusion  
 
At the start of this thesis, I described a gulf in expectations of the policy response 
to the often-fatal consequences of a lack of access to affordable energy between 
2000 and 2016. Though the outcomes of the energy market on people who could not 
afford energy were widely acknowledged by the public to be unfair, considerations 
of fairness were not accepted as relevant in the institutional framework that 
governed much of the affordable energy landscape: that of economic regulation 
(Littlechild, 2019). I argued that understanding this gap in expectations between 
the public and their elected representatives on the one hand and those who made 
and implemented the policies on the other, plays an important role in 
understanding the policy choices made between 2000 and 2016. Further, to 
understand the policy choices made, one has to understand how people who use 
energy in their homes were understood within procedures of policy. Due to the 
policy of competitive retail energy markets, this predominantly meant 
understanding how ‘consumers’ were known within the procedures of regulatory 
policy formulation between 2000 and 2016. 
Where possible, insights into the identification of the way that regulatory policy is 
made -in terms of the how and the why –have been discussed by combining 
frameworks founded on literatures from multiple disciplines. Against the standards 
set by Energy Justice research – meaningful participation of respected diverse 
representatives – Ofgem failed significantly between 2000 and 2016. It is not clear 
that the regulatory policy has resulted in any significant changes since 2016, 
despite continuing public concern in response and despite the efforts of charities to 
highlight the extent of the implications of unaffordable energy on cold weather 
deaths (National Energy Action 2019). 
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The role of the regulator in delivering more affordable energy through lower energy 
prices has changed significantly since the final year of analysis. Since 2016, 
legislation which introduced a temporary price cap enforced direct regulation in a 
manner not seen since 2002 (Ofgem 2019b). Furthermore, the definition of 
vulnerability introduced in 2013 is central to proposed reforms on the practices of 
energy suppliers that include proposed new rules to stop harmful practices by 
energy suppliers (Ofgem 2019d). Ofgem has introduced a new tool to engage 
directly with the public which could, in time, consider topics beyond switching 
(Ofgem 2019c). These changes could enable a novel consideration of fairness and 
equitable outcomes in energy regulation. Whether this comes to pass will be an 
important question for future research.  
  
 
 
306 
 
Appendix 
 
Table A1 EJF Coding Frame 
 
As described in section 3.2, the EJF has three pillars: distributional, recognition and 
procedural justice (Jenkins et al. 2014). Procedural justice for affordable energy in 
the UK has been further broken down into three elements: transparent processes, 
meaningful participation and redress (Simcock et al. 2016a; Walker and Day 2012). I 
therefore began with the coding categories in the left-hand column. In response to 
the themes that emerged while engaging with the data, I developed the nested 
codes in the right-hand column.   
 
Coding Category Nested Codes 
Distributional Justice Cross subsidy 
Recognition Justice I Vulnerable Consumers 
Recognition Justice II Consumers in vulnerable circumstances  
Procedural Justice I Transparency Publication of processes 
Procedural justice II Redress Redress process occurred 
Procedural justice III Meaningful 
Participation 
Participation opportunity  
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Table A2 WPR Coding Frame  
 
As described in Table 3.2.1, the WPR framework poses a series of questions (Bacchi 
2009b). Each of these was a coding category. Many of the questions did not result in 
any further nested codes. However, where themes emerged that separated out 
differences, I used nested codes (listed in the right-hand column) to review 
evidence from the full corpus.  
 
Coding Category Nested Codes 
What is the policy or regulation proposing? n/a 
What presuppositions or assumptions 
underlie this representation of the ‘problem’ 
I 
Consumer behaviour 
What presuppositions or assumptions 
underlie this representation of the ‘problem’ 
II 
Energy supply firm decision maker 
What presuppositions or assumptions 
underlie this representation of the ‘problem’ 
III 
Regulatory knowledge 
What practices and processes have led to 
this representation? 
n/a 
What concepts, categories and 
characteristics are used I 
 
Consumer 
What concepts and categories are used and 
characteristics II 
Vulnerable Consumer I 
What concepts and categories are used and 
characteristics III 
Vulnerable Consumer II 
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What concepts and categories and 
characteristics are used IV 
PPM Consumer 
What concepts and categories are used and 
characteristics V 
Fuel Poor 
Can the ‘problem’ be thought about 
differently (has it been thought about 
differently historically?) 
n/a 
What discursive effects are produced by this 
representation of the ‘problem’? 
n/a 
What lived effects are produced by this 
representation of the ‘problem’? 
n/a 
How/where has this representation of the 
‘problem’ been produced, disseminated and 
defended? 
Consultation Responses 
How/where has this representation of the 
‘problem’ been produced, disseminated and 
defended? 
Deliberative focus groups 
How/where has this representation of the 
‘problem’ been produced, disseminated and 
defended? 
Select Committees 
 
How/where has this representation of the 
‘problem’ been produced, disseminated and 
defended? 
Competition and Markets Authority 
How could it be questioned disrupted, 
reproblematised and replaced? 
Select Committee 
How could it be questioned disrupted, 
reproblematised and replaced? 
Legislative Act 
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Where are the silences? 
 
Fear as lived experience of energy 
Where are the silences? 
 
Death as outcome of lack of affordable 
energy 
Where are the silences? 
 
Inequality as context of affordability of 
energy 
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Table A3 TPF Coding Frame 
 
As described in Table 3.2.2, the TPF framework poses a series of questions to 
answer (Jordan and Turnpenny 2015). Many of the questions are stand-alone codes 
that could be used without adaptation. However, different tools used in policy 
formulation led to further nested codes along with their respective values. I 
therefore introduced further nested codes as listed in the right-hand column in the 
table below. 
Coding Category Nested Codes 
Why do these actors develop and/or 
promote particular tools?  
n/a 
Why were particular tools developed, when 
and by whom I 
Deliberative focus groups 
Why were particular tools developed, when 
and by whom II 
Indicators 
Why were particular tools developed, when 
and by whom III 
Stakeholder consultations 
What values do the tools embody  
 
 
Legitimacy through due process 
What values do the tools embody  
 
Legitimacy through expertise 
How do tools and venues intersect in 
practice? 
 
Participation – Deliberative Focus Group 
How do tools and venues intersect in 
practice? 
 
Participation – Stakeholder Consultation 
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How do tools and venues intersect in 
practice? 
 
Indicator – Market Monitoring 
How do tools and venues intersect in 
practice? 
 
Indicator Social Obligations Reporting 
What factors enable capacities related to 
this tool? 
n/a 
What factors constrain capacities related to 
this tool? 
 
n/a 
What substantive effects does the tool 
generate when employed? 
n/a 
What procedural effects does the tool 
generate when they are employed? 
n/a 
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Table A4 Keywords 
 
I used the keywords listed below to identify documents to include in the corpus. 
Each document was published within the time period 2000 to 2016 and is listed in 
full in the bibliography. I opened each document in the Ofgem archive and 
conducted a key word search to review for inclusion. I used the same keywords to 
include a document from the CMA market investigation (Competition and Markets 
Authority 2014, 2016b).  
 
Regulatory Archive 
(Ofgem; Competition and Markets 
Authority) 
Parliamentary Archives 
(UK House of Parliament, Scottish 
Parliament, Welsh Assembly) 
Domestic Energy 
Residential Energy bill 
Market Electricity bill 
Supply Gas bill 
Consumer Energy price 
Redress Electricity price 
Energy bill Gas price 
Fuel Poverty Fuel Poverty 
Vulnerable Ofgem 
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Table A5 Topic Guide 
 
Interviewees were approached online with a list of three topics to discuss. These 
are listed as themes in the table below. These themes emerged from connections to 
the three frameworks outlined in section 3.2. I included in my topic guide an 
opening question for each theme to prompt me, if needed, to move between 
themes. I also included a column to capture specific prompts that I could include if 
there was a question related to an item of interest in the documentary analysis.  
Theme Framework questions Opening questions Specifics 
prompts 
 
 
How organisations go 
about engaging with 
institutions and 
organisations who 
develop and deliver 
energy policy  
 
Procedural Justice 
 
Who are the actors participating in policy 
formulation? 
 
What factors shape the selection and 
deployment of particular tools in particular 
policy venues? 
 
Your organisation 
and your role 
 
Individual to 
interviewee 
 
Any distinctions 
between contexts in 
the development of 
affordable warmth 
policy e.g. devolved 
administrations 
 
Procedural justice 
 
Distribution justice 
 
What capacities do actors have to employ 
specific policy formulation tools? 
 
Are there factors which may enable or 
constrain the availability of these capacities? 
 
How/where has this representation of the 
‘problem’ been produced disseminated and 
defended? 
 
You have described 
a range of 
interacting 
organisations, are 
there any 
differences / which 
of the differences 
that you described 
would you say were 
most significant? 
Individual to 
interviewee 
 
How are the people 
who use energy to heat 
and light their homes 
understood by 
organisations and 
institutions that 
develop policy 
 
Recognition justice 
 
What concepts and categories are used? 
 
 
How could it be questioned, disrupted 
replaced or reproblematised? 
 
What practices and processes have led to 
this representation? 
 
Can / has the ‘problem’ be thought about 
differently? 
 
What types of 
evidence do you use 
/ see used to 
understand people 
who use energy to 
heat and light their 
homes? 
Individual to 
interviewee 
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Table A6 Political context of energy market regulation for domestic 
consumers 2000 – 2016 
 
This table lists in full the events that made up the political events included in the 
process tracing presented in Figure 4.1 
 
 
Acts 
  
A1 Utilities Act (Anon 2000a) 
A2 Warms Homes and Energy Conservation Act (Anon 2000b) 
A3 Energy Act 2004 (Anon 2004) 
A4 Energy Act 2008 (Anon 2008) 
A5 Energy Act 2010 (Anon 2010) 
A6 Energy Act 2011 (Anon 2011) 
A7 Energy Act 2013 (Anon 2013) 
Elections 
E1 Election – Labour majority, 2001 
E2 Election – Labour majority, 2005 
E3 Election – Conservative / Liberal Democrat Coalition, 2010 
E4 Election – Conservative Majority, 2015 
Committee Reports 
C1 Gas Prices 
(House of Commons Select Committee on Trade and 
Industry 2001) 
C2 Fuel Poverty 
(House of Commons Select Committee on Trade and 
Industry 2002) 
C3 
Debt and 
Disconnection 
(House of Commons Select Committee on Trade and 
Industry 2005) 
C4 
Ofgem's Social 
Action Plan and 
Household 
Energy Efficiency 
(National Audit Office 2004) 
C5 
UK Economic 
Regulators 
 
 
(House of Lords Select Committee on Regulators 2007) 
 
 
C6 
Energy prices, 
fuel poverty and 
Ofgem 
(House of Commons Select Committee on  Business and 
Enterprise 2008) 
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C7 
Pensioner 
Poverty 
 
 
(House of Commons Select Committee on Work and 
Pensions 2008) 
 
 
C8 
Ofgem's Retail 
Market Review 
(House of Commons Select Committee on Energy and 
Climate Change 2011) 
C9 
Consumer 
Engagement with 
Energy Markets 
 
(House of Commons Select Committee on Energy and 
Climate Change 2012) 
C10 
Energy Prices, 
Profits and 
Poverty 
(House of Commons Select Committee on Energy and 
Climate Change 2013) 
C11 
Energy price 
comparison 
websites 
(House of Commons Select Committee on Energy and 
Climate Change 2015) 
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Table A7 Energy market regulatory activities in GB 2000 – 2016 
This table lists in full the documents that made up the process tracing presented in 
Figure 4.1 
 
Regulatory Publications  
Social Action Plan: Improving Social Obligations Proposals Document (Ofgem 2000a) 
The Social Action Plan (Ofgem 2000b) 
Review of domestic gas and electricity competition and supply price regulation (Ofgem 2001b) 
Making Markets work for customers – Vol I, II & III 
(Ofgem 2003a, 
2003b, 2003c) 
Domestic Market Retail Market Report (Ofgem 2004b) 
Social Action Strategy, Ofgem (Ofgem 2005e) 
Energy Supply Probe Call for Evidence (Ofgem 2008b) 
Energy Supply Probe Initial Findings Report (Ofgem 2008d) 
Addressing Unfair Price Differentials (Ofgem 2009g) 
Energy Supply Probe Remedies (Ofgem 2009f) 
Addressing Undue Discrimination, Impact Assessment (Ofgem 2009b) 
Addressing undue discrimination (Ofgem 2009a) 
Debt and Disconnection Review (Ofgem 2008a) 
Review of Protection for Vulnerable Customers from Disconnection (Ofgem 2009h) 
Notification of modifications of standard licence condition 27.11 (Ofgem 2010c) 
Retail Market Review  (Ofgem 2010f) 
The Retail Market Review – Draft Impact Assessment for the updated domestic 
proposals 
(Ofgem 2011j) 
Retail Market Review Findings and initial proposals (Ofgem 2011h) 
The Standardised Element of Standard Tariffs under the Retail Market Review (Ofgem 2012o) 
The Retail Market Review - Updated Domestic Proposals (Ofgem 2012k) 
Draft domestic licence conditions for the Retail Market Review proposals (Ofgem 2012e) 
The Retail Market Review - Final Domestic Proposals (Ofgem 2012i) 
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The Retail Market Review – Final Impact Assessment for domestic proposals (Ofgem 2013j) 
The Retail Market Review – Implementation of Simpler Tariff Choices and Clearer 
Information 
(Ofgem 2013k) 
Implementation of the domestic Standards of Conduct – decision to make licence 
modifications 
(Ofgem 2013g) 
Proposal for a new Consumer Vulnerability Strategy (Ofgem 2012h) 
Energy Affordability: helping develop Ofgem’s Vulnerable Consumers Strategy (Ofgem 2012f) 
Consumer Vulnerability Strategy (Ofgem 2013c) 
State of the Market Report 
(Ofgem, Office of 
Fair Trading and 
Competition and 
Markets Authority 
2014) 
Consultation on a proposal to make a market investigation reference in respect 
of the supply and acquisition of energy in Great Britain 
(Ofgem 2014a) 
Issues Statement 
(Competition and 
Markets Authority 
2014) 
Updated issues statement 
(Competition and 
Markets Authority 
2015b) 
Provisional decision on remedies report 
(Competition and 
Markets Authority 
2016c) 
Final Report  
(Competition and 
Markets Authority 
2016b) 
The Energy Market Investigation (Database) Order 2016 
(Competition and 
Markets Authority 
2016d) 
The Energy Market Investigation (Restricted Meters) Order 2016 
(Competition and 
Markets Authority 
2016e) 
The Energy Market Investigation (Prepayment Charge Restriction) Order 2016 
(Competition and 
Markets Authority 
2016f) 
Proposals to improve outcomes for prepayment customers (Ofgem 2015i) 
Prepayment meters installed under warrant: final proposals (Ofgem 2016f) 
The Future of Market Regulation (Ofgem 2016j) 
Ofgem’s Regulatory Stances (Ofgem 2016e) 
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Table A8 Organisation and Institution name changes 2000 to 2016  
 
Between 2000 and 2016, organisations and institutions involved in regulatory policy 
formulation changed names despite maintaining a consistent role. I list these below 
for reference. 
Government Department responsible for energy regulation 
 
• Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) – 2000 - 2007 
• Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (DBERR) – 2007 - 
2008 
• Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) – 2008 - 2016  
• BEIS – 2016 to date 
 
Consumer Advocate in energy markets 
 
• Energywatch - 2000 – 2008 
• Consumer Focus - 2008 – 2010 
• Consumer Futures - 2010 – 2014 
• Citizens Advice - 2014 to date 
 
Industry body representing energy supply firms 
 
• Energy Retailers Association (ERA) – 2003 - 2012 
• Energy UK (EUK) – 2012 to date 
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